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Abstract
This thesis studies the Spanish social protection system from a gender perspective. 
The period investigated is between 1978 and 1996. Two primary research questions were 
found relevant for the investigation. First, to what extent- and in which way- does the social 
protection system in Spain affect gender differently in terms of outcomes for men and 
women? Second, what are the potential factors that explain that degree of gender difference? 
Two main issues were set up as hypotheses for the analysis o f this second research question: 
the extent to which gender equality issues are targeted as objectives in the social protection 
policy process; and, whether women are represented as social actors in the policy-making 
process.
Using secondary statistical data and legislative documents on entitlement rules, the 
first question is analysed by assessing men and women’s access to benefits in cash 
administered by the public social security system. Additional consideration is given to social 
services in kind and the income tax system as complementary sources of social provision. 
Elite interviews and documentary material are undertaken as primary research material for 
the second part o f the investigation. The focus has been on patterns o f neo-corporatism, 
policy access of women’s policy machinery, gender equality strategies and the discourses and 
ideologies that embrace social actors’ intervention in the policy process.
The thesis starts with an overview of the existing literature. The first chapters 
concentrate on theoretical issues and background of the country under study. Chapter 4 
locates several ways in which gender stratification is sustained in the social protection 
system. It will be shown how labour market segregation and specific configuration of benefits 
through entitlement rules explain two-track access to social security for men and women. 
Chapter 5, chapter 6, and chapter 7 have identified internal and external factors conditioning 
the inclusion of gender equality as a relevant issue in the policy process and the intervention 
of women’s policy machinery in policy-making. Bringing together the findings from the 
previous chapters, chapter 8 identifies a distinctive gender and welfare model common to the 
countries of southern Europe, outlining challenges for the future of their social protection 
systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Building on the insights provided by feminist analysis of welfare states, this 
thesis, 'the Gender Dimension o f the Spanish Social Protection System ’ is an attempt to 
contribute in two ways to the debate on the relationship between gender and the welfare 
state. On the one hand, by focusing on one country, in this case Spain, which has not been 
the subject of much attention by scholars in the field. On the other hand, by offering an 
explanation of the relations between gender and welfare systems based on political 
constructions of notions of social citizenship.
Considering the first aspect, I argue that the Spanish experience with its particular 
features associated with specific patterns of socio-economic and political development, 
and as a welfare state that is approaching EU medium size, will contribute to a wider 
understanding of gender and welfare state relationships. Spain has very frequently been 
neglected in comparative studies of European welfare states. The literature on 
comparative social policy, either from mainstream or feminist analyses, has in general 
failed to include systematically, the countries of southern Europe1 within the analysis. 
The late development of the welfare state in Spain and the lack of comparative statistical 
data are the two main factors that explain Spain’s absence from much comparative 
research. However, the existence of convergent elements with other welfare state models 
and divergent components resulting from the concrete historical evolution, produce 
specific patterns of welfare protection and, eventually, important repercussions on gender 
relations.
Thus, the present study joins an increasing field of research interested in knowing 
whether the countries of southern Europe can be considered as a distinct regime-type in 
its own. In this sense, and as Lijphart (1971) argues, certain types of case studies, such as 
this one, are closely connected with the comparative perspective and might indeed be 
considered as implicit parts of the comparative method.
1 Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are the countries commonly included within the southern or 
Mediterranean model.
In relation to the second aspect, focusing attention on the political factor of the 
gender dimension of a social protection system is, in my judgement, important for several 
reasons. Gender stratification patterns can be more or less predicted according to the type 
of welfare regime. Of course, the degree and the form in which welfare states are 
gendered matter. A welfare system relying primarily on income maintenance schemes 
will, in principle, have stronger connotations for gender relations than a more universal 
rights-based welfare. In this sense, part o f my concern is to find out how differences 
between men and women exist in the provision of benefits. However, a comprehensive 
understanding of how such a reality has been shaped, can only be reached by studying the 
concrete way in which the policy process has been configured.
Moreover, by concentrating on the political aspect, offering an explanation that 
situates gender relations and women’s politics centre stage, the study aims not only to 
describe a concrete sphere of intervention but also to discover the relevance o f gender 
roles in the organisation of society. Evoking the principle policies affect politics and 
politics affect policies, the starting point o f this research is that the way policies are 
organised is crucial for the empowering of groups traditionally excluded from politics and 
at the same time, the possibility to act politically challenges existing definitions of 
policies.
Context o f the research
In the most recent years, welfare state research from a gender perspective has been 
expanding in different directions. What used to be two unconnected spheres of 
investigation, are now complementary and interactive perspectives. Gender is at present 
recognised as a fundamental variable in shaping welfare states. Equally, welfare states are 
seen not just as determining class but also gender relations.
The best example of this shift can be found when comparing the first introductory 
paragraphs of two influential volumes in the field, edited by Diane Sainsbury.
“Fem inist and mainstream theorizing and scholarship on welfare states have been  
informed by different research paradigms resulting in distinctive contributions. A s yet 
there has been little effort to confront the two perspectives and to com bine their insights 
in analysing welfare states and gender. Instead mainstream researchers have largely 
ignored fem inist scholarship, and feminists have primarily engaged in a critique o f
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mainstream analysis. The result has been an intellectual impasse which needs to be 
overcome” (Sainsbury 1994: 1).
Five years later, Sainsbury writes:
“The past decade has witnessed an exciting reorientation in welfare state research. The 
gender division of welfare, previously a neglected area of study in comparative 
scholarship, is currently a major focus of interest. Crucial to this reorientation have been 
feminist critiques of mainstream analyses of welfare states and the combining of feminist 
and comparative perspectives” (Sainsbury 1999: 1).
Gendering Welfare States by Sainsbury (1994) was a crucial book in my early 
approach to this field. Almost all the contributions in that volume appear at different 
moments in the theoretical framework of chapter 2. In the latest volume, Gender and 
Welfare State Regimes (Sainsbury 1999), the progress made from the point o f view of 
assessing welfare variations from a gender perspective is phenomenal, although Spain is 
absent in the cross-national comparisons. Moreover, the political dimension that received 
little attention in previous studies of gender and welfare states is now integrated along 
with other indicators of variation of the relationship between gender and welfare states.
Thus, the research builds on an analytical framework where gender and welfare 
states are seen in a dynamic relationship. Scott (1986) theorised gender as a constitutive 
element o f social relationships and as a primary way of signifying relationships o f power. 
By the former she understands the effect gender has in social and institutional 
relationships and by the latter, the implication of gender in the construction o f power 
itself. Both dimensions of the term recognise that gender relations in society define 
structures of differentiation, inequalities and hierarchies (Orloff 1996). In this sense, 
gender is not only a descriptive variable, i.e. differences between men and women. It is 
also an analytical category. Gender relations conceptualise the very reality of welfare 
states.2
Conversely, the welfare state is understood as being not only a consequence of 
economic, political and ideological systems, but also as a powerful institution that in 
certain ways gives shape to economic, ideological and political realities. It is considered 
not only as a mechanism that intervenes and corrects the structure of inequality o f a
2 Jones and Jonasdottir (1988: 9) defined gender as an analytical category in political theory as “to perceive 
gender as at least an analytically distinct set o f social relationships”.
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society, but also as a stratification system on its own, an active force on the structure of 
social relations (Esping-Andersen 1990).
From this perspective, the relation between women and the welfare state is not 
established as linear but as relational. A linear understanding would consider that 
women’s dependency is either strengthened or weakened by the welfare state. A relational 
vision emphasises its contradictory nature. That is, what several feminists have called 
“paradoxical”. Women’s position within the private sphere plays a very important role in 
the configuration of the welfare state and also, the welfare state becomes crucial in the 
achievement of gender equality in society. As Pateman (1989) puts it, the paradox 
consists of the patriarchal structure of the welfare state as an institution that has also 
brought challenges to patriarchal power and helped to provide a basis for women’s 
autonomous citizenship.
Therefore, when assessing the gender dimension o f welfare states, this 
antagonistic relationship will have to be estimated. Doing so implies looking at the 
importance of the family along with the state and the market in welfare provision, in order 
to assess the role of women as providers of welfare. Also, the existence of policies that 
allow women’s emancipation from family obligations needs to be appraised, such as 
policies that encourage women’s entrance to the labour market and policies that promote 
the combination of paid and unpaid work.
However, I do not assume that either categories or gender roles are internally 
homogeneous. Central variables such as race, age, education, income or labour market 
position produce divisions within each gender category. Women’s interests might 
therefore differ. Policies designed for women’s roles as mothers and carers do not affect 
all women, for the simple reason that not all women are mothers or carers. Even for those 
that do perform that role, such policies only affect them in a concrete period o f their life 
cycle. Similarly, not all men benefit equally from welfare provision given on a 
breadwinner basis, simply because not all men are breadwinners.
Nonetheless, as far as these categories and roles are socially constructed and tend 
to explain the norm, there is a case for analysis. As several authors have outlined, the 
recognition of multiple identities between men and women does not undermine the case 
for political agency. As Lister (1997: 77) points out, “the recognition that the category 
woman is not unitary does not render it meaningless”.
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Why the social protection system?
Initially, social protection schemes were developed to secure the income of 
individual workers facing risks of the life cycle. These risks were mainly produced as a 
consequence of temporary or permanent spells from the labour market. The first attempts 
of social insurance programmes were motivated by the productivity needs of 
industrialised economies and by the interests of the political elite to preserve the 
hierarchical structures of society by containing potential social conflicts. Thus, strictly 
speaking, when these insurance schemes were first created, issues such as equality or 
redistribution between members of society, were not relevant objectives. On the contrary, 
to secure individual income in the face of certain risks often meant to secure differences 
in the life standards of individuals acquired through lifetime.
The development of social protection schemes under democratic political systems 
soon gave a social dimension to these individual rights. As Baldwin (1990) argues, 
concerns that had formerly been individual became political in its broad sense. Thus, for 
instance, a pension given by the state to someone reaching old age embodies certain 
definitions of citizenship in its social expression. Is the pension given on the basis o f age? 
Is it tied to the labour market? Is it on the basis of family dependency?
This understanding of social protection benefits as citizenship rights becomes very 
relevant from a gender point of view. Although citizenship has been claimed as being 
neutral, feminism has identified its gender constructions. Rights and obligations embody 
strong assumptions about gender roles. The very definition of risk can have a gender bias 
since social protection schemes represent an area of intervention where the family, the 
market, and the state are strongly inter-linked. When the state decides not to intervene in 
certain circumstances, the decision hits on families as primary institutions of social 
protection. Also, by identifying certain risks and not others, benefits rely on assumptions 
of what social needs are identified as such, and how they should be protected. Thus, the 
way in which social protection systems define risk and the social bases o f the protection 
offered, i.e. understandings of equality and solidarity, not only reflects, but also shapes, 
structures of power and social relations. As Baldwin (1990) notes:
“Social insurance has not been a neutral system. It has not just mirrored econom ic and 
demographic changes or the evolution o f  risk incidence. Rather, it has directly affected
12
how such developm ents have been perceived and received in the political forum (1990:
16).
Thus, policy outcomes and structures need to be acknowledged when studying the 
gender dimension of a social protection system. The analysis of policy outcomes will 
focus on patterns o f stratification in the performance o f men and women in the different 
protection schemes. The study of the policy structure will have to pay attention to how 
risks and needs are defined and how they are articulated in the actual configuration of 
benefits. As far as political options and decisions condition final outcomes, the 
configuration of the policy process has an impact on gender relations.
The assessment of the policy process will have to assume its multidimensionality. 
That means that there are several factors intervening in the policy process and that they all 
influence the final outcomes. Every single factor that intervenes in the course of action of 
policy formation has a specific responsibility for the final outcome. Therefore, the actors 
that intervene in the process, the problems they aim to solve, the identification of 
alternatives and the viability of possible solutions, are all issues that need to be identified.
Thus, the interest from a gender perspective is to develop a focus o f analysis that 
underlines the role of women and the relevance of gender related topics, all the way 
through the agenda setting to the implementation stage.
Research questions and methods
I set out the research proposal by suggesting two main questions: To what extent -  
and in which way- does the social protection system in Spain affect gender differently in 
terms of outcomes for men and women?; and what are the potential factors that explain 
that degree o f gender difference?
The first research question tries to distinguish patterns of dissimilarities in the way 
men and women are protected and the principles by which men and women’s social rights 
are defined -whether they are obtained on a labour market basis, through family 
dependency or individually-. More specifically, I attempt to find out to what extent 
gender differentiation is affected by processes of claiming benefits and by the existence of 
different programmes for family and labour market needs, and redistributive mechanisms.
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Social protection in Spain is organised around four main entities. The National 
Social Security Office {Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social), which manages the 
following cash benefits: old-age pensions, permanent invalidity, widow’s pensions, 
orphan’s benefits, benefits for family members, cash benefits in the case of temporary 
incapacity for work, family benefits and maternity allowances; the National Health Office 
{Instituto Nacional de Salud) gives benefits both to the persons insured in the sickness 
insurance funds and to the population which have no resources. Agencies of the 
autonomous devolved regions have transferred powers. The National Employment Office 
{Instituto Nacional de Empleo, INEM) manages all unemployment benefits and here also 
bodies of the autonomous regions have transferred powers. Finally, the National 
Migration and Social Services Office {Instituto de Migraciones y  Servicios Sociales, 
IMSERSO) is in charge of migration affairs and controls additional social services and 
also administers social assistance allowances and non-contributory benefits. While the 
National Health Office is subordinate to the Ministry o f Health, all the other bodies are 
subordinate to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
In the present study, the empirical analysis will concentrate on all the cash 
benefits and allowances included under the National Social Security Office. The reasons 
for choosing social insurance as the main focus o f attention lie in the fact that in Spain, 
and contrary to other social protection schemes such as the British, social protection is 
overwhelmingly supported by social insurance, and other non-insurance programmes 
have less importance. The ‘Minimum Income Scheme’ (RMI), for example, which 
provides income support for people in extreme situation o f need is completely 
decentralised and independent of the national social security system. The analysis of these 
latter benefits, therefore, goes beyond the time and space constraints o f this research. 
Similarly, unemployment protection, although it is a key element o f social protection, will 
not be analysed in the empirical research since it is not included within the rest of cash 
benefits in terms of data collection, administration and regulation.
The public system of cash benefits o f the social security system (pensiones publicas de la Seguridad 
Social) consists o f a main contributory scheme and a secondary non-contributory means-tested scheme. 
Invalidity, retirement and surviving are the main risks covered under the social security system. Widow 
benefits are the most important category of survivors although orphan and ‘in family favour’ also exists as 
two minor categories (see appendix 3). The contribution-related statutory social insurance has a general 
scheme (employees in industry and in the service sector) and special schemes for the workers o f other 
economic sectors (agrarian workers, self-employed, seamen, miners, and domestic service). While the 
specific contribution requirements of the special regimes will be analysed (chapter 4) the data on cash 
benefits gathers all regimes. Data by regimes and by sex could not be obtained from the official statistics of 
the Ministry of Labour and the INSS.
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However, apart from cash benefits, discussion also extends to social services in 
kind and the income tax system as two elements that are complementary to cash benefits 
(see chapter 4).
The assessment of the social security benefits is carried out by looking at the 
criteria for initial and ongoing eligibility, accessibility and generosity of all benefit types 
and how it affects men and women differently.
Considering the eligibility criteria, attention will be paid to the conditions of 
entitlement for each benefit, such as the contribution record (number o f years of 
contribution required to qualify for the benefit) and the requirements of affiliation to 
social security (earning requirements, and other restrictions such as age, marital status, 
years o f marital cohabitation, etc.). Women’s access to benefits will be analysed by 
looking at the percentage distribution by age and sex in all contributory and non­
contributory benefits.
The ‘generosity aspect’ will be studied by comparing average and minimum 
benefits between men and women in different age groups. The analysis will also 
concentrate on the redistributive mechanisms that operate within the social protection 
system, such as minimum pension policy, occupational schemes and the calculation used 
for initial pensions. These mechanisms are very relevant for women since they are created 
to break the relationship between contributions paid and the income received from the 
benefit.
The differences between individual and derived benefits, that is, benefits given on 
an individual basis or benefits given on a family basis, in terms of access and quality of 
the benefits, will also be studied since it largely explains patterns o f gender stratification.
The treatment given to maternity and family benefits will also be explored to 
determine to what extent the system of protection allows for a real reconciliation between 
paid and unpaid work. Social services and taxation also need attention as complements to 
cash transfers. Changes produced over time will be assessed.
The second, and larger in scope, research question concentrates on the policy 
process. In particular, the analysis will focus on the key social security reforms. Using the 
outcomes of the previous question contextually, two main issues are set up as hypotheses 
for this part o f the analysis:
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- To what extent are women represented by social actors or as social actors in 
the policy-making process?
- How are gender equality issues targeted as objectives in the social protection 
policy process?
The study of social actors’ participation in the policy process implies the analysis 
of the balance of power between the actors involved in the decision-making processes. In 
this investigation I will pay attention to patterns of neo-corporatism in the development of 
policy-making. By corporatism I refer to the description o f a union system between the 
state administration, employers associations and trade unions for taking on 
responsibilities of economic and socio-political issues (Fuhrer 1996). I argue that how 
these power relations are configured has an impact on policy-making and on women’s 
policy intervention and structures of gender roles.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the two main trade unions at 
national level - UGT and CC.OO.- (departments of institutional relations) will be 
analysed as the two main social actors intervening in the policy process. The Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, through the INSS (National Institute for Social Security) has 
been responsible for the policy-making and implementation of social security reform. 
Trade unions are legitimised social actors in social security reforms although not always 
intervening directly.4
The analysis of the policy process will also require the examination o f a number 
of factors that might also determine the contents of the agenda. These factors range from 
institutional arrangements, structural constraints and policy legacies and play a part in 
jeopardising the chance to introduce gender oriented policies.
While the relevance of the political factor in welfare state formation has been 
considered by focusing on the class coalition and the political structure between right and 
left political formations, a gender perspective will have to pay attention to how all these 
elements interact and affect gender relations.
4 What is commonly the third party in corporatist and tripartite agreements, the employers’ organisation 
(CEOE) is not taken into account in this analysis. For two main reasons: firstly because the CEOE has not 
been a decisive power in most of the social security reforms. Secondly, because this organisation does not 
have any section or department devoted to women or gender issues. Representing the core entrepreneurial 
world, the employers organisation is not considered as a social actor that would act in the interest o f women 
as either citizens or workers.
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A main concern will be to assess the policy influence and access o f women’s 
advocacy institutions in the policy process. I use the concept o f women’s advocacy 
institutions or women’s policy machinery to refer to institutional bodies, which have as a 
main objective the promotion of gender equality. The concept is taken from McBride and 
Mazur’s (1995) work on comparative state feminism. These authors use the term 
‘women’s policy machinery’ to describe any structure established by government with its 
main purpose being the betterment of women’s social status. I will refer to the term in a 
broader sense, including the governmental structure, the Women’s Rights Institute, 
Instituto de la Mujer, and also the bodies responsible for gender issues inside trade 
unions, Women’s Secretariat of CC.OO. and Women’s Department o f UGT.5
The concept of ‘policy access’ also comes from the afore mentioned study of  
McBride and Mazur (1995).6 1 will apply it to my own research to refer to the capacity of  
women’s advocacy organisations to intervene directly, as part o f the policy process, or 
indirectly, by acting upon the actors involved in the process, in those policy arenas 
dealing with social protection issues. This part o f the investigation also aims to discover 
the extent to which gender policies are strategically integrated with other public policies 
or whether they are designed and implemented in isolation. The organisational strength of  
the women’s advocacy groups is meant to be fundamental to whether gender equality and 
discrimination in the social protection system obtains specific consideration. Policy 
formulation and implementation are considered as political processes, from this point of 
view, the absence of women from the decision-making processes has negative 
implications for the excluded group. Therefore, a basic assumption will be that a greater 
presence of these women’s advocacy groups in the policy process contributes to integrate
5 The feminist movement as such will not be considered as an autonomous social actor for two main 
reasons. Since the beginning of the 1980s the political demands of the feminist movement have been 
articulated through public institutions (the 1M) and organisations (trade unions). The IM represents the 
institutionalisation o f the feminist movement and hence it is logical to assume that the chances o f political 
success o f the women’s movement’s demands will have to be analysed through this administrative body. 
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that social protection is a field where decisions are mostly taken 
within a labour relations framework. While in other areas of intervention grassroots movements or civil 
society organisations might exercise pressure upon political decisions, the chance to exercise pressure in 
this particular field come from within the actors legitimised in the process (in this case, the government and 
the trade unions).
6 MacBride and Mazur (1995) in their analysis on Comparative State Feminism used the concepts o f ‘policy 
influence’ and ‘policy access’ to investigate the general effectiveness o f state feminism in several countries. 
‘Policy influence’ refers to the participation of each women’s policy office in the formation o f  feminist 
policies that promote the status of women and/or undermine patterns o f gender hierarchy. ‘Policy access’ is 
the degree to which women’s policy machinery develop opportunities for society-based actors to exert 
influence on feminist policies.
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gender issues into the policy agenda. The issue is theoretically dealt with in chapter 2 and 
empirically analysed in chapter 6.
Moreover, the research will also pay attention to what the different strategies 
towards gender equality and demands of the women’s advocacy institutions in shaping 
policy outcomes have been.
Furthermore, it is important to evaluate how gender issues, in relation to the social 
protection system, have been conceptualised by the actors intervening in the policy 
process. The discourses and ideologies that embrace actors’ strategies will be assessed by 
examining in depth ‘solidarity’ (solidaridad) as a strategic concept. Notions of solidarity 
were very present in the interviews I had conducted. The word appeared so many times in 
the interviews with policy-makers that I had no option but to place the meanings o f the 
word in context and look for its implications when viewed from a gender perspective. I 
would argue that the definition of ‘solidarity’ as a key concept in the articulation o f the 
social protection system is usually taken for granted. However, from my point o f view, 
this supposition can be questioned and the concept might be redefined when looked from 
a gender angle. The investigation will look at the way in which notions o f solidarity rely 
on assumptions about ‘familialism’, which includes unpaid work in the private sphere.
The empirical material used for this part o f the research is a combination of elite 
interviews and documentary material (see appendix 1). Documentary and interview 
analyses are two complementary research strategies both dealing with the same empirical 
units (social actors in gender and social policies) and are used for the same ends (research 
questions and sub-hypotheses testing). The interviews are particularly important in this 
type of research. Since the direction of the research questions obliges a study o f what is 
not there as much as what is there, in the sense that gender equality issues have not 
motivated policy changes in the social protection system, the verbal testimonies of the 
actors involved in the process are needed.
In addition to these accounts, documents are a valuable tool to analyse how 
changes in policy-making and choices in public policy affecting gender relations have 
been explained, sustained and constructed by the different social actors at a particular 
period of time. As socially constructed realities, institutional texts are inextricably linked 
to the social contexts in which they are produced (Miller 1997). Documentary research is 
also used to provide an exhaustive knowledge of the external circumstances determining 
options and decisions in the policy process. Finally, the use of two complementary
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methods for this qualitative research gives more opportunities for reflexive elaboration 
and thus contributes to the validity of the analysis.
Structure o f  the thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, in which this introductory 
chapter is included, concentrates on theoretical issues and background o f the country that 
is the object of study. Chapter 2 starts with the development o f feminist analyses of  
welfare states from a uniform and unilateral vision to a more complex picture of 
paradoxical and contradictory relations between women and welfare systems. The 
understandings of welfare state performances and the indicators used to measure welfare 
state development are criticised, from a gender point o f view, for the use o f a notion of 
social citizenship that excludes gender. Mainstream theory is challenged by feminism 
through the creation of a number of indicators that are either complementary or 
alternative to the pre-existing ones. The chapter finishes with the attempt to integrate the 
views on welfare states from a gender perspective within wider debate o f challenging 
notions of citizenship.
The historical and contextual framework o f welfare state development in Spain is 
analysed in chapter 3. The chapter offers a description o f the evolution o f the Spanish 
welfare state, with a particular focus on the social protection system, through basic socio­
economic and political processes. The analysis tries to identify convergent and divergent 
patterns in relation to the main European welfare state models and the repercussions of 
these factors on gender relations.
Chapter 4 is of an empirical nature, and provides an overview of the performance 
of men and women in the social protection system, in terms of access and quality o f the 
benefits. The variable ‘sex’ is analysed, together with age, using the information that is 
available offering a complete view of benefits’ distribution. The study of the conditions of 
entitlements and type of benefits provides a comprehensive view o f how the system is 
organised and what the repercussions are in terms of gender relations. The study o f the 
basis o f entitlement helps to clarify whether policies reinforce existing gender relations or 
transform them. The chapter aims to address a number o f questions: to what extent is 
gender differentiation affected by processes of claiming benefits and by the existence of 
different programmes for family and labour market needs? Can we distinguish patterns of
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dissimilarities in the way men and women are protected? Are men and women’s social 
rights based on equal principles of independence and autonomy?
The material o f chapter 4 provides the context to the following chapters. From the 
empirical evidence of gender patterns of stratification and inequality in the social 
protection system, the research moves towards the policy process’ analysis. Thus, the first 
part provides a framework for the second part and also poses a number o f unresolved 
questions to be adopted by the following empirical chapters.
Using the literature on policy-making, chapter 5 attempts to explain how the 
political agenda was configured from the beginning o f democracy. It deals with the 
importance of policy legacy, policy objectives and policy discourses in determining the 
agenda’s objectives. It examines what the constraints and/or the motivations have been 
for the consideration of gender issues in the political agenda and in the final 
implementation of the policies. Finally, it looks at how the power relations between the 
social actors, in particular the existence o f corporatist relations, might have had an 
influence on final outcomes.
The empirical analysis developed in chapters 6 and 7 continue along the path 
initiated in chapter 5. Thus, these chapters share a common goal: to understand what the 
factors are that have conditioned the introduction o f a more gender oriented social 
protection system, motivating or constraining policy change from the previous system, 
once democracy was established. Chapter 6 focuses on the policy access of women’s 
advocacy groups. Chapter 7 unravels the false nature of apparently neutral notions of 
solidarity, in which the social protection system is rooted. Gender is understood by its 
absence. Social provisions rely on assumptions about gender and family roles that interact 
with the state and the labour market.
The last chapter ties together the analysis o f the previous chapters reflecting the 
major research findings. The chapter also tries to reflect upon the implications of my 
findings for the theoretical understanding of the relationship between the welfare state, 
gender inequalities and notions of social citizenship. The chapter will return to the issue 
of welfare state regimes and gender regimes. The findings of my research will enable me 
to consider whether Spain can be placed alongside the major welfare and gender 
categories or whether it forms, along with the other southern European countries, a 
distinctive gender and welfare typology. Attention will also be paid to the social and 
economic challenges that social protection systems are currently confronting.
20
Finally, appendix 1 “Considerations on methods” offers additional information on 
some methodological aspects of the empirical chapters. Appendix 2 gathers together the 
secondary statistical data used in chapter 4 and appendix 3 is a selected audit o f the main 
benefit types.
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Chapter 2
The Gender Dimension of the Welfare State
Introduction
The study of gender and welfare state engages with key debates in feminist theory. 
From the feminist perspective, the point of departure in an analysis o f the gender 
dimension of welfare states has been to focus on the public/private division. What is 
needed, it has been argued, is a theoretical focus that outlines the implications of a 
systematic gender difference in terms of access to social rights based on the public/private 
dichotomy. These dichotomies, widely used to explore the nature o f women’s 
subordination, are also relevant for understanding the complex relationship between 
gender and the state, which also relates to notions o f citizenship. The present chapter 
investigates the specific fomi that these dichotomies adopt in the analysis o f gender and 
welfare state relationship. Attention will be paid to the changes in the perception of the 
problem and the alternatives to mainstream analysis from a gender point o f view.
The gender and feminist examination of welfare programmes and structure also 
encounters the broader contemporary debate about the nature o f state intervention and 
social citizenship in present changing societies.
Early feminist views on the welfare state
The early approaches to the relationship between women and welfare states were 
polarised. The first broad perspective can be seen in terms of what Orloff (1996) titles ‘the 
social reproduction of gender hierarchy’. The various schools of thought that come within 
this perspective, although differing broadly,1 shared a suspicious -if not a wholly
1 Radical Feminism understood the welfare state as an institution that reinforces the subordinate position of  
women through discourses of motherhood and caring as a female responsibility. They have tended to give a 
biological explanation to the universal oppression of women. The strategy o f Radical Feminism in terms 
of the welfare state has been the creation of separate alternative resources for women. Socialist feminists 
have also understood the welfare state as maintaining male domination over women by focusing on 
women’s role as family members (mothers and wives) with the whole range o f domestic and caring 
responsibilities. Socialist Feminism concentrated on capitalism as a system o f oppression for men and
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negative- idea of the potential capacity of welfare policies to enhance women’s 
independence. The basic idea was an understanding of the state and its social policies as 
maintaining social control and gender hierarchies under a patriarchal society. Thus, 
control was achieved through a number of legitimated means such as the gendered 
divisions o f labour, the family wage system or the traditional family (Orloff 1996). The 
opposing position can be seen in terms of the potential for welfare states to ameliorate 
gender inequalities. Gender and welfare state relations are analysed from the assumption 
that welfare states work to reduce social inequalities and provide an effective instrument 
in reducing poverty among women.
These two main first incursions in gender and welfare state studies had two main 
problems. On the one hand the studies were for the most part made from the particular 
context of one country -overwhelmingly English-speaking and Nordic countries- 
reinforcing a fairly unified view of such relationship. On the other hand, by concentrating 
on women’s position in comparison with men, features o f gender differentials were 
generally neglected. Gender refers not just to two sexes but also to the cultural and social 
constructions of masculine and feminine roles, emphasising not only the specific 
conditions of each category but also their mutual dependency.
The uniformity and linearity of these two visions could not allow for an 
understanding of the complexity of national and historical variations and different patterns 
of gender roles. Feminist scholars have lately began to recognise the complexity, 
multiplicity and at times contradictory nature of women-state relationships. Although 
recognising welfare states as systems of stratification and inequality between men and 
women, the emancipatory potential of welfare state policies is also pointed out. Policy is 
now seen more as an instrument that might promote different types o f gender relations. 
From this point of view, efforts have been made to either complement mainstream 
measures to equally integrate men and women or suggesting alternative dimensions to 
assess gender differences in welfare state’ outcomes. This contemporary approach also 
brings the recognition of the existence of different state formations and its implications in 
terms of gender.
women. Hence, one major concern has been to locate domestic labour within an analysis o f productive 
relations.
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The interaction between mainstream and feminist analysis has been particularly 
fruitful over the last decade. However, before examining this relationship in more detail, 
the key features of mainstream theory need to be explained.
Mainstream analysis o f the welfare state. Notions o f citizenship
Mainstream theories have always privileged the market-state nexus in welfare 
state’s analysis. By so doing, only the class divisions are placed at the centre, leaving 
outside other types of social divisions such as gender division. The classical approaches to 
the study of the welfare state were based on the basic key variables o f class, state, market 
and democracy. But despite these common traits, the approaches differed widely.
Classical political economy maintained that state’s intervention was an obstacle to 
the healthy functioning of the market. Adam Smith, its main advocate, saw the production 
and exchange of goods and services within the formal economy as the only way to 
provide individual welfare (Pierson 1991). Marxism saw the state under a capitalist 
society as an instrument for the reproduction of social relations and in the interest o f the 
capitalist class. The distribution of welfare under a capitalist society is meant to reflect 
market capacity rather than real needs (Pierson 1991).
Social, political and economic changes that took place during the 20th century - 
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation- would soon indicate the congruence of 
state provision of welfare and the development of a capitalist economy. Under this 
century’s challenges the first studies o f welfare states concentrated mainly on the origins 
of welfare states and in examining differences and similarities between specific welfare 
state formation. Some authors, collectively represented as the ‘industrialisation approach’ 
focused on the industrialisation process as the main explanatory factor in welfare state 
origins (Wilensky 1975). According to this view, economic and social changes brought by 
industrialisation forced the states to develop welfare programmes independently of 
particular political formations. From a different perspective, the ‘class mobilisation 
approach’ (Korpi 1978) placed the driving force of welfare state formation in the political 
power of left wing parties and trade union organisations. Finally, the ‘state-centred view’ 
concentrated on the specific features of a given state as the main influence in the building 
of a welfare system (Heidenheimer and Heclo 1976).
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However, given the evidence of different welfare state formations, current trends 
have focused on the construction of “ideal types” defined through certain dimensions of 
variation to draw a more accurate picture of welfare state formation and reflect more 
complex and multivariable explanations. A common feature of all mainstream studies 
however has been the emphasis placed on market-state nexus, with a unified point of 
departure: the concept of citizenship as an element that determines origins and 
characteristics of the welfare state.
T.H. Marshall’s paper “Citizenship and Social Class” published in 1950, was an 
attempt to understand the welfare state in terms of the development of citizenship rights 
and their relationship with class. Citizenship is defined as a status, which is enjoyed by a 
person who is a full member of a community. The author identified three components in 
the notion of citizenship: civil rights, institutionalised in the law courts; political rights: 
that guarantee the right to participate in the exercise of political power in the community; 
and social rights, embodied in the welfare state, defined as the right to participate in an 
appropriate standard of living. Marshall’s theory constitutes a progressive, linear model of 
the acquisition of rights, which follows a chronological order in all societies with civil 
rights coming first and social rights last. In this sense, Marshall’s notion o f citizenship is 
clearly based on the Anglo-Saxon experience which makes it difficult to apply to other 
countries’ experiences, such as Spain where, as we shall see, to a certain extent social 
rights came before political and civil rights. The development o f welfare states in 
different countries shows that the process of citizenship is much more complex than a 
linear model. Moreover the non-linear mutual interdependence between civil, political 
and social rights is also evident in another way. As Lister (1997: 34) explains “social 
rights, at least in theory, enable citizens to exercise their political and civil rights on equal 
terms and create the conditions for full social and political participation”.
However, what makes Marshall’s theory so important is his view of the 
contradiction between the principles of citizenship and the operation o f the capitalist 
market. This relation between citizenship and the labour market is analysed by Marshall 
in terms of class. The analysis is very similar to the one developed by Hegel, what Donald 
Moon calls Hegel’s dilemma: “the moral dilemma that arises when citizenship is 
undermined by the operation of the capitalist market” (Pateman 1989: 182). The market 
leaves some individuals deprived of the resources for social participation and so they
25
become exiles from society. The problem therefore is that if  full citizenship is considered 
to be achieved through the participation in the labour market, then those who cannot 
participate are deprived of such rights.
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism (1990), one o f the most 
influential studies o f comparative welfare states’ analysis o f the last decade, uses two 
indicators that are directly influenced by Marshall’s notion of citizenship: de- 
commodification and social stratification. In his own words:
“ Few can disagree with T.H. Marshall’s proposition that social citizenship constitutes 
the core idea o f a welfare state. (...) The concept must involve the granting o f  social 
rights. If social rights are given the legal and practical status o f  property rights, if  they are 
inviolable, and if  they are granted on the basis o f citizenship rather than performance, 
they will entail a de-commodification o f  the status o f  individuals vis-a-vis the market. 
But the concept o f social citizenship also involves social stratification: one’s status as a 
citizen will compete with, or even replace, one’s class position” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 
21 ).
Therefore, what is meant by de-commodification is the degree to which social 
rights are guaranteed independently of pure market forces; when a person can maintain a 
living without reliance on the market. The concept determines the type o f citizenship 
given in a society.
Furthermore, the concept of social citizenship also helps determine social 
stratification. From this perspective, the welfare state defines a specific type of 
stratification in our society:
“The welfare state in not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the 
structure o f  inequality, it is in its own right a system o f  stratification, an active force in 
the ordering o f social relations” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23).
Using the two indicators, together with an analysis of the employment structure, 
Esping-Andersen distinguishes three regime-types of welfare states in contemporary 
capitalist societies: conservative, liberal and social-democrat. Each one o f the three 
regimes goes hand in hand with a particular attitude towards de-commodification, a 
specific form of social stratification and a distinctive labour market regime. The
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conservative or corporatist welfare regime provides de-commodification in a limited 
form. It defends the preservation of status differentials where rights are attached to class 
and status and there is no commitment to full employment since women are discouraged 
from working. The liberal type minimises de-commodification effects and social rights 
are guaranteed on a minimum basis. The social-democratic type maximises de­
commodification. The access to social rights is based on the principle of universality. This 
type of welfare is committed to full-employment.2
Finally, the three elements are influenced by the particular way in which the class 
structure has been organised. Esping-Andersen redefines the influence o f the political 
factor substituting the existing ‘class mobilisation’ approach previously described, by the 
‘class coalition’ thesis. Three historical forces are included in this category: the pattern of 
working-class political formation, the political coalition building in the transition from a 
rural economy to a middle-class society, and the past reforms towards the institution of 
class preferences and political behaviour. Applied to the regime-types, while the strength 
o f left-party mobilisation explains the foundation of social-democratic regimes, the 
negative or insignificant effect of this variable helps to understand the formations o f the 
liberal and conservative regime. In the last, Catholic-party strength and a history of 
absolutism were principal forces in welfare state formation.
The class coalition thesis underlines the importance of an understanding o f power 
in terms of social relations more than in terms o f social categories (Esping-Andersen 
1990). From this perspective, the patterns of power alliances, such as neo-corporatism, 
and the structure of not only working class and labour parties but also of right-wing party 
power, are considered of great importance in social policy outcomes.
The feminist critique to mainstream approaches. Challenging citizenship
The basic problem, from a gender point of view, is that the study o f citizenship 
does not lead these authors to deal theoretically with gender. The attention paid to class 
does not lead Marshall or Esping-Andersen to a particular mindfulness o f women’s 
position. By asserting the connection between social rights and social class, the
2 The archetypical examples for each regime are: the USA, Canada and Australia as liberal welfare states. 
Australia, France, Germany and Italy as the representatives o f the conservative type. The Scandinavian 
countries representing the social-democratic regime type (Esping-Andersen 1990).
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problematic relationship between citizenship and dependency in the family is not 
considered. Hegel’s dilemma has been analysed by Pateman (1989) in terms o f gender, 
establishing what she calls the Hegel’s second dilemma. In her opinion this dilemma is 
based on that category of individuals who are exiles from citizenship not because they do 
not find any one to buy their labour-power at a living wage, as happens in the first case, 
but because they are incapable of working. This incapacity to work prevents their 
integration into civil society as citizens. These groups are mainly women since “women 
naturally lack the attributes and capacities of the individuals who can enter civil society, 
sell their labour-power and become citizens. Women, Hegel held, are ‘natural’ social 
exiles” (Pateman 1989: 183). As a result, women are, quite often, not incorporated into 
the welfare state as independent citizens but as members of the family.
As has already been outlined, the understanding of this unequal position o f women 
in citizenship and the welfare state, constitutes the core preoccupation of feminist theory. 
It highlights the problematic nature of the ideological foundations of apparently neutral 
concepts, in this case, the notion o f citizenship. As Lister (1997: 3) stresses “the 
reappropriation of strategic concepts such as citizenship is central to the development o f  
feminist political and social theory”.
Thus, as has been argued before, there is a necessity for a theoretical focus that 
outlines the implications of a systematic gender difference in terms of access to social 
rights based on the public/private dichotomy. The meaning of citizenship for women 
needs to focus on other ‘non visible’ issues that have also given shape to the configuration 
of the welfare state. The public/private division in the study of welfare state and social 
policy is articulated in terms of two further dichotomies: those o f
dependence/independence and productive/reproductive.
Binary oppositions
Citizenship has been constructed through an intrinsic division between the 
attributes and capacities of the two sexes. The central criterion for citizenship has always 
been independence and such independence has always been associated with male 
“attributes” and “abilities”. Men, but not women have been seen as possessing the 
capacities required of ‘individuals’, ‘workers’ and ‘citizens’. Pateman (1989) outlines
28
three elements o f independence: the capacity to bear arms, the capacity to own property 
and the capacity for self-government. In the democratic welfare state, she notices, 
citizenship is related to the last two dimensions. On the one hand, men’s status as workers 
depends on their ability to contract out the property they own in their labour-power, on 
the other hand, the institution of marriage gives the right and obligation to men to be the 
breadwinner of the family.
If the meaning of independence is associated with men, the one o f dependence has 
female attributes. Women are still not property owners to the extent men are and 
moreover, women enter into the protection category in terms of the dichotomy 
breadwinner/ housewife. “The category of ‘breadwinner’ presupposes that wives are 
constituted as economic dependants or ‘housewives’, which places them in a subordinate 
position” (Pateman 1989: 186). Moreover, women’s economic dependency underpins the 
sexual division of labour. It creates and legitimates those inequalities both inside and 
outside the home. At the same time, it encourages male work incentives and, thereby, 
their relative independence of state monetary support. At this point, 
dependence/independence leads to the productive/ reproductive dichotomy, which is also 
constructed through the sexual division of labour. These two categories are particularly 
relevant in the discussion about the welfare state because they can make visible the way 
through which the welfare state can reinforce or attenuate women’s subordinate position 
in the “reproductive” and private area by promoting certain types of policies.
However, the use of these two categories for gender analysis carries some 
problems. Basically these arise from the use of categories that belong to an ideology 
(Marxism) that, like the rest, has been gender blind. In very broad terms, the Marxist 
concept of reproduction applied to women would focus on the way that women at home 
have an indirect relationship to capital, through the function of reproducing the male 
labour force. As Pascall (1986) sees it, this analysis is valid in the sense that it places 
domestic work within the economic system, but it is problematic because women’s 
relationship to capital is examined at the expense of women’s relationship to men. 
Therefore, the analysis of reproduction needs to be placed within the broad understanding 
of the public/private divide. The way in which women have been relegated to the 
reproductive, dependent and private realm has to be seen not only as a consequence o f the
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dynamics o f the economic system but also as a consequence of cultural and ideological 
patterns.
In fact, more than just a division of labour, the foundation stone o f citizenship has 
been a very powerful gendered construction of irreconcilable categories. The opposition 
between independent male/dependent female, public man/private woman, male 
citizen/woman non-citizen assembles a whole web of antagonistic meanings, which not 
only has material evidence - to own or not to own private property- but relates also to a 
non-material emotional and physical world of interpretation. While the public male 
citizen is a disembodied and rational individual, the private female is embodied and 
emotional (see Valcarcel 1991; James 1992; Amoros 1997).
At this point, we should be able to recognise why social policy and welfare state 
analyses have been frequently made from the productive world and not from the world of 
reproduction.
“The difficulty is that the analysis is confined to productive relations. Thus m ost serious 
theoretical work on the welfare state concerns relations between capital and labour and 
the nature o f  the state in a capitalist society (...) reproductive relations are subordinated to 
the productive process, and are not them selves analysed” (Pascall 1986: 21).
The dependence/independence and productive/reproductive dichotomies, or more 
generally the public/private division, have significant implications in terms of the welfare 
state. By making the notion of citizenship only relevant to the public, independent, and 
productive sphere, the connection or the importance of the private, dependent, and 
reproductive world is completely ignored. And yet “the public character o f the sphere of 
civil society/state is constructed and gains its meaning through what it excludes: the 
private association of the family” (Pateman 1989: 183).
Within this framework, the claims for women’s social benefits have been seen as a 
forced election between two different citizenship statuses. Either the caring and maternal 
activities women perform at home are recognised as a relevant citizenship category, 
bringing ‘motherhood’ to a political status (see Pateman 1992) or they are accepted under 
the “neutrality” of the term, participating equally with men in the public sphere and 
therefore vindicating the right for equality in a universal conception o f citizenship. These 
two routes have important policy implications. Welfare states might establish strong 
family policies to enable women to raise children and do the caring having the protection
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of the state, either through tax deductions or cash benefits. Conversely, social policy 
might also promote women’s access to paid work and include them in the traditional 
labour market-state link for protection. Moreover it also determines the feminist strategies 
in terms of whether they place the emphasis on women’s status under citizenship as carers 
or as wage earners.
However, the question is, are these two routes to welfare truly incompatible? To 
start with, the dichotomies dependent/independent and production/reproduction may 
obscure two important facts. First, the ‘dependence’ o f women means also that men are 
dependent on them for care and servicing. Women’s status in the home is not absolute but 
is conditional upon their being simultaneously depended on by others. For many women, 
being a dependent is synonymous not with receiving care but with giving it. Second, it 
also obscures the extent to which a proportion o f the female population belongs under 
different conditions to the “productive world” of the labour market. The confinement of 
women at home can sometimes be more ideological than real.
For that reason there has been a wide range of literature that tries to ‘deconstruct’ 
the dichotomies, to disentangle the ways in which each part o f the binary division 
includes and contemplates the other. The issue hints at the wider debate on the difference 
versus equality dilemma for feminism. The ‘equality versus difference’ debate has 
produced one of the most vivid discrepancies among feminists, although scholars have to 
a large extent recognised the false nature of the opposition. As Scott (1988: 44) argued, 
the problem is solved by the “unmasking of the power relationships constructed by posing 
equality as the antithesis of difference and the refusal of its consequent construction of  
political choices”. In the case of dependence versus independence, by breaking the binary 
thinking, a third concept emerges and the connection between the two poles takes the 
stage. Lister (1997) for instance, talks about the trichotomy of dependence, independence 
and interdependence to underline the mutual reliance of the two categories. From here, 
welfare states have the policy option of not just privileging one citizenship status over 
another but significantly enhancing the combination of both. Taking this complementary 
view, the feminist strategy regarding citizenship finds a way to integrate the two sides of 
the old dilemma. Equality and difference can be combined in a definition o f citizenship 
that challenges the sexual division of labour. The share of domestic responsibilities can be 
promoted, so that men and women have the chance - or the obligation- to combine unpaid
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work at home with paid work. Also, the public infrastructure for the caring o f dependant 
children and adults can be made available and more flexible ways to enter and exit the 
labour market can be fostered.
This deconstruction also stands for the breaking of the gender categories that the 
dichotomies have rigidly defined. By allowing for variation within each category a more 
complex picture arises. This is the case not just for the ‘unified woman’ but also for the 
‘universal man’. Men have also been trapped into a category where variation from the 
norm has equally been neglected. However, as previously argued, the recognition of 
multiple identities within the two categories does not have to undermine the case for 
political agency.
Revising welfare state dimensions o f variation
Having raised the gender issue, it can now be understood what is problematic in 
Esping-Andersen’s indicators of de-commodification and social stratification. In the case 
of de-commodification there are several critiques made with a feminist insight. First, the 
category fails to acknowledge the extent to which women already operate in a 
‘decommodified’ domestic sphere and the extent to which their involvement in that 
sphere is a necessary basis for the ‘commodification’ o f labour (Clarke and Cochrane 
1993). The three components that define the degree of de-commodification are strongly 
connected to the market. Here we return to the discussion of Hegel’s dilemma, those 
individuals that are temporarily social exiles, because for different reasons they cannot 
participate in the labour market. What Pateman calls Hegel’s second dilemma reappears 
here, since women are not represented in the concept o f de-commodification as 
independent citizens. Second, as Meyer (1994) argues, the social basis for de- 
commodification is not the same when we refer to men or to women. The foundation of 
the concept of de-commodification, the idea that the potential of social policy can best be 
measured by looking at an individual’s degree of independence from the labour market is 
based on:
“The assumption that attachment to the labour market is the norm for all citizens and 
ignores the material and social reality o f  wom en, for whom  a w eakening o f  personal 
dependence through em ploym ent is an emancipatory step” (M eyer 1994: 81).
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In this case, the welfare state can act as a commodification factor for women. Daly 
(1994) has also remarked that women’s decisions to enter into and exit from the labour 
market are not determined by social security provisions to the same extent that men’s are.
In the case of social stratification, none of the indicators used by the author to 
measure that concept takes into account the different access to social benefits in terms of 
gender and yet it is, as we have shown, a determinant factor in the effective functioning of 
the welfare state. The basic problem is that social stratification is mainly defined in terms 
of class inequalities and therefore it tends to devalue the significance of other inequalities, 
such as those related to the gender dimension.
Finally, the importance of the political factor in the evolution of welfare state 
regimes might obscure the fact that coalitions between social institutions and political 
parties might have supported in an implicit and unspoken common agreement the 
maintenance of sexual divisions of labour. These power relations might also determine the 
possibilities o f women’s movement in policy intervention.
Feminists have also emphasised the relevance o f other spheres o f the welfare state 
in determining gender relationships. Mainstream analyses have concentrated overall in 
social provisions and have not paid so much attention to the tax systems and provisions in 
kind, such as social services. However, the nexus between the state, the market and the 
family is built not only through social provisions in cash but also through these other 
spheres of the welfare state. The tax system is an important instrument for promoting 
preferred types of families and relationships within families. The different taxation 
mechanisms can reward or penalise women’s work outside the home. Furthermore, state’s 
provision in kind is also a fundamental component o f the welfare state that influences in a 
crucial way the link between the market and the family.
Gender dimensions o f the welfare state
Hence, when the interest is to appraise the impact o f state policies on gender 
relations and vice versa, the Gordian knot becomes how to find gender dimensions based 
on an understanding of gender interests. This has been the most recent search for several 
feminist scholars of different backgrounds. Their starting points differ, some have chosen 
to use or complete existing mainstream typologies and dimensions to examine gender,
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while others have decided to construct new categories and theorise alternative 
dimensions. Furthermore, some studies are based on comparative research while others 
are single case studies. However, despite these differences, they all contribute to the 
debate of the gender dimension of welfare states.
Some authors have made an attempt to modify or complement concepts -such as 
independence from the labour market- that are fundamental to mainstream theories. Orloff
(1993), Bussmaker (1994), O’Connor (1993) are three major exponents o f this scheme. 
Orloff puts forward the incorporation of two new dimensions to the concept of de- 
commodification. These two dimensions are access to paid  work and the capacity to form  
and maintain an autonomous household. For the first case, the starting point is that 
commodification is potentially emancipatory for women and, therefore, de- 
commodification has to be changed by “a new analytic dimension that taps into the extent 
to which states promote or discourage women’s paid employment and the right to be 
commodified” (Orloff 1993: 318). The second dimension is meant to deal with the effects 
of state social provision on gender relations. The way she proposes conceptualising it is 
through an indicator of self-determination that would include independence from markets 
and marriages and a dimension based on women’s movements.
O’Connor (1993) has also emphasised the necessity to incorporate in notions of 
economic independence other types of independence that will be more likely to reflect 
women’s lives. In particular she advocates supplementing de-commodification with a 
concept o f personal life, insulation from personal and public dependence as well as from 
market pressures.
In a similar way Bussemaker and Van Kersbergen (1994) search for a concept that 
would take into account independence as changing patterns o f work and care, rights and 
needs between individuals, the state, the family and the market. As they argue, the 
concept “has to deal not only with economic independence but also with independence 
understood as the possibility of making choices and of insulation from emotional or 
psychological dependence” (1994: 24).
These works throw light on the direction to follow when the interest lies in 
analysing the relationship between women and the welfare state. Their contributions 
recognise the potential of social policy, not only by looking at an individual’s degree of 
independence from the labour market but also other types o f dependency. As we have
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seen, de-commodification is not an adequate indicator in two main ways. On the one 
hand, de-commodification does not consider the role the state can play as a commodifier 
agent for some social groups like women. On the other hand, de-commodification 
obscures the fact that women’s independence might not be so strongly connected with the 
market but with their possibility to be free from caring and family responsibilities. Both 
aspects are considered, in one way or another, by the authors mentioned above.
The impact of state policies on gender needs to be assessed by looking also at the 
specific features of policy structure. The potential impact on gender stratification can be 
predicted by examining the needs identified, the risks covered and the entitlement to 
benefits. A policy structure that identifies risks on a labour market basis or that provides 
benefits not on an individual basis but on family dependency grounds, surely has an 
impact on gender stratification. As Daly (1994) puts it, to study the range o f risks 
covered, the conditions of entitlement and the constructions of female and male labour, 
implies conceiving the welfare state as a set of ideological practices. To analyse the risks 
and needs identified in the configuration of policies implicitly means focusing on the 
denial of other social risks and needs. The failure to recognise or meet certain needs based 
on the different gender roles is another way through which policy might create or enhance 
relationships of dependency.
Equally important is the assessment of the outcomes o f policy definitions since 
there might be policies, which claim to be gender neutral and, yet, produce unequal 
results. An example can be seen in the use of time as a resource that has been applied by 
some authors to the different access for men and women to social provision. Time policies 
tend to be a strong mechanism for the eligibility o f entitlement for social benefits and 
therefore they should be analysed together with de-commodification for an understanding 
of under what conditions certain benefits are provided. Bryson, Bittman and Donathistead
(1994) have juxtaposed paid and unpaid work and time use in studying the welfare state 
of Australia and Finland. According to their findings, patterns of time spent in paid work 
are far more similar between men of the different countries, than they are between men 
and women in their own countries. Scheiwe (1994) has also incorporated time in her study 
of the gender dimension of the German pension system, arriving at the conclusion that 
time is a key factor in explaining gender differences in access to retirement pensions and 
pension differences between men and women. While the analysis of stratification in
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mainstream theory has considered the German welfare state as ‘status maintenance’ of 
different classes of employees, the gender system as an interacting stratifying structure is 
ignored. Scheiwe distinguishes between ‘female’ and ‘male’ time models. ‘Female times’ 
are characterised by larger time investments in unpaid care activities and servicing work 
outside the labour market and to discontinuous time patterns of employment or 
substandard working hours. ‘Male times’ assume full availability for paid work on time 
schedules that inhibit simultaneous fulfilment of caring responsibilities outside 
employment. In the German regime, Scheiwe argues, ‘female times’ are particularly 
disadvantaged because benefits are strongly dependent on long employment periods and 
because the dependent status of ‘wife’ is encouraged through social security provisions 
and tax law. “Women less frequently than men meet substantial time requirements, and 
this results in gendered tracks into different pension types” (Scheiwe 1994: 136).
In this sense and applied to the labour market, Maruani (1994) advocates the 
analysis of the social construction of sexual divisions within the labour market. She 
proposes replacing what has been the central concept in the sociology of work - “work” - 
by the concept of “employment”.3 Focusing on employment provides the possibility to 
examine the problems women have in accessing the labour market, and the conditions of  
those integrated in it. By so doing, the attention shifts from distinguishing just between 
who works and who does not work, to attending to the conditions and circumstances of 
employment (full time/part time; stability/instability) and non-employment.
A constant in the proposals we have seen is the necessity to recognise a gender 
dimension of social rights through defamialism, that is, women’s rights outside family 
dependencies. Other authors draw attention to the need to consider the economic 
dimension of citizenship for women. As Hobson (1997) puts it:
“As welfare states become less and less willing to support benefits for mothers to remain 
at home (...) there is a need to develop theories that incorporate gender dimensions o f  
economic citizenship” (Hobson 1997: 4).
3 The definition o f work implies an examination of the conditions under which the professional activity is 
carried out (organisation and conditions of work, salaries, qualifications, etc.). Employment involves 
dealing with the problems o f unemployment and “under-employment” (unqualified jobs, part-time 
contracts, etc.), and the access to the labour market (Maruani 1994:51).
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With this in mind, Hobson proposes a model o f gender disadvantage to analyse 
gender equality policies. According to the author, a model that incorporates gender 
disadvantage shifts the focus towards the institutional mechanisms and structures that 
produce gender disadvantage since systematic patterns o f inequality are to be found in 
social relations of groups and institutional settings. Laws and policies reflect these 
relations and codify them.
However, the operationalisation of all these gender dimensions is still unclear in 
most o f the cases. While the authors have mainly worked towards the conceptualisation of 
the new dimensions, their application in empirical analysis remains a hard task. The 
alternatives seem to work better as criticisms than as real replacements. What still remains 
problematic is the measurement of dependencies that do not belong to the market, 
dependencies outside the market sphere such as personal or psychological ones. Several 
authors have dealt with the issue of how to measure the economic contributions o f the 
unpaid work women do at home. There are two major obstacles for the integration of 
unpaid work carried out in the private sphere into the economic structure. Firstly, there is 
a problem of definition and secondly, the methodological and technical trouble o f data 
gathering. Regarding the first one, Duran (1994) holds that the pitfall stems from the 
consideration of the activity of ‘care’ not as a specific activity or right but as a 
responsibility and obligation. According to the International Labour Organisation, the 
definition and measure of tasks is easier when the process o f transformation is visible. 
The difficulties are greater in those tasks that do not imply physical movement or 
transformation (ILO 1986 quoted in Duran 1994). However, this is not the case for 
intellectual or educational activities where the monetary value assigned is not directly 
linked to any visual transformation of goods. Moreover, as Salvador (1997) indicates, 
caring and domestic activities are hard to measure in monetary terms only when they take 
place in the private realm of the house. When the very same activity is performed by any 
public or private institution, then the product does have a market price. Therefore, and 
according to the author, domestic production and market production only differ in the 
nature of the relations of production and not in the nature of the final product nor in the 
efforts made or the goods used for that final product.
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In the second place, most of statistical sources and analytical tools used for 
analysing social issues do not integrate gender and, frequently, the problem is how to test 
theoretical concepts that cannot be tested empirically. An eloquent illustration o f this is 
the attempt by Millar (1997) to analyse the gender dimensions o f poverty. According to 
the author, there is a conceptual and methodological problem in measuring poverty from a 
gender viewpoint. The unit of analysis is the household or the family through the concept 
of ‘family income’, which is a single measure resulting from the combination o f all the 
sources of income coming into the family. However, as the author points out, the concept 
of family income starts from two key assumptions. First, that everyone in the family 
shares the income equally and they share the same standard of living. Second, that the 
source of the various components that make up the family income is irrelevant, all money 
coming into the home is equally available to be used in the same way. The outcome of 
this in terms of gender is that the category ‘family income’ obscures gender differences in 
the extent and experience of poverty, the concept then is not only a research tool it also 
plays an ideological function.
Gender and welfare state regimes
Despite the difficulties, there have been significant attempts to elaborate 
alternative clustering of welfare states to the ones defined by mainstream theory. The first 
try was the breadwinner model elaborated by Lewis (1992). She proposed a different set 
of criteria for constructing social policy regimes based upon variations in attachment to 
the male breadwinner ideology: strong, moderate, and weak breadwinner outlook. By 
studying the male breadwinner model the idea is to reveal the interaction o f public and 
private spheres o f life in the organisation of welfare which also implies the awareness of 
the role o f women’s unpaid work as providers o f welfare. Recently, Ostner (1997) has 
introduced the breadwinner model within a broader concept of individualisation to 
compare welfare states. The concept involves two dimensions. The first one is the 
economic independence analysed through the strength or weakness o f the male 
breadwinner model. The second one is independence from family obligations, measured 
by the existence of laws that enforce family obligations and the availability o f full-time 
public services for children and the elderly.
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The breadwinner model has been criticised for representing men and women in a 
very uniform manner. In relation to women, Daly (1994) has argued that:
“Lew is and Ostner speak o f  a tw o dim ensional relationship to the state - mothers and 
workers- but modern welfare states are more likely to encourage com binations o f  
activities on the part o f  w om en, and indeed to pursue contradictory and even ambivalent 
policies rather than to operate to a singular role construction” (1994: 113).
Men are also fixed into one category - as workers/breadwinners- but men’s 
relation with the welfare state does not only go in one direction, their family status is also 
highly relevant for welfare benefits. Arguably, the breadwinner model is probably too 
North-European centric. Countries such as those in the South o f Europe can be included 
within the strong breadwinner category along with other European countries and that can 
obscure fundamental cultural and social patterns that differ broadly from other countries.
There have been more recent attempts to categorise gender regimes recognising a 
more complex reality. Sainsbury (1996; 1999) adds the individual model and the separate 
gender regime to the breadwinner model through a number of dimensions to explain the 
variation among the Scandinavian countries. These dimensions are: familial ideology; 
principles of entitlement; basis of entitlement; recipient of benefits; taxation; employment 
and wage policies; sphere of care; and caring work. Each model shows different patterns 
throughout all the dimensions.
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Table 2.1: Three gender policy regimes
Regime Attributes M ale Breadwinner Separate Gender Roles Individual Earner- 
Carer
Ideology Division o f labour 
Husband = earner 
Wife = carer
Strict division o f labour 
Husband = earner 
Wife = carer
Shared tasks 
Father = eamer-carer 
Mother = eamer-carer
Entitlement Unequal among spouses Differentiated by gender 
role
Equal
Basis o f Entitlement The principle of  
maintenance
Family responsibilities Citizenship or residence
Recipient o f Benefits Head o f household 
Supplements dependants
Men as family providers 
Women as caregivers
Individual
Taxation Joint Taxation 
Deduction dependants
Joint Taxation 
Deduction dependants
Separate taxation 
Equal tax relief
Employment policies Priority to men Priority to men Aimed at both sexes
Sphere o f Care Primarily private Primarily private Strong state 
involvement
Caring Work Unpaid Paid component to 
caregivers in the home
Paid component to 
caregivers in and 
outside the home
Source: Sainsbury (1999: 78)
Sainsbury uses these three models to argue that countries belonging to the same 
regime-type, the social-democrat one, demonstrate quite different types o f gender 
regimes.4
Korpi (1999) has also tried to integrate gender into a comparative perspective o f  
policy variation. The author has placed gender together with class into an analysis o f  
different dimensions o f inequality in the three main types o f welfare states across eighteen 
countries. He has established three typologies o f gendered welfare state institutions 
selected to reflect the ways in which public support to families is organised in a society. In 
the dual earner model women are encouraged to participate in the labour market, 
parenthood is combined with paid work and there is redistributive caring work within 
families. In the general family support model women are responsible for caring, and they
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enter into the labour market as secondary earners. Finally, the market-oriented model 
allows market forces to dominate the shaping o f gender relations. A number o f  indicators 
are created for each typology5 and the influence o f political tendencies and women’s 
performance in the labour market is also taken into account.
Table 2.2: Gender Policy Models.
Dimensions General Family 
Support
Dual Earner Market Oriented
Social insurance 
programmes for parents 
and children
Cash child allowances Earning-related 
maternity leave
Minimum ‘safety nets’
Taxation Family Tax Benefits Individual Individual
Social Services Public day-care services 
for older children
Public day-care services 
for children 0-2 years 
Public care for the 
elderly
Informal help. Market 
Resources
Employment Women’s participation 
is not encouraged
Women’s participation 
is encouraged
Women’s participation is 
encouraged
Social Insurance State Corporatist Encompassing Basic Security
Welfare Regime Corporatist-Statist Social-democrat Liberal
Political Tendency Confessional/Conservati
ve-centrist
Left Conservative-centrist
Class Inequality Medium/High Low High
Gender Inequality Medium/High Low Medium
Source: from Korpi’s typologies 1999.
These typologies carry the problem that in fact all typologies have to face, there 
can be infinite combinations and crossings between the typologies. Any typology 
eventually breaks down at several points when both different policy spheres and different 
countries are brought into the analysis. In this sense, both attempts seem to rely heavily on
4 Denmark is the nearest to the individual eamer-carer model. Norway is the closest to the separate gender 
roles regime. Finland is a combination o f both and Sweden has moved from a separate gender roles regime 
towards a individual eamer-carer regime (Sainsbury 1999:81).
5 General Family Support: cash child allowances, family tax benefits to infants and to economically non­
active spouse and public day-care services for older children (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, 
Ireland and the Netherlands). Dual earner support: provision o f day-care for pre-school children, policies 
for eamings-related maternity and paternity leave and policies supporting public care (Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and Norway). The countries described as having a market oriented gender policy model (the UK,
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the countries that have been used as a reference. I would argue that if the countries of 
southern Europe were brought into the analysis, a new category could emerge. 
Nevertheless, these are two genuine attempts and I shall keep them as a reliable reference 
for my case study.
Women as policy agents
Finally, several experts have pointed out the importance of considering the 
political participation as a dimension of the relationship gender-welfare states (Hemes 
1987; Siim 1988; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993), understanding political 
participation as the influence over policy issues and control of power position. This 
implies an analytical focus that outlines, on the one hand, women’s role in policy-making 
and their representation in the formal channels of politics and on the other hand, the 
impact o f political structures on gender roles and gender relationships. Women 
participation in politics needs also to direct attention towards women’s contribution in 
more informal forms of politics (Lister 1997).
The role of women as active agents in policy-making has received less attention 
from the feminist literature than their representation as recipients of social programmes. 
However, given the interdependence between social and political rights, political 
participation falls into another dimension of citizenship. It is often the case that the 
development of women friendly social programmes is directly connected with women’s 
involvement in the construction of the policy. Also, women’s access to social rights has 
given them the possibility of political participation. An understanding o f citizenship as 
participation speaks for an expression of human agency in the political arena. In Lister’s 
(1997: 36) words, “citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents”. Sen (1992) has 
taken a broader view to suggest that aspects reflecting agency, what he calls ‘the 
capability to achieve functionings’, meaning the capacity of individuals to choose, should 
be considered as fundamental components of inequality. The lack of power is generally 
associated with fewer chances to make decisions.
USA, Australia and Canada) are those that show the lowest values in the rank-order in terms o f the two first 
models (Korpi 1999:14).
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Behind the issue of political participation lies the assumption that women have 
interest that are different from and potentially in conflict with those of men, which makes 
the case for women’s interests to be represented by women in the policy arena. Phillips 
(1996) gives an example of this through her idea of a ‘politics of presence’, as compared 
with a ‘politics of ideas’. ‘Politics of presence’ she argues, is a necessary step to 
overcome the problem of exclusion from politics. “Issues o f political presence are largely 
discounted, for when difference is considered in terms of intellectual diversity, it does not 
much matter who represents the range of ideas” (Phillips 1996: 141). The politics of 
ideas, according to the author, cannot truly account for the experience of those groups that 
have been excluded from the political arena. Political equality needs, thus, the active 
representation of those affected, since policy proposals elaborated for certain groups but 
without their involvement may leave out important concerns.
However, the issue of women’s agency can of course be contested: do women in 
politics share common goals? Are women politicians more able to achieve women- 
friendly policies? Do they represent women as a group? Sapiro (1998) takes a similar 
stand to Phillips’ idea of a ‘politics of presence’. According to her, women’s exclusion 
from politics is not acceptable simply because participation is a fundamental political 
value in a democracy. This participation, Sapiro argues, has to be claimed independently 
of whether women define themselves as having special interests requiring representation. 
Women might not be conscious of the different social position they hold in relation to 
men:
“Part o f  the political relevance o f some groups is that they have been systematically 
denied the means with which to form themselves into an interest organisation: self- 
consciousness and identification” (Sapiro 1998: 165).
Women working in politics might not work for women’s interests at all. However, 
the fact that institutional agencies for women’s rights represented through what is known 
as state feminism, 6 together with other women’s advocacy groups, are created to represent 
women’s interest and promote equality, can be hardly disputed. The question is to what 
extent these institutions are actually effective in promoting the rights of women and
6 The term state feminism broadly refers to the institutionalisation o f feminist interests. As McBride and 
Mazur (1995) explain, state feminism is integrated by feminist employed as administrators and bureaucrats 
in positions o f power and women politicians advocating gender equality policies.
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creating policies and practices that will reduce gender inequalities. The answer would 
require the assessment of what the strategies are, that are pursued by these groups in 
targeting gender inequality. The mere presence of these institutions is only one factor 
among many others, determining the extent to which governments respond to women’s 
interests.
In this sense, Fraser (1997) describes three different gender equity models that 
support alternative ways to deal with the relationship between gender and the welfare 
state. The 'universal-hreadwinner strategy’, a vision that, according to the author is 
implicit in the current political practice o f most US feminists and liberals, aims at 
integrating women into labour market. The centre of this model is state provision of 
employment-enabling services. The 'caregiver parity model’, followed by Western 
European feminists and social democrats, attempts to place care work at a level with 
waged work in terms of social rights, giving priority to state provision of caregiver 
allowances. Finally the ‘universal-caregiver model’, the strategy which Fraser thinks is 
best suited to gender equity, results from a combination of both, defending the right of 
both men and women to do caring and earning equally. The issue will be raised and 
further discussed in the following chapters.
Further implications
Although different analytical constructs from different perspectives have been 
examined, several unifying themes are revealed. The main idea is that the market-state 
nexus as a framework to analyse the welfare state is not satisfactory when women are 
brought into the picture. The family has to be included along with the market and the 
state. This has a number of implications: unpaid work has to be considered along with 
paid work. Attention to other types of independence apart from independence from the 
market is necessary, which means that the welfare state has to be seen not only as a de- 
commodifier agent but also as a commodifier (the extent to which state encourages - or 
discourages - women’s independence from caring and family responsibilities). The fact 
that social provision is shaped by sexual divisions of labour and that, equally, social 
policies affect women and men in a variety of different ways has to be recognised. There 
is also a need to focus on the social construction of sexual divisions within the labour
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market: women’s access to the labour market and their conditions of employment. 
Finally, the dimension of political participation has to be integrated within gender and 
welfare state studies.
Today, a challenge to the nature of social citizenship rights is being demanded by 
other groups and social movements -i.e. ecologist and pacifist movements-. The dominant 
market paradigm that has framed welfare state development has been questioned and there 
is growing concern with uncovering patterns of oppression. The claims for this 
transformation go hand in hand with aspirations of political representation.
These demands gain strength when the problem becomes not just a question of 
justice but also a question of efficiency and social sustainability. The economic and social 
conditions under which welfare states developed have experienced profound 
transformations. Changes at both the macro and micro levels o f society are generating 
unknown patters of social inclusion and exclusion with which welfare systems are 
currently confronted.
On the one hand, there are profound changes in the nature of work. There is a 
great degree of fragmentation and diversity in the working histories of individuals that 
bring high complexity in determining the new needs and obligations of the different 
population groups. The links to the labour market are becoming more and more fragile, 
unstable and unpredictable for more people. As Offe and others (1996) argue:
“The capacity o f  the labour market to absorb w age labour under norm al w orking  
conditions  - professional, continuous, full-tim e productive activity within enterprises- is 
falling. The areas at the margins o f  the em ploym ent system , where the connection  
between w age labour and subsistence is uncertain, is beginning to grow ” (O ffe, 
Miickenberger and Ostner 1996: 203).
As a result, social programmes relying primarily on protecting labour market risks 
are not attending to the new demands and new needs that arise in society after shifts in the 
productive world.
Social and cultural changes also pose a threat to existing patterns o f state 
protection based on the old definition of gender roles. The male breadwinner-female 
housewife family organisation provided the normative picture of most families but these 
gender roles are no longer tenable. Contemporary societies have more diverse and less 
predictable ways of organising social, family and individual life. If welfare states were, in
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the “old times”, providing an effective protection to women, even if such protection was 
based on their status o f dependency, now, with the new economic, social, and 
demographic changes, that protection is not just unequal but is also inefficient. Women 
are not so able to secure their existence on a continuous basis within marriage, since 
marriage is a status that affects a lower proportion of people. The very conditions o f the 
‘marriage contract’ have changed, divorce has become a frequent phenomenon and 
women have larger life expectancy than men.
This growing disjunction between existing social protection schemes and new 
risks and needs due to changes in the social and economic structure and changes in the 
life cycle, is for many authors a major cause of welfare state crisis. As Esping-Andersen 
(1996) argues:
“Part o f  the welfare state crisis today may be sim ply a question o f  financial strain and 
rising unemployment. In part, it is clearly also related to less tangible needs for new  
m odes o f  social integration, solidarity and citizenship” (1996: 27).
Although this issue will be raised again in the last chapter, it is worth outlining 
here, summed up by Fraser’s (1996: 219) idea of a new post-industrial welfare state, that 
we need “something new, that would be suited to radically new conditions of employment 
and reproduction”.
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Chapter 3
The Spanish Welfare State in Context
Introduction
This chapter offers a description of the evolution o f the Spanish welfare state, 
paying specific attention to the social protection system, in relation to basic economic, 
political and social transformations to provide context for later gender analysis. The 
chapter will focus on the impact that the different changes in the political, economic, 
demographic and social spheres have had on gender relations.
The focus on the historical evolution is particularly important. Spain has not been 
the object of attention of sustained social policy contemporary research. The late 
development of the welfare state compared with that in other European countries, the 
absence o f international data sources and the distance from contemporary developments 
in Europe have kept Spain outside mainstream analysis o f welfare states. The few 
attempts to place Spain in a comparative framework initially aimed at constructing a new 
typology of Tate comers’ or the ‘Latin Rim’ for the countries of southern Europe 
(Leibfried 1991; Castles 1995). However, these categorisations have usually strengthened 
the view o f welfare state underdevelopment at the cost o f recognising more complex 
patterns o f welfare state formation in these countries, stemming from a significant degree 
of historical difference. Recently, and thanks to an increasing interest in the field, several 
authors have been more concerned with identifying the distinctive context and 
particularities of welfare formation and provision in southern Europe (Ferrera 1996; 
Rhodes 1997).
In this chapter and in the following one, the Spanish welfare state will be analysed 
paying attention to what I believe are two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, 
the convergent elements with other welfare state models and on the other hand, the 
divergent components resulting from specific historical evolution. I would argue that the 
development trajectory of the Spanish welfare state is hard to explain using existing 
theories o f political influence in welfare state formation. The common and specific
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features have had different repercussions on gender relations and might bring new insights 
to the relationship between systems of welfare and gender.
First steps
A unified system of social protection in Spain came as late as the 1960s. Before 
that date, different limited systems were created mainly to protect industrial workers. The 
first o f these systems came during the Restoration (1876-1923). According to Guillen 
(1990), the period was significant in terms of its ideological formulations. Certain 
ideological groups within government -particularly Social Catholicism and Liberal 
Krausism - supported social reforms and social intervention by the state. Several laws 
were passed, one of the most significant was the Industrial Accident Registry in 1900, 
which was the first public protection for death and survival as well as for permanent 
invalidity of workers. The protection consisted of fixed compensations to cover the 
expenditure of burial and for the surviving dependants.
In 1908 the National Institute of Insurance (Instituto Nacional de Prevision) was 
created, considered as the pioneering institution of the future Spanish social welfare 
system. In 1919, the most complete and sophisticated system of protection of this period 
was constituted, the Compulsory Workers’ Insurance (Retiro Obrero Obligatorio) . It was 
a contributory system for workers with very strict conditions o f eligibility. The system 
was financed by the contributions of the employees and a strong contribution of the 
central administration -around 25% of the total budget according to De La Villa (1985).
Nevertheless, the social protection programmes of this period considered the 
coverage of a very narrow set of risks. These were schemes only available to industrial 
low-income workers. Not surprisingly, the incipient model of social protection for 
workers coexisted with clear patterns of gender stratification that was institutionally 
encouraged. As Nash (1996) argues, the subordination of women under the Restoration 
was formally supported by a number of legal codes relying on the principle o f gender 
discrimination.1
1 The Civil Code o f 1889 established the dependency o f the spouse to her husband. The wife had the 
obligation to obey, he was the legal administrator of the marriage goods and o f her salary. Women could 
not undertake any public action without the husbands’ consent (Nash 1996).
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However, the Restoration’s social projects were never adequately implemented. 
The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) dismantled the project before it was put 
into practice.
The Second Republic (1931-1936) re-adopted the plans for the expansion of a 
system of social insurance but the sudden outbreak of the Civil War (1936-1939) left their 
projects unfinished. Factors that prompt Guillen (1990) to consider the years after the 
Restoration period as the “backwardness” of the Spanish welfare state.
In terms of women’s rights, the Second Republic introduced fundamental changes 
in the legal treatment of women and the family (Cousins 1995). The Republic took away 
power from the Church, and the new Republican Constitution introduced new laws that 
favoured gender equality, such as the female suffrage, divorce by consent, and the 
abortion law reform. The Francoist regime however quickly modified these new laws, 
before any actual results were visible. The historical events that followed interrupted what 
could have been a way towards gender equality in several spheres.
Moreover, the Second Republic was a positive framework for the development of 
the feminist movement in the sense that it opened up the educational and professional 
opportunities of a large number of women, creating what Scanlon (1990: 87) calls the 
“social bases of feminism”. However, the general repression o f freedom in the following 
decades and the lack of historical roots of the feminist movement worked against the 
consolidation of any incipient process.2 Feminism developed in this period at the 
theoretical level led by a reduced number of politicians and intellectuals. Although their 
work could not challenge the social order at that time, they became the reference for the 
future development of Spanish feminism at the end of the 1960s, beginning o f the 1970s. 
The sharp political and social tensions of the period could not provide a positive 
framework for the creation of a common basis for feminists o f different political and 
social background. As San Jose (1986: 40) points out, “the Spanish feminism never 
enjoyed a free and independent development, it was dragged by the more general conflict 
between the left and the right”. The author also argues that women at that time were more 
directly identified with class origins than with gender divisions. There was a clear
2 Feminism could not develop in Spain at the end of the 19th and beginning o f the 20th century given the 
absence of the ideological and material factors that favoured the development o f the feminist movement in 
other countries. According to Scanlon (1990) these factors are the growth o f middle class, the existence o f a 
political liberal tradition, a solid framework o f parliamentary democracy and a protestant culture.
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distinction between a bourgeois and liberal feminism and a socialist feminism. Although 
both groups demanded equal rights for women, liberal feminists emphasised the rights of 
middle class women while socialist feminists gave priority to working class women. 
Thus, class was an additional factor that marked the character of Spanish feminism.
The Francoist social insurance programmes
The real beginning of some kind of welfare state started after the Civil War under 
a non-democratic political system. The Franco’s regime (1939-1975) developed social 
policy under what Moreno and Sarasa (1992) call a “reactionary despotic system”. In the 
social policy area, the regime combined the action o f the Catholic Church and of National 
Fascists (Falange) to develop a social insurance system based on charity and beneficence.
The regime is generally divided into two main periods: from 1939 to 1960 and 
from 1960 until Franco’s death in 1975. The first twenty years were characterised in terms 
of social policy as an assistential state almost exclusively dedicated to (low income) 
industrial workers in an isolated economic context (autarky).3 Given the absence of 
political rights, the concessions in social rights can only be seen in terms of a mechanism 
of social control to the service of an authoritarian power. In 1947 the Compulsory 
Insurance of Old Age and Invalidity (SOVI) was created, the field o f application and the 
risks protected were much wider than the previous one, in that non-professional invalidity 
was covered for the first time. In 1955 the risks covered by SOVI were extended to death 
and survivors with the creation o f widow and orphan benefits.
At the organisational level and due to the insufficiency of the SOVI system, the 
National Insurance scheme were complemented with private insurance funds 
(mutualidades labor ales), financed by the contributions of the employers and the 
employees. The system had a unitary structure, although the differences between the 
professional and occupational categories in the extent of risks protected still remained.
Nevertheless, both systems were still lacking in many aspects. SOVI was clearly 
insufficient in terms of the protection provided and the benefits of the private insurance 
funds implied an additional source of unequal protection among workers. The
3 The Spanish economy was preserved from external competition. Strong protectionist mechanisms were 
maintained to keep the “autonomy” o f the productive system.
50
combination of both schemes often meant a duplication of resources and a lack of  
efficiency in the management area.
Although these two first decades of the regime cannot be considered as 
introducing universal social rights, the period is important in terms of social policy, since 
most o f the provision was later included under the Basic Law of Social Security {Ley de 
Bases de la Seguridad Social) o f 1963.
The weakness and inefficiency of the social protection system was compensated 
through the existence of a strong “traditional” family. During the first two decades of the 
regime, family programmes were a central part of the social provision system. In fact they 
were a complementary source of income for many workers (Valiente 1996). The first 
family allowances were constituted in 1938 -subsidios familiares- financed by the state 
and the contributions from employment. The beneficiaries were mainly civil servants and 
dependent workers. In 1954 family allowances became monthly payments for families 
with dependent children and a dependent spouse. Also in that year, the family bonus -plus 
de cargas familiares- was also created as a complementary family programme. This 
consisted o f a supplement to the salary paid to workers with children. The bonuses were 
totally financed by the employers. Additionally, the state provided different sorts o f loans, 
benefits, preferential treatment on tax, transport, school fees, etc. and even prizes for large 
families -i.e. families with at least four dependent children.
According to Valiente (1996), family policies under Franco had two main features: 
pro-birth and anti-feminism. Increasing the birth rate was an open and declared objective 
of the regime. As the author argues, “family policy was not a hidden or implicit policy but 
a recurrent theme in the rhetoric and propaganda of the regime” (1996: 102). Franco 
aimed at stimulating population growth reinforcing a specific family model: a male 
breadwinner family instituted by Catholic marriage and composed of as many children as 
possible. For women this meant the incompatibility of domestic and caring activities with 
any paid job. The family was understood to be a hierarchical unit. Indeed, the majority o f 
the benefits were generally paid to the male breadwinner and the amounts of the benefits 
increased in the case of an economically dependent wife.
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The profile of women and family policies under Franco was ideologically defined 
and encouraged by the powerful Catholic Church and the Falange.4 Apart from the family 
programmes, other measures were taken to constrain women’s activities outside the home 
and the institution of marriage itself. The right of divorce, introduced during the Second 
Republic, was made illegal and the ‘family law’ was restored as a responsibility of the 
Church. Equality between legitimate and illegitimate children was removed, adultery and 
the use of contraception were penalised and the rights of women outside and inside 
marriage were severely restricted (Cousins 1995). From 1938 married women had to 
obtain permission from their husbands to work outside the home.
Thus, in its very rudimentary form, the foundations of the welfare state in Spain 
displayed certain similar patterns with the conservative-corporatist Bismarkian type of 
welfare state. That is, the system of social protection started to be shaped as a limited 
professional system with earning-related benefits, separate insurance programmes for 
different occupational categories, and financed mostly by contributions from the insured 
and the employers. Rights were attached to class and social status, largely dependent on a 
traditional conception of the family, where men are the family breadwinners and women 
are discouraged from working outside the realm of the house. As in the corporatist 
welfare state model, this configuration of the protection was determined by the social and 
political power of the Church.
However, we cannot ignore the fact that the socio-economic structure of the 
country differed broadly from the countries where Bismarkian welfare states first 
flourished. On the contrary, the uneven growth, large territorial disparities, the weakness 
of the institutions and the co-existence of informal economies alongside the formal ones, 
were all common features of the countries o f southern Europe (see Ferrara 1996; Rhodes 
1997). The underdevelopment of the social protection system during the first two decades 
of the Francoist regime placed a considerable distance between the actual organisation of 
society and the ‘model’ used as a reference. This is particularly true in the case of 
women’s role. Although the regime supported the sexual division o f labour between the 
productive and reproductive spheres, Spain’s agrarian and subsistence economy could not
4 The Section Femenina was a Falangist organisation that mobilised women (especially young women) 
across the country. The activities carried out in this organisation were all related with what was defined as 
“female work”, i.e. domestic and caring work.
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afford to keep women at home. Most families undertook some form of self-employed 
activity where the work of all its members was necessary. The confinement of women at 
home was in this case more ideological than real.
The institutionalisation o f the welfare state (from 1960 to 1975)
During the 1960s, though still under dictatorship, several circumstances created 
the basis for the development of real welfare benefits. The Authoritarian Welfare State, as 
Rodriguez Cabrero (1989) termed it, developed within a context o f important national 
changes. An unprecedented economic growth took place. Autarchy was progressively 
abandoned and the country began a process of international economic competition, 
although some protectionist policies were maintained. The new economic movement was 
shaped by the Stabilisation Plan of 1959 which, through different liberalising economic 
measures, promoted the introduction of new instruments of production, the restructuring 
of existing manpower patterns, and an increase in productivity (Guillen 1992). Full 
employment was reached although this is not a reliable indicator given that a considerable 
proportion of the active population migrated to other European countries. Female 
employment rates increased rapidly evidenced particularly in the service sector and 
mainly due to the development of tourism (Harrison 1978).
Economic growth triggered significant processes with a clear impact on everyday 
life. Massive migration movements from rural to urban areas provoked a rapid 
urbanisation development, and changes in traditional social and cultural patterns, such as 
secularisation processes, became visible.
One of the most important changes that took place during the 1960s was the 
transformation of family life and sexual patterns. As a consequence of women’s 
participation in paid work, the birth rate began to fall after 1964. The traditional role of 
women within the family started to break down.
Thus, although political change did not come until the late 1970s, the behaviour 
and attitudes of the majority of society had already transformed the ‘Spanish family’ (De 
Ussel 1991). The emergence of new social transformations fostered the expansion of the 
social protection system in an environment of economic growth.
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The Basic Law of Social Security (LBSS) - operationalised by the 1966 Law of 
Social Security (Ley de Seguridad Social)- was the first attempt to unify and integrate the 
social protection system through a financing basis of distribution, public management and 
an important economic contribution from the state. From the very beginning, the LBSS 
showed signs of structural deficiencies in organisation and management. In fact, not too 
long after its creation, a new legal reform was again necessary. Nevertheless, the LBSS is 
identified as a fundamental step, at least in theory, towards the creation o f a ‘universal’ 
system of protection. Under the LBSS, social expenditure was consolidated as first 
function of the public expenditure, and attempts were made to increase the 
universalisation of the social security system and to improve public education and health. 
There was also a considerable increase in the proportion of population now covered by the 
protection of the public services.
As Rodriguez Cabrero (1989) pointed out, it was at this moment that the welfare 
state developed towards its institutional basis, being strongly based on income- 
maintenance social security programmes. The social security system, under the Basic 
Law, was compound of a number of occupational regimes5 that received special treatment 
in terms o f the length of contribution periods and amounts of the contributions. Therefore, 
the protection varied greatly among the different types of workers.
As for family programmes, their importance in the system of social protection 
decreased substantially. Their value was rarely updated which meant that with the impact 
of inflation, the real value of these benefits between 1960 and 1970 went down. Moreover 
due to the new socio-demographic patterns of Spanish society, certain programmes such 
as those aimed at supporting large-size families, became obsolete.
The general progress in terms o f social policy was still highly conditioned by the 
political situation and by the corporatist nature of the social protection system. In fact, 
several authors point out that the changes that occurred in the economic and social 
provision fields have to be deciphered more as a question of adaptation than the regime’s
5 The General Regime is the central body of the system and gathers together all dependant workers of 
industry and services as well as those professional categories that are not given separate treatment through a 
special regime. In total there are five special regimes that, given their specific conditions o f time, space or 
production, require special treatment. These regimes are: Seamen workers; Miners; Agrarian (dependent 
and self-employed); Self-employed workers and Domestic Service (dependent workers o f domestic service 
in private households).
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initiative to change. According to Giner and Sevilla (1984), the openness of the country in 
economic terms first and social terms later, during the 1960s, was not a planned strategy 
of the Francoist regime. As the authors argued:
“It is a mistake to attribute econom ic developm ent and social m obility (after 1959) to the 
intentions and designs o f  Francoism. These occurred under the pressure o f  exogenous  
factors and with largely unintended consequences” (1984: 116).
Therefore, the social reforms of the 1960s meant overall a change in the dynamic 
of growth. The national social security system remained in the form of a general scheme 
for workers and several specific schemes for other professional categories, a large 
proportion of the population continued to be uncovered. However, it implied the change 
from a residual/assistential state towards an institutional state based on the social 
insurance principle. Although constrained by the political situation, the reforms o f the 
1960s created the basis for the real takeoff of the welfare system a decade later.
During the early 1970s there was a second wave of social reforms brought about 
by the social conflicts of the late 1960s, the end of economic boom and the growing 
demands of the urban population for social welfare. National and international pressure 
created a crisis o f legitimisation forcing the regime to provide more generous social rights 
through an expansive social expenditure policy (Desdentado 1987).
Laws concerning education, social security and social assistance were introduced, 
accelerating the extension of welfare benefits and services. In 1970, the General Law of 
Education modified the structure of the education system.6 New legislation introduced in 
1972 and 1974 were both attempts to correct the deficiencies o f the social security system 
in terms of its management and rationalisation. These laws had as major objectives the 
increase in the intensity of protection, basically through the increase of the quantities of 
the benefits,7 and more flexibility in the conditions of entitlement, particularly invalidity 
and widow benefits. The immediate consequence of the application o f this law was a 
certain increase in the number and also in the amounts of both these benefits (Desdentado 
1987: 117).
6 The law established compulsory education until 14 years of age, unified secondary schooling and 
pretended to build a more meritocratic system (Bonald 1998).
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In the opinion of Rodriguez Cabrero (1989), such extension of welfare benefits 
and the redistribution from profits to wages between 1970 and 1975 were the grounds on 
which the political democracy could be built as a process of political consensus. During 
this decade, social expenditure had its maximum annual growth in relation to the GDP. It 
increased from 37% of public spending in 1960 to 55% in 1970 and 65% in 1978. The 
process o f universalisation was intensified. The main areas of investment were public 
cash benefits, education and health. However, the increase in public expenditure was also 
forced by high rates of unemployment -also connected with the return of migrants from 
Europe-. The expansion of social expenditure in a period of economic recession was, to a 
large extent made at the expense of an increase in public debt.
The welfare state under the 1978 Constitution
After the death of Franco, the ‘reformers’ o f the regime headed by Suarez8 began a 
fruitful dialogue between the government and the still illegal opposition initiating the 
transition to democracy.
The way in which the political transition to democracy took place was, to a large 
extent, a result of already existing changes of mentality and values among Spanish 
society. Perez Diaz (1993) outlines the importance of the transformation of civil society 
during the 1960s and 1970s to explain the success of the political transition. By the time 
the transition took place, large sectors of society already identified themselves with 
democratic values. Moreover, Perez Diaz mentions how certain institutions had already 
initiated important movements towards democracy, which would afterwards facilitate the 
consolidation of the democratic process. The Church began a clear process of distancing 
from Francoism and the University system contributed to create an identity oppositional 
to the authoritarian regime itself. In the mid 1960s the economic, social and cultural 
institutions of Spain were already preparing themselves to live in a democracy, which 
explains, according to Perez Diaz, the considerable speed of the process o f political 
change.
7 In this sense an important step was to reduce the distances between reference wages and real incomes for 
the assignment o f pensions and not for administrative fixed rates
8 Leader o f the Christian-democrat party UCD, prime minister after the first general election in 1977.
56
The changes brought by the 1960s provided also a positive framework for the 
awakening of the feminist movement. The traditional views concerning women’s role 
started to be challenged. As Astelarra (1992) has pointed out:
“W ith the reappearance o f  clandestine organisations and the em ergence o f  opposition  
groups, a space w as created for the participation o f  w om en’s groups that criticised the 
traditional concept o f  w om en’s role. Although they m obilised a sm all proportion o f  
Spanish w om en, these groups nevertheless launched the first criticism  o f  Spanish 
patriarchal society” (1992: 43).
With the death of Franco, numerous women’s associations became more strongly 
active.9 Thus, Spanish women’s movement was defined by the political context in which 
it was bom, that is, the democratic movement against the dictatorship. Most women’s 
organisations were linked to anti-Franco and semi-clandestine opposition.
The feminist movement concentrated on two complementary sets of issues. They 
were involved with the general demands of left parties on political, social and civil rights. 
At the same time, these organisations were more specifically devoted to highlighting 
discrimination against women. The 1975 United Nations call for the International 
Women’s Year, was an impulse for the feminist movement. As Threlfall (1996: 116) 
argues “the UN’s call for non-governmental organisations to take action over sex 
discrimination both encouraged and protected the Spanish women’s movement”. The first 
Congress of Women’s Liberation held in secret and attended by 500 women, was, 
according to different authors, the starting point for the transformation o f feminism into 
an organised and consolidated movement. A year later, the first Catalan Women’s 
Congress (I Jornadas Catalanas de la Dona), supported by 4.000 women, represented the 
consolidation of the movement.
The 1978 Constitution, formulated with the agreement of all political parties, was 
clearly the first success of the democratic transition. The Constitution became, from that 
moment, the basic instrument of welfare state and social security regulation, signifying a 
benchmark in the orientation of welfare state policies. Certain welfare state’s areas,
9The most active women’s organisation was the ‘Women’s Democratic Movement’ (Movimiento 
democratico de mujeres), closely linked to the Spanish communist party (PCE) and with an active 
opposition role against the dictatorship.
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particularly health and education, were defined as fundamental components o f universal 
citizenship’s rights.
The Constitution established the catalogue o f civic, political, and social 
democratic rights. In terms of social security, the document designed a model of social 
security that consisted of a mixed system of social benefits that included the health 
assistance, contributory and non-contributory public cash benefits and social assistance 
and services.10
In terms of the equality between the sexes, the Constitution introduced the formal 
equal rights of men and women in every sphere, from legislation, to education, politics 
and employment. Others measures adopted were the legalisation of contraception (1978), 
equal pay legislation (1980), divorce by consent (1981) and equal rights of men and 
women inside marriage and of children bom outside and inside marriage (1981) (Cousins 
1995).
However, as will be explored in more detailed in chapter 5, key issues of women’s 
rights were not incorporated to the final document. The Constitution did not have any 
reference to birth control and abortion rights, two important demands of feminists. These 
issues were an important source of confrontation between left and right, and given the 
consensus character of this policy process, they were the kind of issues that had to be left 
aside. Feminists inside left political parties soon became, as Threlfall (1996: 116) puts it, 
the “opposition within the opposition” in the sense that they had to convince their male 
colleagues of the necessity to include gender issues in the political agenda.
Notwithstanding, the Constitution was the first legal document in contemporary 
Spain to establish formal gender equality and it was under the UCD centre-right 
government of Suarez that important rights for women were recognised in practice. 
However, unlike most o f the centre-right and conservative parties in other European 
countries, the UCD did not implement family policies. In fact it was during UCD’s period
10 At the organisational level the competencies were divided between the different territorial levels. The 
central administration becomes responsible for the legislation and formulation o f all social protection 
policies and for the economic management o f the social security system. The regional entities become 
responsible for the management of certain benefits such as assistential and non-contributory benefits. The 
Constitution also considered the further development o f the decentralisation process in the organisation of  
programmes and resources. The management of social protection is grouped in four main administrative 
entities: National Institute o f Social Security (INSS), National Institute of Employment (INE), National 
Institute o f Health Care (INSALUD), and National Institute for Old Age and Disability contingencies 
(INSERSO).
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in office that budget for most family programmes were reduced in practice because 
benefit levels were not adjusted in line with inflation.
According to Valiente (1996) there are three main factors that explain the almost 
complete absence of family policy issues in the UCD public discourse and political 
priorities. First, other matters such as the creation of a legal framework for political action 
had priority in the consolidation process of democracy. Secondly, the consensus stance 
that characterised the transition implied that actors had to concentrate on those issues 
where agreement was possible. In that sense, family programmes were the types of issues 
to avoid because they contained echoes of the Francoist rhetoric. And thirdly, the absence 
of a unified public institution specialising in family affairs.
Limits and potentialities o f the expanding welfare state (from 1982 to 1990)
The transition period is said to culminate with the first victory of the socialist party 
PSOE in 1982.11 Two contradictory processes in the field of social and economic policy 
marked the first two terms of office of the socialist governments. The necessity of 
modernising the economic apparatus and achieving a greater convergence with Europe led 
to a political economy that was trying to accomplish a higher degree of flexibility and de­
regulation in the labour market. The political weakness of the first years o f democracy 
and the context of the economic crisis were not a favourable environment to accomplish 
structural reforms in the productive apparatus that were, however, urgently needed. 
Additionally, the international context of progressive economic globalisation imposed 
measures of de-regularisation, labour flexibility and public expenditure restrain in all 
nation states. Thus, as a major legacy from the previous period and under the pressure 
from outside, one of the main objectives of the first years of PSOE rule was the 
modernisation of the productive apparatus. The government fostered a process of 
economic ‘rationalisation’, timidly initiated by the previous UCD government. This 
process involved macro-economic reforms concerning large economic sectors and
11 PSOE obtained majority in the first three general elections (1982, 1986 and 1989). In 1993 it lost 
majority and formed a government with the support of the nationalist Catalan party CiU. PSOE’s period of  
office ended in 1996 when the conservative party PP won the elections and formed government with the 
support o f CiU.
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restructuring of ‘unproductive’ industries.12 Two important social consequences were the 
moderation in wage increases and the reduction of workers in these economic sectors 
through early retirement and unemployment benefits. High levels o f unemployment 
appeared revealing its definite structural character.13 These policies were coupled with a 
stabilisation in the level of social spending.14 Moreno and Sarasa (1992) argued that the 
heavy financial burden linked to these policies and the large resources needed to 
accomplish the ‘competitive rationalisation’ of industries have prevented the Spanish state 
from becoming an important machine of job creation.
Parallel to this neo-liberal economic policy, issues o f equality and social rights 
became legitimate political values. PSOE’s commitment to social-democrat ideals and the 
integration of Spain into the European Union in 1986 were factors that enhanced the 
development of the welfare state. As Rodriguez Cabrero (1998) points out, the European 
Union, while imposing liberal economic polices, also favoured the maintenance and 
development of social protection systems, highly legitimised from the political point of 
view as being an important part of the social capital and political culture o f the European 
Union.
The widening of the Spanish welfare state was achieved through the 
universalisation of some of its spheres. The balance has been partly achieved through a 
high degree of universalisation in the areas of education and health, which have had a 
redistribution effect on family incomes. The health system15 started its transformation 
from a previous configuration along professional lines and financed through workers and 
employers contributions to a universal system totally financed by the state. The state was 
also fully responsible for the education system16 in its financing and public offer, 
introducing a principle of equality of opportunities aimed at balancing out the differences 
between private and public education.
The policies targeted at universali sing rights and income redistribution showed 
positive effects on certain spheres of social life. In relation to poverty rates, different
12 The share o f employment in the different economic sectors changed substantially over the period of a 
decade. In 1975 the share of employment was 22% in agriculture, 38% in industry and 40% in services. In 
1985 the relation was 16%, 32%, 52% respectively (European Commission 1999).
13 In 1984-1985 the unemployment rate was over 20% (Perez Diaz 1993).
14 Almost half o f the public spending growth during the first years o f the Socialist government was 
dedicated to the payment o f public debt interest (Moreno and Sarasa 1992: 26).
15 Royal Decree 137/1984 and the General Law of Health (Ley General de Sanidad).
16 Organic Law o f Education (Ley Organica de Derecho a la Educacion) LODE 8/1985.
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studies (Del Rio and Ruiz Castillo 1997; Ayala and Martinez 1999) have demonstrated 
the decrease of the levels of poverty during the 1980s. Throughout the decade, there was a 
reduction o f traditional forms o f poverty, particularly among old people. According to 
Ayala and Martinez (1999), the extension of contributory and non-contributory retirement 
and invalidity benefits helped to contain poverty levels. “The data reveals that during the 
1980s Spain was, together with Italy and France, the EU country where poverty rates for 
people over 65 of age were the most reduced” (1999: 660).
The improvements in education, health and well-being of the society generated the 
acceleration of socio-demographic changes already initiated in the precedent decades 
noted earlier. The speed of the changes created what Garrido (1992) has called the ‘two 
biographies of women’. The life experiences and the personal expectations o f younger 
and older generations of women were increasingly divergent. The decrease of birth rate 
has been unprecedented from 1977. The number average of children per woman decreased 
from 2.9 in 1970 to 1.9 in 1982 and 1.2 in 1992 (IM 1992), and since then has dropped 
below the replacement rate. Moreover, the age of women giving birth for the first time 
increased (IM 1992).
The institution of marriage also experienced profound changes. The marriage rate17 
decreased from 8% in 1972 to 5% in 1982, and the increase of separation and divorce 
since 1981 (when it was legally re-established) until 1990 has been 120% in the case of 
separation and 140% in the case of legal divorce (IM 1992).
Contradictorily, however, socio-demographic changes were not coupled with 
labour integration of women. Although, from 1980 there has been a constant increase of 
female activity rates,18 which runs contrary to the previous era, when female participation 
in the labour market fluctuated, depending on economic cycles (Carrasco and Mayordomo 
1997), female employment rates were still very low in comparison with men and also in 
comparison with the other European countries. The activity rate (as a percentage of the 
working age population) was 34% for women in 1985 (80% for men) and 41% in 1990 
(78% for men). These percentages, although considerably lower in comparison with most
17 Number o f marriages by 1000 inhabitants.
18 From 1980 to 1995 total activity rate increased to 2.5 million people o f which 2.1 million were women. 
That means that approximately 85% o f the increase in activity rate was female. Considering age, the most 
spectacular increase in the activity rates has been for women between 30 and 40 years o f age. The age 
group from 30-34 increased from 38% in 1984 to 56.3% in 1990 and 61.4% in 1993. The next age group 
(35-39) went from 31.9% in 1984 to 49% and 56.9% in 1990 and 1993 correspondingly (CES 1994: 56).
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European countries, have been approaching the EU standards (50.9% in 1985 and 54.8% 
in 1990). However, as the employment and unemployment figures show, the significant 
increase in activity rates does not always imply improvement in employment prospects 
for women. The employment rate (as percentage of the working age population) was 25% 
in 1985 (64% for men) and 31% in 1990 (69% for men). Again, the distance in relation to 
the EU average has decreased, but is still significant (45% EU average female 
employment rate in 1985 and 49.4% in 1990). Unemployment was high for both men and 
women, but much higher for the latter: 25% in 1985 (20% for men) and 24% in 1990 
(12% for men). EU average was 11.7% for women and 8.8% for men in 1985 and 9.8% 
for women and 6.3% for men in 1990 (European Commission 1999). Youth 
unemployment (percentage of the population from 15-24) for women was also much 
higher in Spain than in the rest of the European countries including those of the south 
European countries.19 The high levels of long-term unemployment also affect women 
significantly.20 During the 1980s, long-term unemployment was concentrated among 
young people seeking first employment, a decade later, however, the profile was adult 
women with family responsibilities, with job experience and intermediate educational 
levels (Gutierrez and Guillen 1998: 24).
At the organisational level, the 1980s were also characterised by two other 
important features. Firstly, there was a progressive decentralisation o f the public 
administration and, secondly, the administration initiated a partial process o f privatisation 
in certain spheres of the welfare state. Considering the first point, the administrative and 
political decentralisation means that the home nations and regions (Comunidades 
Autonomas) started to assume responsibility for the planning and implementation 
processes o f social policy. However, the decentralisation process has not occurred equally 
in all spheres of the welfare state nor has it been a homogeneous process. Some regions, 
the ‘historic home nations’ like Catalonia and the Basque Country, have obtained more 
power and responsibilities than other regions. Goma and Subirats (1998) have attempted
19 In 1985 female youth unemployment was 19.7% in Spain; 14% in Portugal; 14.5 in Italy; 14% in France; 
and 10.8% in the UK. In 1990 the figures were 16.8% in Spain; 6% in Portugal; 13.2% in Italy; 9.5% in 
France; and 6.4 in the UK (European Commission 1999).
20 Long-term unemployment (% o f the labour force) 1985: Spain 16.2%; Portugal 7.1%; Italy 9.2%; France 
6.3%; Germany 4.0%; and the UK 4.0%. In 1990: Spain 14.8%; Portugal 3.2%; Italy 9.9%; France 5.4%; 
Germany 2.5%; and the UK 1.5% (European Commission 1999).
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to measure the degree of input of each governmental level in the elaboration o f public 
policies. In the case o f the different welfare state domains, the authors conclude that while 
in health, education and housing policies, the decentralisation process has largely 
transferred central state responsibilities to regional governments, in the social protection 
sphere the state remains responsible for the planning and the implementation o f the 
policies. Decentralisation has merely occurred in the administration of assistential and 
non-contributory benefits.
In relation to the second aspect, there has been an increasing role for private and 
voluntary organisations (particularly the Catholic organisation Caritas and the Red Cross) 
in the financing and administration of social provisions. The Church and the Non- 
Governmental Organisations receive state funds from income tax (IRPF). Regional 
governments and local councils give economic incentives and grants to those institutions 
dealing with social issues. The main groups of attention are the elderly, handicapped and 
immigrants, and increasingly victims of domestic violence and ethnic minorities. 
However, the co-operation between these institutions has been scarcely institutionalised 
(Rodriguez Cabrero 1998).
Continuity in the social protection system
Despite the major progress in the extension of the welfare state, the social 
protection system displayed unequal results. Although, from the 1980s the socialist 
government did accomplish strategic shifts of content in certain policies such as taxation, 
education, health and territorial policy, such changes did not impinge on the social 
security system that remained largely occupational. The historical legacy was in this case 
translated into an adaptation of the old model without any major questioning of its 
foundations.
The legal reforms taken during this period aimed at consolidating and 
strengthening the professional system. Thus, the central point of the legislation in 1985 
was the reform of cash benefits, particularly the law aimed at reinforcing the professional, 
contributory and proportional character of retirement and invalidity benefits.21
21 The contribution period providing access to benefits was extended (from 10 to 15 years) and the period 
defined to calculate the amount o f the retirement pensions was also widened (from 2 to 8 years).
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Parallel to the strengthening of the contribution principles, reforms were carried 
out to separate the nature of the protection between a core professional scheme and an 
assistential and subsidiary non-contributory scheme. The 1989 reform of the financing 
structure of the social security differentiated the sources o f financing in relation to the 
nature of the protection given, distinguishing between contributory benefits financed 
basically through social contributions, and non-contributory benefits financed through 
taxes. This distinction became even clearer with the 1990 Law, which established the old 
age and invalidity non-contributory benefits, for persons in need and without enough 
economic resources.
Thus, although efforts had been placed on universalising the cash benefits system 
and the protection of unemployment, the Spanish social protection system continued, after 
these reforms, to be mainly a system of income maintenance to those citizens who have 
made contributions to the system during their working life. Income maintenance is based 
on occupational status and there are different schemes for private employees, civil 
servants and the self-employed, often with widely differing regulations concerning 
contributions and benefit formulas. This trait o f income maintenance coupled with labour 
flexibility creates a polarisation with regard to the protection offered. It provides a 
reasonably large degree of protection to the main sectors of the labour force well 
integrated into the core labour market. However, there are important social groups that do 
not belong to the formal economy on a continuous basis, and therefore have weak 
subsidisation. Critically, this is largely the case for women. A large proportion of the 
female population are outside the labour market and those that are in paid work are in 
precarious and unstable employment.
The difficulty for women in accessing the labour market and the characteristics of 
the system of social provision have contributed to a slowing down of the emergence of 
new patterns o f socialisation and the breaking off o f traditional sexual roles. The promises 
of modernisation take longer to consolidate. The family continues to be a vital institution 
of social protection for a large proportion of citizens. This has encumbered the progress 
for women’s economic independence, and equally made it hard for many individuals to 
receive care and protection outside the family.
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The political interest in gender equality
Changes in the political culture fostered the consideration of gender equality as an 
accepted political value. PSOE came to power with a manifesto commitment to gender 
equality and promotion policies. There was an explicit political desire to change the 
situation with reference to gender inequalities. It was under the first socialist government 
that the feminist movement was for the first time given a space within a framework of 
political and institutional representation. The ‘institutionalisation’ of the feminist 
movement or state feminism, as it has been called in other countries with similar 
experiences, was formalised in 1983 with the creation of the Women’s Rights Institute 
(Instituto de la Mujer). This public body has had relevant implications for the evolution of 
gender issues in Spain.
The creation of the Insitututo de la Mujer (IM) was a demand o f the feminist 
movement in the early 1980s, learning from the experiences o f several European 
countries, particularly France and Italy. According to Valiente (1996) the most important 
factor in the creation of the IM was the acceptance within the PSOE government of the 
demands made by certain sectors of the women’s movement during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. These sectors, Valiente argues, were frequently ‘double activists’, that is, 
women equally involved in the socialist party and the feminist movement, with a clear 
conception of gender discrimination in the different spheres o f Spanish society and with a 
considerable influence within the socialist party and therefore within the government. 
From 1984 until 1995 the budget of the Institute tripled in nominal terms, which indicates 
the commitment of the Ministry responsible of the Institute22 towards its consolidation. 
The relationship between the institutional body for gender equality and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs were fluid given that the two heads o f the Ministry during that period were 
women clearly identified with the women’s rights movement.
In short, several factors, both at national and supranational levels created a 
favourable environment for the development of the feminist institution. As Threlfall 
(1996) argues:
“It is doubtful that any other European country experienced a comparable phenom enon, 
not just because the government that acted as its patron w as re-elected four tim es, but
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because the earlier European reigns o f  social democracy occurred before second-wave 
feminism was in full swing” (1996: 124).
The policy of the IM focused on two equal opportunities’ schemes (1988-90 and 
1993-95). These programmes were created under the direct influence o f the Action 
Programmes of the European Community. The main goals have been from the beginning 
the study, information and report of sexual discrimination and the definition of the 
governmental strategy towards gender equality. The procedures have consisted of 
measures o f positive action mainly in the areas of education, employment, and political 
activity.
It is worth noting that the emphasis placed on equal opportunities policies for 
women was directly correlated with a rejection of family policies by the IM, most o f the 
feminist movement and socialist feminists, since family policies were still considered as a 
Francoist inheritance. The family was seen as a site o f oppression for women, and 
therefore efforts were made to act politically on behalf of women alone and not in the 
name of women as part of a family unit. As Valiente (1996) notes, the best family policy 
was, at that time, a non-policy.
Other bodies for gender equality at regional and local levels were also created.23 
The IM also gave an important percentage of its budget to fund women’s organisations 
across the country.
A second political resolution adopted by the socialist government was a quota 
system created in 1988 by decision of the party congress. The goal was to achieve the 
representation of women in all levels within the hierarchy of government’s bodies in a 
percentage of no less than 25%. The participation of women in parliament within the 
socialist party increased from 7.1% in the 1986 election to 19.4% in the 1989 election. 
However, although female representation in government and in the party PSOE increased 
in relation to the previous period, it did not fulfil the promise o f the 25% representation.
22 The IM was, from its creation, an autonomous body dependent from 1983 to 1988 on the Ministry of 
Culture. From 1988, the Institute became part o f the Ministry o f Social Affairs.
23 The foundation law o f the Instituto de la Mujer contemplated the establishment o f relations with 
institutions o f similar nature in the autonomous communities and local councils.
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The new political framework o f the 1990s
The economic recession and the new economic demands of the 1990s intensified 
the dual conception of the social protection system. The Maastricht requirements for 
European convergence for instance, led to a restrictive monetary policy. The new political 
framework resulting from the 1989 national elections, and consolidated in the 1993 
elections, also had important repercussions. PSOE lost majority in Parliament and had to 
govern with the support of the centre-right Catalan nationalist party CiU. The new 
‘political ally’ had strong demands in terms of restrictive expenditure policies with a 
regressive social profile. The centrality of anti-inflation policies, the partial privatisation 
of public enterprises, the assistentialisation of universal services and a new financing 
model for the regions were some of the important demands (Goma and Subirats 1998). 
The support of CiU was also visible in the withdrawal o f certain issues from the political 
agenda, such as the reform of the abortion legislation. Labour and economic policies 
penetrated deep into the deregulation of the labour market24 although at the same time, the 
government introduced active employment policies and the creation o f the tripartite 
consultative economic and social council, CES (Consejo Economico y  Social) .
In this period, social policy has been firmly subordinated to economic policy 
producing a wide gap between an extremely flexible and liberal economic policy and a 
system of social protection still based on traditional labour market patterns. The 
combination of access to the labour market of non-traditional active labour force together 
with the new configuration of the labour market as a consequence of the political and 
monetary economy imposed new challenges for social policy. The disproportionate 
growth of temporary contracts and high labour flexibility25 affected mainly young people 
and women. Most o f these workers did not have access to any kind o f social protection.
The income-maintenance basis of the social protection system and the neo-liberal 
principles of the economic policy, together with the consolidation o f the decentralisation 
process, have generated, according to several authors (Ayala 1995; Mangen 1996) the rise
24 The 1994 reform o f the labour market created new short-term contracts with little or no social protection 
(no right to unemployment and no right to temporal incapacity). This made redundancies easier and 
cheaper. Enterprises o f temporary work were also legalised.
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of spatial and social exclusion processes. Core-periphery territorial effects increased due 
to differences between regional communities. The social core-periphery effect is twofold. 
First, within the labour market there is an increasing distance between those with stable 
full-time employment and a second group, in a very unstable and precarious employment 
situation, frequently associated with lower pay. Second, the effect also applies to the 
performance of the social protection system that distinguishes between a large group of 
workers entitled to receive benefits and another group who is not entitled to receive any 
kind o f public protection and have no access to private insurance.
The increase in poverty rates during the 1990s shows this rise o f new patterns of 
social exclusion. If, during the previous decade, poverty rates went down, this tendency is 
now being reversed. According to Ayala and Martinez (1999) the relationship between 
unemployment and poverty has been more intense during the 1990s than in the previous 
decade.26 The authors argue that there are three main reasons that explain this closer link 
between (non-) access to the labour market and situations o f poverty. Firstly, the public 
system of protection, particularly the unemployment benefits, reduced its capacity as a 
safety net. Secondly, the labour market is increasingly segmented and thirdly, there has 
been a decrease in the capacity of informal networks, mainly the family, to provide 
protection when the state fails to do so. People under the age of 30 and single mothers27 
appear now as two new groups most likely to be affected by poverty.
Nonetheless, as happened during the 1980s, the feminisation o f  poverty is still 
largely a result of the number of old women living in poverty. According to Adelantado 
(1998), 40% of households headed by a woman over 65 live in poverty.
Focusing specifically on women’s access to the labour market, some authors 
(Carrasco and Mayordomo 1997; Guillen 1997) indicate that the clear disadvantage of 
women in terms of access to paid employment lead to adoption o f different employment 
patterns mainly according to education and age. There is clear segmentation between 
young women that have had access to some kind of training and have had the possibility
25 Fixed-term contracts increased from 18% in 1985 to 38% in 1994 for female workers (percentage o f total 
employment) and from 14% to 31% for male workers. Part-time employment represented in 1990 12% of  
female employment and 15% in 1994 (European Commission 1999).
26 Their work shows that during the 1980s the increase of unemployment was parallel to a reduction of 
poverty rates. However, during the 1990s and compared with the previous decade, both, unemployment and 
poverty rates increased (Ayala and Martinez 1999).
27 According to CES (1995), 85% in 1990 and 87% in 1995 of single parent households were headed by 
women.
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of labour integration with the expansive cycles of the economy, and older women who 
have had no chance of receiving training. Education plays a major role in labour market 
opportunities for women. Women with high educational levels have had greater 
opportunities to work overall in the public sector and to a lesser extent in the private one. 
These women represent the group with higher levels o f continuity in their labour market 
participation and thus higher access to protection. Nevertheless, female youth 
unemployment (19.5% in 1994) is still much higher than the EU average. Moreover, 
employment insecurity particularly hits women. The percentage of women on fixed-term 
contracts was almost 40% in 1994. This percentage is much higher than any other EU 
country (for instance France 12.4% and Germany 11%). These figures show an increase 
of employment vulnerability given the difficulties to find another job afterwards. 
Furthermore, and as a result of the labour market reform in 1994, the use of part-time 
work increased significantly among women. In 1995, part-time workers represented 17% 
of the female employed population (in contrast with men who only represent 3% of their 
total employed population). In fact, women represent from 75% to 80% of total part time 
workers (CES 1996). Nonetheless, part-time employment in Spain, as well as in the other 
countries o f southern Europe is less developed than in the northern European countries.28 
However, in Spain, this type of employment seems to be mainly involuntary. In 1994, 
only 3% of these workers were content with their situation (CES 1994). 9% cited family 
responsibilities as the main reason to be engaged in part-time employment, while 43% 
argued that the reason was the type of activity. Therefore, professional and occupational 
segregation of women in the labour market seems to be the principal explanation for their 
engagement with part-time work (CES 1994: 12). One o f the explanatory factors might be 
the weak level of support in reconciling paid work and family life, given the patent lack of 
childcare provision, and insufficient flexible working time arrangements. Moreover, part- 
time employment is often associated with low income and vulnerability in terms of 
protection. As it will be shown in chapter 4, entitlement to benefits heavily rely on full­
time and stable patterns of employment. Flexible arrangements insofar as they are most of 
the time linked to employment insecurity, do not lead to important social protection 
benefits.
28 Percentage o f part-time employment in 1994: 15.2% in Spain; 12.1% in Portugal; 12.4% in Italy; 27.8% 
in France; 33% in Germany; and 44.4% in the UK (European Commission 1999).
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As for family benefits, the remaining family programmes were, during the 1990s, 
converted into instruments against poverty for dependent children through the 
establishment of means tested benefits. In addition, a non-contributory means-tested child 
allowance was established within social security. Family benefits have been diverted 
through the tax crediting system (IRPF). However, as we will see in the next chapter, tax 
relief for children and other dependents is not important enough to compensate for the 
non-existence of monetary transactions.
The immediate future of the system of social protection in Spain seems to be 
framed under the principle of continuity of the existing one and reinforcing the potential 
of its professional focus. The Toledo Pact, signed by the majority of political parties in 
Parliament in 1995, analysed the structural problems o f the Spanish social security 
system, indicating the principal reforms that were needed in order to guarantee the 
viability of the present public system of cash benefits. The lines of action proposed were 
based on making viable (in economic terms) the existing model of social security. With 
the focus on consolidation, any attempt to profoundly modify the system was abandoned. 
The model of protection is still based on two main forms: a central contributory one - 
income substitution- financed by social contributions, and a second non contributory one 
based on a secondary principle of solidarity and financed through state transfers to the 
social security budget. Another two levels of technical provisions complemented both 
systems: health care and social services of universal character and financed through taxes. 
The Toledo Pact’s report also asserted the necessity of a complementary private system of 
insurance, with a total private management, for all those citizens “who voluntarily wish to 
complete the protection of the public system” (MTSS 1995a: 78). One of the 
recommendations made by the report to promote this last objective was to support private 
pensions and savings schemes by improving the fiscal incentives. The report also argued 
in favour of the separation and clarification of the sources of financing. That is, a 
contributory model financed through social contributions and a non-contributory model 
financed solely by the state.
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Conclusions
From this general overview of the specific development of the Spanish welfare 
state, some important points can be outlined as conclusions. The origins o f the first 
institutionalised form of protection came at the beginning o f the 1960s in the absence of 
democracy. The Authoritarian Welfare State developed primarily through a social 
insurance scheme. The professional nature of social insurance programmes, the 
intervention of the Church and the role of the traditional family, are all characteristics of 
the Bismarkian type of welfare that have been identified in the early periods o f the 
Spanish welfare state.
However, Spain soon configured a continental model o f specific nature. This type 
of welfare state coincides with what Ferrera (1996) has identified as a common path to 
modernisation o f the countries of southern Europe. The presence of a strong left (inside 
and outside the political arena) pushed for the universalisation o f certain spheres of the 
welfare state, mainly health and education, and the introduction of equal o f opportunity 
ideals. At the same time, the system of social protection preserved a very corporatist 
nature, maintaining a high degree of continuity with the previous scheme developed under 
Franco. It offered generous protection to the core group of workers and fragile 
subsidisation to those at the periphery. The family is a crucial if  shadowy figure in the 
organisation of welfare. This corporatist organisation of the social protection was, for a 
period of time, effective in reducing poverty in absolute terms although not so effective in 
providing women with the means for economic independence.
Applied to gender relations, the left and feminism worked together to transform 
perceptions of social equality. Gender equality became an independent political interest 
that resulted in the formation of state feminism though the power of this independent 
body needs to be explored.
Socio-economic and political changes of the 1990s altered the scenario in more 
than one sense. The political and administrative process of decentralisation is being taken 
further and the dual conception of the social protection is intensified. Labour market 
flexibility deepens the distance between centre, traditional male labour force, and 
periphery workers, women and young people with precarious work conditions. Also, 
partly as a result of the new expectations of independence of women produced by access
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to universal rights, the traditional image of the extended and protective family blurs both 
as a symbol of identity and as an effective informal institution o f welfare. The 
combination of these processes has generated new patterns of social exclusion, which 
neither the labour market or the state seem able to resolve.
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Chapter 4
Men and Women in Spanish Social Security
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to assess the effects o f the social protection system on 
gender relations. The focus is on the ways in which the Spanish social security system 
organises the provision of welfare. Attention is paid to the criteria for initial and ongoing 
eligibility, level and generosity o f benefits and the consequences of these factors for 
gender relations.
For the purpose of my analysis, the object of study has been limited to the cash 
benefits delivered by the public social security system. In Spain social insurance is the 
main pillar o f social protection and other non-insurance contribution programmes have 
less importance.1 Apart from pensions, attention will also be paid to family protection and 
maternity leave. A supplementary discussion of social services in kind and the income tax 
system will also be provided. These two elements are complementary to cash benefits and 
need to be taken into account to assess in real terms the public support to the family and 
individual protection.
The organisation o f  social provision
The public system of cash benefits consists of a main contributory scheme and a 
secondary non-contributory means-tested scheme. Contributory benefits are based on the 
contributory history of individuals in their working life. The system can be classified as a 
‘Pay As You Go’ scheme, since the contributions of the current working population pay 
the pensions of the current pensioners. Assistential benefits were replaced by non­
contributory benefits in 1990. This new scheme aimed to be more ‘universal’ and 
complementary than an assistential form of protection. The scheme was designed as 
another form of income support for those individuals with economic needs and who do
‘Cash benefits accounted in 1996 for 66% of the total social security expenditure, Health care represented 
31%, personal social services 2% and others 1.5% (Informe Econdmico-Financiero 1999).
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not have a contributions record that enables them to qualify for the contributory cash 
benefits scheme. The non-contributory scheme is integrated in the social security system 
and the benefits are paid and regulated by the central government although the 
administration corresponds to regional governments. Since 1992, categorical assistential 
benefits at national level are only received by those claimants already benefiting from or 
with a right to an assistential benefit before 1992. Otherwise, assistential benefits come 
through the regional and local levels, under the general scheme of ‘Minimum Incomes’, 
totally demarcated from the social security system.
Contributory benefits play a much more important role -in terms of budget and 
number o f benefits- than non-contributory benefits. In 1977, contributory benefits 
accounted for 72% of all cash benefits paid by the social security. Since then, contributory 
benefits have been increasing constantly. In 1990, contributory benefits almost reached 
90%. Thereafter, the introduction of non-contributory benefits reduced, almost 
symbolically, the importance of contributory benefits, just over two percent o f the total 
budget went from contributory to non-contributory benefits in 1996 (Informe Economico- 
Financiero 1996).
Therefore, as in the conservative-corporatist welfare model, the focus of the social 
security system in Spain has been on cash transfers more than on direct provisions of 
services. Also, as in the corporatist regime-type, the principle of social insurance is based 
on labour market participation. Here, the preservation of a proportion of former earnings 
is more important than providing a general needs-oriented minimum or basic security. 
Thus, individual’s employment record plays a fundamental role in accessing the cash 
benefits system. Time is a basic resource. Social insurance rights are shaped by time 
requirements such as the minimum working hours, duration and continuity of 
employment or contribution periods. Because of gender inequalities in the labour market, 
requirements o f stable and long periods of contribution to the labour market perform, 
generally, worse for women than for men, in terms of both, access and quality o f the 
benefits.
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Female representation in contributory benefits. Access to direct and derived benefits2
Despite the fact that labour market inequalities do have an impact on men and 
women’s access to benefits an important starting point of this analysis is that the cash 
benefits’ outcomes, the prime object of study, cannot be totally explained by examining 
the labour market. On the contrary, these inequalities are the result o f policy options in the 
design of social protection and in the establishment of the pension rules.
A fundamental policy option in the construction o f the social protection system 
has been the distinction made between direct and derived benefits within the contributory 
scheme. Individual or direct benefits, such as retirement and invalidity benefits, are 
exclusively dependent on labour market performance. However, derived benefits, which 
are mainly widow3 benefits, are based on the contribution record of the former spouse 
and, thus, the entitlement right comes through family status.
Derived benefits do not have any relevance in countries o f a liberal or social- 
democrat welfare tradition. For different reasons, survivorship is a very minor component 
in countries like the UK (0.2 of social protection expenditure in 1994) and Denmark (0.1) 
(table A.2).4 However, for the continental welfare tradition and the countries of southern 
Europe, survivors’ benefits represent an important form of protection, fundamentally for 
old age women. The conservative welfare tradition shows a stronger support o f the male- 
breadwinner type of family and usually provides generous social benefits to the family 
provider.
Generally speaking, women as a social group have easier access to derived 
benefits than to direct ones. Female employment patterns are often insufficient to gain 
access to a direct individual contributory benefit. We will see to what extent this
2 Data gathered on the MTSS official statistics on affiliation to social security (evolution o f workers 
registered with social security) is not classified by sex. This was emphasised in a recent report made by the 
Economic and Social Council (CES 1996) as a major obstacle to study men's and women's performance in 
social security. Here we account for access of men and women in all cash benefits and its evolution over 
time.
3 In Spain men are also eligible for widowed benefits. However, given the fact that the vast majority of  
recipients are women, I will be referring to these benefits as widow benefits.
4 In the liberal welfare state tradition, cash benefits for families have been kept at low levels. This model of 
welfare has generally relied on means testing and there has been a prominence o f occupational and fiscal 
welfare. For the social-democratic countries, social benefits are not heavily funded through contributions 
but through state transfers and there has been a more universal approach to social protection. Therefore, 
benefits with a high degree of familialism, such as widow benefits, have not been supported through 
income maintenance.
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differentiation in the entitlement rights affects men and women differently and its 
evolution over time. The focus of this analysis will be on contributory retirement and 
invalidity benefits as the two types of direct benefits and on contributory widow benefits 
as the main form of derived benefits. As we shall see, there has been a decrease in female 
representation in direct benefits and an increase in the derived ones. Moreover, the 
different demographic pattern between men and women is an important feature in their 
access to benefits. The population of pensioners has increased in absolute terms due to the 
demographic trends.5 Furthermore, women have higher life expectancy6 and that explains 
their over-representation in the oldest age groups of all the different benefits. In terms of 
access to contributory benefits it is important to bear in mind that women pensioners are 
concentrated in the oldest age groups and, thus, are more vulnerable to situations of 
poverty, brought about by old age, such as, precarious health conditions and less physical 
mobility.
Retirement pensions are, both in terms of claimants and in percentage of the 
budget (tables A.3 and A.4) the most important part o f the Spanish social security 
contributory pensions scheme. They represent between 45% and 48% of the total 
contributory benefits since 1986, obtaining more than 50% of the budget. Outlays on 
retirement pensions have increased in the last decade due to the increase in pensioners’ 
population and also due to a general transfer from invalidity benefits, as well as quality of 
entitlement and coverage extension. Since 1994, invalidity pensioners that reach 65 years 
of age are automatically converted into retirement pensioners. As a consequence of this 
reform, invalidity benefits have decreased in terms of claimants (from 27% of all 
recipients in 1986 to 24% in 1996) and also in terms o f budget allocation (29% in 1986 
and 24% in 1996).
Widow benefits have been increasing in number as well as in budget allocation. In 
1986, widow benefits’ recipients were 24% of all contributory recipients, ten years later, 
they were 26% of total recipients; in fact, since 1991, there have been more recipients of 
widow benefits than of invalidity ones. After retirement, they are now the second largest
5In 1960 people over 65 represented 8% o f the population, in 1981 they were already 11% of the total 
population and by 1995 people over 65 represented more than 15% of the population. Thus, the ageing rate 
has increased from 11 points in 1980 to 13.4 in 1992 (Adelantado et al. 1998).
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category of contributory benefits. Nevertheless, invalidity benefits continue to consume a 
higher budgetary percentage than widow benefits (24% for the former and 18% for the 
latter in 1996). As will be analysed later, the different levels of generosity of the benefits 
explain the larger budgetary allocation for invalidity benefits. The incomes o f invalidity 
benefits are substantially higher than the incomes of widow benefits.7
In relation to female representation in retirement benefits, in 1982 women were 
40% of the total recipients (table A.5). This percentage has decreased through the years, 
representing 32% in 1996. Looking at the distribution o f pensioners in each age group 
(table A.6), there are considerable differences between men and women that are worth 
pointing out. In the age groups corresponding to early retirement (before 65 years of age) 
women’s share of retirement pensions is very small. Only a small proportion of women 
apply (or can apply) for early retirement. It may also be the case that, given their own 
unattractive income history, they have given up their retirement pension and chosen 
widow benefits, where eligible. Female representation increases considerably as we move 
towards the oldest age categories. While men aged between 65 to 69 represent, since 
1986, the largest age group of male retirement pensioners, for women it is the oldest 
category (80 years and over) that has the largest number of recipients. Since 1989, 
approximately 30% of female pensioners are 80 years o f age and older.
As has been outlined in chapter 3, the minimum period o f contribution for a 
retirement benefit increased from ten to fifteen years in the 1985 reform. This five year 
increase in the time ceiling damaged the expectations of those workers, most obviously 
women, with short or fragmented careers, who need to work for an extra five years to gain 
a pension.
Moreover, the Spanish system does not, as other countries do,8 consider crediting 
pension contributions during gaps in working life. Except for maternity leave and the first
6 In 1990 women lived as average 80 years while men lived 73 years (Informe Economico-Financiero 
1998). Since 1982, women represent more than 58% of the population over 65.
7 Orphan pensions and ‘In Family Favour’ (family members o f the deceased others than the surviving 
spouse and children) are also contingencies o f survival although both play an insignificant role in terms o f  
percentage o f the budget and also in terms o f number of claimants (tables A.3 and A.4). Nowadays, the 
strict conditions o f eligibility (see appendix 3) and the disappearance o f the old pattern o f (extended) family 
organisation have progressively reduced the relevance of both benefits in the overall system.
8 In Germany for instance, a crediting system for time spent looking after children was introduced in 1992. 
For each child a maximum of three years credit might be claimed at the rate o f approximately 75% of
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year o f voluntary leave -which have both counted towards the contribution record since 
1989-, pension rules do not take into account gaps in employment due to either family 
responsibility or unemployment. Yet, as Evans and Falkingham (1997) have argued:
“Pensions are sensitive to long gaps in working life. Mechanisms o f  ensuring continuing 
contributions during absence from the labour market have a significant effect. Short-term 
frictional unemployment has little effect, but long periods o f  unemployment, sickness or 
family responsibility do” (1997: 46).
This lack of crediting mechanisms to compensate spells outside employment 
penalises women’s access to a retirement benefit to the extent that any period of time 
outside the labour market has an effect on their capacity to claim a benefit.
Given lower activity rates, women’s representation in invalidity benefits has 
always been low. However, as happened in the case of retirement benefits, their 
representation decreased after the 1985 reform. Women were recipients o f 35% of 
invalidity benefits in 1982 (table A.5), a percentage, which after dropping 2 points in 
1986, has remained stable at 33% until 1996. As was also the case in retirement benefits, 
women have increased their representation as invalidity pensioners in the oldest 
categories. In 1996, 52% of invalidity pensioners over 80 years o f age were women. 
Invalidity benefits have also been made more labour market related.9 By doing so, there 
has been a greater capacity to control improper uses and fraudulent practices, which were 
common practice in the past. However women have poorer access to work-related benefits 
and thus, gender inequalities due to differentiated access persist. As we shall see, the 
means-tested scheme offers no real alternative for the people that have some type of 
invalidity and cannot have access to an invalidity contributory benefit.
More than half of female recipients are recipients of widow benefits. Women 
represent more than 90% of recipients o f these benefits in any age group. Since 1993, 
(when data is available by sex) women have been the recipients o f 96% of the total 
benefits (table A.5). Inevitably, women have high representation in all age groups of 
widow benefits. The limited participation of men in these benefits is concentrated in the 
oldest age group. Since 1993 they have been recipients of 5% of the benefits for
average earnings. In France, two years o f credits are given to mothers who have cared for a child for at least 
nine years (Rake 1999).
9 See appendix 3 for requirements o f contribution periods.
78
individuals 80 and over. Although not a very important figure, given the small percentage 
of recipients, this presents a peculiar case of reverse dependency.
While access to direct contributory benefits has become more difficult, the access 
to derived benefits has become easier. Widow benefits used to be means-tested benefits, 
only those women in situation of need would be entitled to receive a widow benefit. This 
requirement was abolished in 1972. However, women’s greatest access to the cash 
benefits system through derived benefits is a problem in itself given that, as has been 
analysed in chapter 2, it upholds a kind of second route to citizenship. Women’s rights are 
channelled through family dependency instead of their own individual rights, reinforcing 
dependency on the main income provider. Furthermore, the protection of women through 
these derived benefits carries a number of specific implications. One fundamental 
problem of women relying on widow benefits for old age income is that the system 
protects through marital union at a time of serious threats to the marriage institution. 
Derived rights such as widow benefits are vulnerable in the face o f marital dissolution. In 
this respect, the legislation has responded to this ‘new’ social phenomenon of marital 
dissolution by introducing in 1989 the right of entitlement to a widow benefit for divorced 
women.10 Although they lose the benefit if they marry again, divorced women are 
paradoxically less penalised than women that never married. Extramarital unions give no 
right to a widow benefit.
Moreover, widow benefits can create disincentives for women to work on a 
regular basis. Although it is very hard to measure, the percentage of women working for 
the shadow economy is very high in Spain, as indeed it is in all the other countries of 
southern Europe (Ferrera 1996; Trifiletti 1999). It is possible that the system may be 
indirectly tolerating and even encouraging the work o f women in this non-regulated 
sector, mainly as home-workers. Although, this marginal employment does not provide 
access to social security, this might not be seen as a problem since these women might 
find a way into the social protection system through their family status. In this sense, 
work is not regarded as an independent way of making a living, but rather as a 
complement to other sources of income. As we shall see, this ‘hidden tolerance’ o f non­
regulated employment is also implicitly present in the regulation of other types of
10 In case o f separation or divorce, the benefit is given in proportion to the length o f the period of  
cohabitation.
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benefits, adding a considerable degree of complexity to the assessment of the final 
outcomes.
The existence of derived benefits might also create social inequality. Female 
workers that have received low salaries throughout their lives might end up receiving 
lower pensions when they retire than women that have never worked but benefit from 
their husbands’ generous pension. However, as we will see next, derived benefits do not 
share the same levels of generosity as direct benefits.
Generosity o f contributory benefits
The ‘generosity’ of a contributory benefit relies very much on past or present 
labour performance. Women have shorter contribution periods and lower salaries and 
thus, they have a poor level of benefit generosity if  access is at all fulfilled. Special 
requirements of length and continuity of employment affects women’s access to benefits 
and the generosity of these benefits." Social benefits are mirrored by occupational 
segregation and by the gender division between paid and unpaid work.
Decisions made at the policy level also determine the degree of generosity o f the 
different types o f benefits. Again, an important feature is the considerable distance that 
exists between direct and derived benefits in terms of generosity.12 As we shall see, the 
‘old age risk’ is, in reality, two separate and distinctively gendered risks: that of losing 
income due to retirement and that o f losing income because of being economically 
dependent on someone who retires or dies.
Another very important feature of policy choice is the presence o f redistributive 
elements within the contributory system. As will be analysed later, benefits are not always 
proportional to contributions. In certain cases, redistributive mechanisms break the 
proportionality between benefits and former earnings. In this sense, the income- 
maintenance principle by which status differentials are maintained when working as 
opposed to not working, are weakened introducing certain characteristics o f social 
equality. Thus, benefits are not always totally ‘earned’ since there are considerable
11 Retirement benefits range from a minimum of 60% of the reference wage (calculated using the mean of  
the worker’s annual salaries) for 15 years o f contribution to a maximum of 100% for 35 years of
contribution or more.
12 Widow benefits correspond to 45% of the reference wage o f the former spouse.
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exemptions to the rule.13 However, as we shall see, none o f these measures have been 
designed to compensate specifically female employment patterns.
Uneven improvements o f contributory benefits
Invalidity and retirement average benefits for both men and women have increased 
considerably since 1982, thanks to the adjustment policies that have brought average 
benefits closer to average salaries. Nevertheless, in both cases men’s have risen more than 
women’s. Considering invalidity, women were, compared to men, paid less in 1996 (70% 
of men’s average benefit) than they were in 1982 (78% of men’s) (table A.9). For 
retirement pensions the differences in terms of payment for men and women are even 
stronger than for invalidity benefits. Although in 1982 women’s retirement pension 
represented 77% of men’s retirement pension, in the following years there has been a 
constant increase in the income difference between men and women’s pensions (table 
A.9).
Examining the relation between average benefits and average salary, we see that 
men’s average benefits have approached the average salary more often than women’s 
average benefits. In 1982 the average invalidity benefit was 30% of average salary for 
men and 22% for women. In 1996, the gap had widened by 13%, to 41% for men and 
28% for women. At the same time, in 1982, the average retirement pension was 31.5% of 
average salary for men and 24% for women. In 1996, men’s were 46% and women’s 
29%. In all these cases, the relationship between average salary and average benefit has 
changed substantially for men but not very significantly for women.
Age also explains part of this gender difference. Younger women receive higher 
income from their pensions than older women do, just because new pensions are o f a 
higher amount than former pensions. However, as has been mentioned before, female 
recipients are concentrated in the oldest age categories. In the case of retirement, the age 
group from 60 to 69 is the one that receives the highest average pension although this 
group represents just 28% of all female retirement pensioners. In the case of invalidity, 
the differences between men and women’s average benefits are smaller (91% of men’s
13 Transfers from tax revenues are added on to the contributions from employment in the social security 
budget to finance these redistributive mechanisms.
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benefit for the age group 30-39; 87% for women under 30; and 85% of men’s benefit for 
women between 40-49. Table A.9). However, the actual number of recipients in these age 
categories is by no means high. In 1996, women from 30 to 59 represented 19% of 
women’s invalidity recipients. The gap between male and female average invalidity 
benefits is greater among pensioners over 65 years of age, where most o f the female 
claimants are situated (68% of female beneficiaries). For men, the situation is reversed. 
The higher average pensions are located within the larger group of recipients. In the oldest 
category the differences between men and women’s average pension are reduced, 
however in this case the differences diminish not because women’s benefits increase but 
rather because men’s benefits are cut down.
As could be expected, despite the large number of beneficiaries, widow recipients 
receive distinctly less income from their benefits. The average benefit has increased, like 
the other benefits though on a smaller scale. In 1996 a widow benefit was 54% of men 
retirement pension. The highest average benefit was for the age group 40-49 in 1996, 
while the lowest average benefit was for women o f 75 and over. It is, however, in these 
categories, as has been previously shown, where the number of women pensioners is 
greater.
In relation to the differences between own-right (retirement and invalidity) and 
derived (widow) benefits in terms o f the scope of the benefits, it might be argued that 
these differences are justified in the sense that a retirement pension, as a source o f old age 
income can actually cover not only the recipient o f the benefit but also the spouse or the 
whole family. However, this ideology of the male breadwinner family is not an explicit 
statement since contributory benefits are individualised. Pension benefits are dependent 
on labour market performance and do not take family responsibilities into account. 
Therefore, cash benefits’ legislation establishes dependency on marriage directly and 
exclusively through widow benefits.
However, the link between contributions and benefits is, in some cases, not so 
straightforward.14 There are three main mechanisms that break the proportionality criteria 
in relation to the generosity of the benefits. These are, first the way the initial retirement
14 According to Monasterio and others (1996) redistributive mechanisms are those that break the equity 
criteria in a social protection system. That is, when the proportionality between the pensions obtained and 
the contributions paid to the system in a working life is weakened.
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pension is calculated, second, the existence of a minimum pension policy and third, the 
presence o f occupational regimes. In what follows, attention will be paid to these three 
elements, focusing on how men and women might be affected differently and what the 
changes have been over time.
Redistributive mechanisms
The way the initial retirement pension is calculated favours all those individuals, 
among them many women, that retire with the minimum number of years. The initial 
retirement pension is calculated considering the percentage of the reference wage that 
corresponds to claimant’s contribution record. The table below shows the initial 
retirement pension (percentage of salary) at the age of 65, according to the number of 
years of contribution, under the different legislative reforms.
Table4.1: Initial Retirement Pension (65 years o f  age)
Percentage Reference Wage
Years
contribution
1972
Reform
1985
Reform
1997
Reform
10 50 0 0
15 60 60 50
20 70 70 65
25 80 80 80
30 90 90 90
35 100 100 100
40< 100 100 100
Although, the requirement of a minimum period of contribution to have access to 
a contributory benefit negatively affects all those with short careers, the table shows that 
those who obtain the right to a pension with the minimum contribution record obtain a 
higher return from the income earned during the working years than those who retire with 
a larger number of years (Duran 1995).15
However, this redistributive capacity has diminished as a consequence of the 
changes introduced by the 1996 Agreement in the formula to calculate the initial 
retirement pensions. Firstly, the percentage of reference wage for the minimum period of
15 1985 reform: someone aged 65 and with 15 years o f contribution period is entitled to a pension 60% of  
his or her average salary. That is, from 0 to 15, each additional year o f contribution gives 5% o f the 
reference wage. Someone retiring with more than 15 years o f contribution receives 2% o f the reference 
wage for each additional year.
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contribution of 15 years was reduced to 50%. Secondly, the percentage o f the reference 
wage also became smaller for any contribution career less than 25 years.16 Although it is 
too early to know the effects that this changes will have in the access and generosity of 
women’s retirement benefits, it is clear that the expectations of those retiring with the 
minimum number of years or with contributory careers under 25 years will be reduced.17 
The changes do not modify the expectations of those retiring with more than 25 years of 
contribution period. Thirdly, the number of years used to calculate the pension amount 
increased from 8 to 15 years. This last measure is detrimental to those workers that 
experience substantial increases in their salaries in the last years o f their working careers.
It can also be argued that the limit of 35 years to reach 100% of the reference wage 
might be detrimental to a number of male professionals since any additional year does not 
add to contributory record. However, the additional working years can compensate if  their 
earnings for those years were higher, giving them entitlement to a higher pension.
Nevertheless, the logic behind this redistributive mechanism in the initial 
retirement pension is not easy to identify and it is doubtful whether this better treatment 
given to pensioners who retire with 15 years o f contribution compensates for the lack of 
pension rights for those with a career below the time ceiling. As we will see, the measure 
favours specially the pensioners o f the occupational regimes.
The minimum pensions’ policy within the contributory system is another 
important redistributive mechanism that breaks the proportionality criteria between the 
contribution record and the amount of the benefit. Minimum pensions guarantee a 
minimum amount of remuneration (annually fixed by the government) for those 
pensioners that, having fulfilled the time requirements, are entitled to receive a pension of 
a higher amount to the one that would strictly correspond according to their contribution 
record. The minimum pensions policy breaks the proportionality criteria in the sense that 
it makes no difference whether they have contributed for the minimum number of years or 
have contributed for a longer period but with the minimum salary.
16 From 0 to 15 years o f contribution, each year gives 3.33% o f reference wage. From 15 to 25 years o f  
contribution each additional year accounts for 3% of the reference wage and from 25 to 35 the percentage 
of the reference wage stays the same as before (2%).
171 have not been able to obtain data by sex on the number of years o f contribution when workers reach 
pension age.
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The initial purpose of this policy was to compensate low wages. During the early 
1980s minimum pensions accounted for almost 50% percent of all pensions. In 1983, 
minimum pensions constituted 52% and 63% of retirement and widow benefits 
correspondingly (Informe Economico-Financiero 1996).
This indicates that pensioners retiring in those years had low contribution records 
partly due to the lack of standardisation of job contracts although working careers usually 
started very early in the life cycle. Furthermore, and as we shall see, pensioners of the 
occupational regimes, particularly self-employed and agrarian workers, have always been 
the most favoured by minimum pension policy, which indicates that this redistributive 
tool was specially created for certain categories of workers.
As working records started to improve in terms of income and time, the minimum 
pension policy became less relevant. Still, these pensions continue to make up a large 
percentage o f all pension types.18 Therefore, although the minimum pension policy has a 
clear worker-status origin, created to protect certain categories o f workers, it did not 
disappear when the socio-economic environment changed. Instead, this mechanism of 
redistribution began to transform itself to adopt a sort o f social-assistance trait within the 
social security system. For this reason, the delimitation of this type o f provision becomes 
troublesome. It certainly protects certain weak categories of workers, among them many 
women, but such protection is hard to define, lying somewhere between social insurance 
and social assistance, as a sort of ‘safety net’ within a professional scheme.
Since 1985 several reforms have attempted to place minimum pensions on a level 
with the minimum wage (SMI). In that sense, since 1985 the amounts have been more 
adjusted to minimum standards. However, the minimum pensions are not the same for 
different types of benefits. Again, it is hard to find an explanation for the different levels 
of minimum benefit, which make ‘safety net’ standards different for different types of 
claimants. The most striking difference is found between retirement, invalidity and widow 
benefits. Until 1993, the minimum for a widow over 65 years o f age was much lower than 
the minimum for a retired pensioner of the same age and without a dependant spouse. 
Moreover, until 1996, the minimum pension for a widow under 65 years of age was lower
18 36% o f all pensions in 1996; 34% in the case of retirement and 47% for widow benefits (Informe 
Econdmico-Financiero 1996: 205).
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than the minimum for a retired person also under 65 years of age and without dependent 
spouse. This lead to an anomaly in the system that until recently had not been resolved.
As a consequence of the policy o f ‘minimum standards’ adjustment, retirement, 
invalidity and widow benefits are now placed on a same level. In this sense, widow 
benefits have benefited from the adjustment policy more than the other benefits.
In 1985 the minimum pension for widows over 65 was 56% the minimum wage and 49% 
for widows under 65, in 1996 the percentage increased to 82% for the first and 72% for 
the second (table A .l 1).
Nevertheless, and as Cruz (1994) argues, the use of the minimum wage as an 
indicator for minimum pensions has created a progressive distancing of these pensions in 
relation to other more ‘real’ indicators, such as average salary or per capita income. In 
1980, the minimum wage was 77.5% of the income per capita and in 1992 it was reduced 
to 52%. Therefore, even when minimum pensions are placed on a level with the minimum 
wage, this does not mean that the benefit allows for an adequate standard of living. For 
this reason it becomes relevant to look at the minimum pensions in relation to average 
pensions.
Certain categories of pensioners have an average pension very close to their 
minimum pension while for other groups, the average pensions are much higher than their 
correspondent minimum amounts. For example, retired men’s average pensions are the 
furthest from minimum pension. In 1985, the minimum pension (over 65 without 
dependent spouse) was 82% of average retirement pension (categories from 65 onwards). 
In 1996, the average pension was almost double the minimum pension. However, for 
retired women the average pension was almost equivalent to the minimum pension. For 
widow pensioners over 65 (in fact, the vast majority o f widow pensioners), given the 
large number of them in the older age groups receiving very small amounts, the average 
pension is below the minimum pension.
As for invalidity, here again women make a more intensive use o f minimum 
pensions compared to men. Men’s average pensions have gradually drifted apart from 
minimum standards. In 1985, minimum pension for absolute and total invalidity was 82% 
of the average total male invalidity. In 1996, the percentage was 67%. In the case of 
women, and as happened in retirement, their total average benefit and minimum amount
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almost concur and even, for certain years the average pension ends up below the 
minimum pension.
The absence of other types of safety net outside the contributory system makes 
this minimum pensions policy more significant. However, one could speculate in this 
case, as in the case o f the calculation used for the retirement benefits, on the rationale 
behind this mechanism. Women tend to benefit more from minimum pensions’ policy 
than men do. Their more poorly remunerated jobs, in the case of direct benefit, and the 
low salary percentage, in the case of derived benefits, typically entitle them to pensions 
that fall below the income limit established through minimum pensions. However, these 
measures o f redistribution were not created to compensate specifically female working 
patterns. The different realities o f men and women’s labour market participation are not 
taken into account. Moreover, it is important to point out that when boundaries exist 
between the kind of work that gives the right to a pension and the kind that does not, 
certain forms of work are validated to the detriment of others.
The specific contribution requirements for occupational regimes (regimenes 
especiales) become the third element that breaks the proportionality criteria, and this takes 
place in a number of ways. Special regimes have a lower contribution pressure. Also, the 
control of affiliation becomes unclear for certain regimes, giving the possibility of  
‘strategic performances’ such as to start contributing to the system at 50 years of age 
(Duran 1995).
There have been legislative efforts since the 1980s to integrate the majority of 
contributory pensioners into the general regime and progressively reduce the special 
regimes. However, in 1995 almost half of contributory benefits were still distributed 
among the regimes (table A. 12). While the balance between the regimes has shifted - 
between 1976 and 1995 self-employed and domestic service regimes have increased while 
the two agrarian regimes have decreased-, their weight in the contributory system is still 
very significant.
We have already pointed out that pensioners of special regimes benefit more from 
the other two redistributive measures than pensioners of the so-called general regime. 
Regarding the distribution of retirement pensions by years o f contribution (table A. 13), 
46% of pensioners of the self-employed regime retired with 15 years of contribution in
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1997. The percentages of pensioners retiring with the minimum years of contribution 
were also high for the dependant agrarian workers regime (37%), the self-employed 
agrarian workers regime (45%) and the domestic service regime (61%). These high 
percentages contrast with the 5.36% that corresponds to the general regime.
In relation to the percentage of pensions over the total that receive minimum 
complements (table A. 14), more than half of the pensions of the self-employed, agrarian 
workers and domestic service are minimum pensions.
Unfortunately, data by regimes and by sex could not be obtained, so we cannot 
know the gender impact of this particular feature of the contributory pension system. 
However, the mere existence of these occupational regimes already tell us something 
about the nature o f social provision. It recognises a powerful feature of ‘welfare 
clientelism’, that is, specific protection to specific groups of workers or ‘clientele’, that 
Ferrera (1996) identified as common to all the countries o f southern Europe. Again, 
women might benefit from the existence of these occupational regimes. However, this 
sort o f ‘patronage’ does certainly not exist to favour women’s full integration as citizens 
of first order social rights. Moreover, it keeps a considerable degree o f complexity and 
multiplicity in determining the type of protection given and its impact in terms of gender. 
Different regimes have different regulations and if  we are able to see through the ‘dark 
world’ o f social security legislation we would not be very surprised to find that the most 
‘masculine regimes’, i.e. miners and agrarian workers have a far more generous treatment 
in terms of access and quality of the benefits than other regimes, potentially more 
‘feminine’, such as, the domestic service and the self-employed workers regimes.19
Maternity and family protection
Maternity20 and family benefits play a very small role in the overall system in 
terms of expenditure. The former increased from 0.1% of social protection expenditure in 
1989 to 1.04 in 1996, while the second one has lost the status given in Franco’s time 
falling from 10.8 in 1977 to 1.34 in 1996 (Informe Economico-Financiero 1996). In fact,
191 am anticipating an issue that was raised by some of the interviewees. This will be further discussed in 
the chapters that follow.
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Spain ranks much lower than the rest of the EU countries in terms of family protection. 
According to direct expenditure, Spain spends 6 points less than the EU average on this 
contingency (table A.2).
Maternity leave has been improved through the implementation of several 
reforms. Improvements have been made in the length of the allowance, from 14 weeks in 
1989 to 16 in 1994, as well as in the amount of the benefit, from 75% of the reference 
wage in 1989 to 100% in 1994. Moreover, the conditions to be entitled to the benefit have 
also improved, while before the minimum contribution period was one year, since 1994, 
the minimum period required is 180 days. Additionally, from 1994, the central 
administration (INSS) was made fully responsible for financing of the subsidy, reducing 
the employer’s costs of this allowance.
Voluntary leave was also reformed. Since 1989, the employer has been obliged to 
guarantee the existence of the same job during the first year, and this year counts as a 
contributory period. Before 1989, the mother could demand voluntary leave but the job 
was not guaranteed on her return. Further, whereas previously an employer would have to 
pay twice for the mother on maternity and the substitute worker, after 1995 the employer 
only pays once and the state takes responsibility for the costs o f the employee on 
maternity leave.21
All theses changes have placed Spain (together with the Netherlands) among the 
most generous countries in Europe concerning maternity leave. Germany for instance, 
gives fourteen weeks of leave period with 100% of the salary. France and Italy give 
sixteen and twenty weeks correspondingly but just 80% of the salary. The UK gives 
eighteen weeks with 46% of wage replacement rate (Gomick et al. 1999).
However, as has been said earlier, Spain is also the European country with the 
weakest family protection. As stated in the previous chapter, family programmes were a 
central part of the Francoist social provision system to the point that they were often used 
as a complementary source of income for workers. The reform of 1985 eliminated some
20 Until 1994 Maternity leave was included within the contingency of employment injuries and 
occupational diseases (Incapacidad Temporal). The reform o f 1994 converted Maternity leave into a risk in 
its own, independently o f any other contingency.
21 95% reduction of social security costs for the first year, 60% for the second and 50% for the third year. 
Beneficiaries o f these substitute contracts have to be claimants o f unemployment subsidies -either 
contributory or non contributory for more than one year (Valiente 1997).
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of the schemes while shifting the character of the ones that remained.22 The ultimate goal 
of this reform with regard to family protection was to convert the provision from a 
protection of marriage and the family unit in reproduction into a protection against 
poverty. Thus, the law limited the benefits for families with low incomes or with less 
protection in social security (unemployed, pensioners and low-income employees). Five 
years later, legislation introduced non-contributory family benefits for those claimants 
that could not meet the requirements of affiliation and contribution to social security. 
Again the legislative reforms were a step further in the intention to convert these benefits 
into measures against poverty. Therefore, since 1990, the concept of family protection 
refers exclusively to family benefit for a dependent child in case o f poverty or disability 
of the child. It provides an economic allowance to employees (contributory) or families 
(non-contributory) with children under 18 and lack of economic resources or with 
disabled children (in this last case no income limit is established). Whereas in the 
contributory scheme there are requirements of affiliation and contribution to social 
security, the non-contributory is designed for those cases where affiliation and 
contribution are not achieved.
Therefore, although there have been substantial improvements in maternity leave, 
it remains a benefit for those inside the labour market. There is no statutory right to 
maternity benefit beyond the relatively short duration of maternity leave. No benefit is 
provided, at national scale, to women outside the labour market who give birth. In Spain 
there is no family allowance for single parents or subsidies for childbirth at a national 
level. Lone mothers or women head of households might receive compensation from local 
social assistance, but in any case, the protection is given only when the household is 
considered as a “poor” household.
The scarcity or non-existence of monetary allowances for childcare or family 
responsibilities is in some countries compensated either through the availability o f social 
services for childcare (social-democrat tradition) or through tax deductions (liberal 
tradition). In Spain neither of the two alternatives has been developed enough to 
compensate for the lack of direct maternity and family protection.
22 Three relevant measures that were abolished were the monthly payment for a dependent spouse, the one- 
off payment for marriage and the one-off payment at the birth of each child within marriage (Valiente 
1997).
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Considering the first aspect, the accessibility of public childcare is very limited 
although it varies greatly among the different regions. The coverage of childcare for 
children under three years of age takes places largely within the private sector (privately 
paid). The distribution between public and private nursery schools for children two to 
three years old is 82% in the private sector and 18% in the public sector (1989 data). 
However among the different regions the range of public provision varies from none or 
under 10% of public provision in Autonomous Communities such as Catalonia, Madrid, 
or Valencia, to over 40% of public provision for the Basque country (IM 1991).
Nevertheless, the assessment of childcare provision is extremely difficult. There is 
no data base at national or regional levels that has gathered information in a systematic 
way on institutions that provide nursery education and the percentage o f children under 
the age of three that receive some kind of childcare.23 The lack of regulation in this area 
has suggested that the majority of children under the age o f three do not attend any public 
or private institution (IM 1991). Given the impossibility o f empirical evidence, it is 
however important to analyse the legislative reforms that have operated in this field. The 
most important one has been the education legislation (LOGSE)24 introduced in 1990 as 
the new legal framework for the design of the education system, which set up, for the first 
time, the education of children under the age of six within the education system. Although 
compulsory education does not start until the age of six, the regulation of infant education 
has been a significant step. The institutions that provide childcare are now obliged to meet 
at least certain requirements established by the central administration and in turn, the 
central administration controls the provision of this service.
Considering taxation, the creation in 1978 of the Progressive Income Tax System 
(IRPF) introduced a taxation mechanism similar to those in the rest of the European 
countries. Yet, while in most countries the unit of taxation was no longer the family but 
the individual, in Spain the family remained as the unit for taxation through joint taxation. 
However, in 1989 the Supreme Court ruled against compulsory joint taxation on the basis 
that it altered the rights for individual confidentiality and the rights o f the family as 
established in the Constitution. As a result, a legislative reform was introduced to make 
the individual the unit of taxation. Joint taxation is still a possible option but since no
23 Evidence confirmed by Victoria Abril from the General Directorate of Social Action (Direction General 
de Action Social, Menor y  Familia; Subdireccion de Jnfanciay Familia) January 2000.
24 The LOGSE, introduced in 1990 was the new legal framework for the whole education programme.
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mechanism is introduced to make it an attractive option, only in few circumstances (when 
one of the earners obtains 90% of the total family income), is joint taxation better than 
separate taxation. Therefore, although until 1990 the male breadwinner/female housewife 
type o f family was rewarded over other type of families, the situation changed 
substantially from that date onwards. With the intention of not penalising non-standard 
types of families, the new legislation considered ‘the family’, for the case o f joint 
taxation, in two ways: married couples with or without children and single parent 
families, independent of marital status. Alvarez (1999) even argues that the system 
privileges cohabitation against marriage. This tax regulation comes in sharp contrast with 
elements of social security that have been previously discussed.
In relation to tax relief for families,25 the tax system of 1978 contemplated a 
number of forms of tax relief for a dependent spouse and for dependent relatives. The 
reform in 1990 abolished the deduction for dependent spouse but maintained the rest. Off­
spring under 30 (before 1990 the age limit was 25) living in the same household and with 
an income under the minimum wage, older relatives and handicapped people integrated in 
the household receive different family tax exemptions. In the case o f children, there is a 
slightly larger exemption as the number of children increases. In the case of elderly 
relatives the tax exemption also varies according to age. All the exemptions are fixed 
quotas independent of earnings. However, these tax deductions have always been rather 
insufficient in compensating for the costs of a dependant in a family unit and do not work 
as an alternative to social provision in cash. In this sense, the state does not significantly 
encourage, through the tax system, a particular type o f family or the gender division of 
labour within the family.
Non-contributory and assistential benefits
Before 1990, the system of compulsory social insurance contribution was 
complemented by social assistance. Benefits existed at national level with a very low 
level o f protection and as a subsidiary mechanism in case of the family’s failure to 
provide protection to its members. In 1982 these benefits represented one fifth o f the 
minimum wage. Through the years, the amounts have been increasing but remained at a
25 See appendix 3.
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relatively low level. These benefits are largely feminised. In 1996, almost 80% of the 
remaining beneficiaries were women. Half of women recipients were 70 years old and 
over (MTAS 1996a).
Considering the eligibility criteria, assistential benefits were given according to 
the principle of subsidiarity, which requires that claimants must prove that neither their 
own resources nor those of their family are sufficient to meet minimum needs. The benefit 
would only be given when it could be proved that there was not any family member 
“obliged” to take care of the invalid or the elderly person or without “material possibility” 
to do so.
In legislative terms, the introduction of non-contributory benefits in 1990 was 
without doubt an important movement to the extent that it was created with the intention 
of protecting citizens that could not otherwise find protection within the social security 
scheme. It was intended to move away from the assistential tradition that dominated the 
previous scheme and was designed for those individuals -invalid or elderly people- who 
have no claim to a contributory benefit, because of inadequate contributions. In practical 
terms, however, the non-contributory scheme functions as a ‘safety net’ of minimum 
income.
As was the case for assistential benefits, non-contributory benefits are largely 
received by women, 80% and 74% of recipients in 1992 and 1996 correspondingly. Men 
tend to be concentrated in the category of invalidity (distributed in younger age groups) 
while women are more likely to be recipients of old age pensions. Approximately 25% of 
old age non-contributory pensioners are 80 years old or more and it is in this older age 
group that female representation increases, 87% in 1995 and 1996 (MTAS 1996).
The amount of non-contributory benefits consists of a fixed rate for all the cases, 
determined each year. These pensioners receive the lowest income of all the pension 
types, in 1991 these benefits were less than half of the minimum wage and in 1992 they 
underwent small increase to 53% of the minimum wage. These pensions are paid at such a 
level as to leave a household pensioner below the poverty line. In addition, these pensions 
are not compatible with a contributory pension or a pension o f any kind. The figure then 
is even more insufficient to guarantee a minimum level o f economic independence.
As already shown, the importance of this scheme within the social security is 
limited given the low percentage of the total budget allocation and the reduced number of
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claimants (less than 200,000 people). In fact, despite the number o f applications, only a 
limited percentage of claimants meet the conditions of eligibility. In 1996, out of the total 
number of applications 46% were refused (Informe Economico-financiero 1996). These 
unsuccessful claimants either exceeded the requirements o f income limit, the age limit or, 
in the case o f invalidity, did not reach the degree o f handicap required.
In terms of the accessibility criteria, the requirement ‘to be in need’ to have access 
to the benefits is so strict, in terms of the income limit, that it leaves a great percentage of 
the population that have neither the right to a contributory benefit nor can they access a 
non-contributory one. These benefits do not even reach minimum wage standards. Thus, 
the Tack of resources’ appears to be almost equivalent to states of severe poverty. 
Moreover, non-contributory benefits are not, in practical terms, individual rights, since the 
income limit applies to the ‘economic unit’, that is, the household within which the 
pensioner is integrated. All the incomes within the household are considered. 
Additionally, the income limit is not as strict if  the pensioner is integrated in a family unit 
formed by their direct relatives.
As a result, and as was established on the assistential scheme non-contributory 
benefits replaced, the family continues to be the centre o f the protection. As Salvador 
(1997b: 69) argues “the benefit, more than a sufficient income for subsistence is a subsidy 
to compensate the minimum expenses of the pensioner integrated in the family”.
The age requirement is another constraining factor for the access to these benefits. 
In the case of retirement, the claimant cannot be under 65 years of age. Thus, those that 
are excluded from early retirement in the contributory system are not entitled to non­
contributory retirement either. Paradoxically, employment continues to be the reference 
for protection in a scheme that does not, in principle, rely on labour market performance.
Thus, despite what the law might say, the non-contributory scheme is by no means 
a universal mode o f protection. On the contrary, non-contributory benefits have deep 
foundations in the assistential aspects of the state. As Escudero (1996) has argued, the 
only reason that justifies the distinction in terms of definition between assistential benefits 
and non-contributory benefits is to make clear the different levels o f administration. 
While non-contributory operates at national level, assistential remains as a safety net at 
regional and local levels. Apart from this distinction, both benefits are of the same 
assistential nature, even if the law does not explicitly recognise them as such.
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The legislation might be misleading in other ways. Despite the good intentions (the 
law makes continuous references to “citizenship” and “universal” rights) the non-contributory 
scheme has little power o f  action given the reduced percentage o f  the budget o f  social 
security assigned to it. Also, to define non-contributory benefits as individual rights is partly 
a false statement. As has been shown, the socio-economic situation o f  the household is taken 
into account for the determination o f income limit and degree o f  disability, and incentives 
have been created to promote the cohabitation o f the pensioner with his/her direct relatives. 
The ability to claim benefits as individuals is then undermined. Therefore, although women 
largely benefit from this scheme, its effectiveness in protecting women is very limited. 
Moreover, the low income o f these types o f benefits makes it hard to think o f the possibility 
o f economic independence o f someone that depends exclusively on this type o f benefit.
However the access to the non-contributory scheme is important for the elderly not 
only in income terms but also in terms o f the additional rights the benefits grant. Pensioners 
whether their benefit comes via contributory, non-contributory or assistential schemes, have 
access to available social services, such as daily care residences and also health and medical 
care.
Concluding remarks
In an attempt to synthesise some o f this chapter’s findings, the next table shows the 
different treatment given to the benefits’ schemes in terms o f accessibility and generosity 
through requirements and entitlement rules and its repercussions for female representation.
Table 4.2: Accessibility and generosity o f different protection schemes
CONTRIBUTORY BENEFITS NON-CONTRIBUTORY
Direct Benefits Derived Benefits BENEFITS
Risk Invalidity/Retirement Widow Invalidity/Retirement
Access Hard Easy (ier) Hard
Generosity High Low Low
Basis Entitlement Individual contributions Spouse’s contributions Individual/Family need
Requirements Contribution record Marital union Low family income
Female Represent.* Low High High
(32% o f total recipients) (95% of total recipients) (74% of total recipients)
*1996 data
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Gender stratification in the social protection system is sustained in a number o f ways. 
The principle o f social insurance based on labour market participation and the weight o f cash 
transfers create a differentiated gendered pattern o f accessibility and generosity o f  benefits. 
Labour force participation and the conditions o f employment have progressively become 
more important to social rights’ access. Moreover, difference in entitlement rules, such as the 
difference between direct and derived benefits, also determines a two track access to the cash 
benefits system for men and women.
Taking a broader view, the table below tries to place the Spanish social protection 
system along gender dimensions o f variation. The issue o f welfare and gender regimes will 
be explored in more depth in the last chapter o f  the investigation. Here, it is worth pointing 
out that, as suggested in the previous chapter, the gender regime models introduced in that 
chapter do not seem able to describe accurately enough patterns o f  variation in this case 
study. Spain might be closer to the ‘male breadwinner model’ (Sainsbury 1999) or to the 
‘general family support model’ (Korpi 1999) and yet critical divergences remain.
Table 4.3: A distinctive gender policy regime
Dimensions
Ideology Blurred division of labour
Entitlement Unequal among spouses and among workers
Basis of entitlement Principle of maintenance/ principle o f need
Recipient o f benefits Individual
Taxation Individual
Employment policies Dualistic
Family Benefits Eamings-related maternity leave
Social Services Childcare primarily private. Elderly care publicly subsidised
Sphere of care Primarily private (extended family)
Caring work Unpaid
One o f the distinctive traits is the coexistence o f individualised and more or less 
universalised policy spheres, such as tax regulation and health care, with a merely 
occupational social security. Another major difference is the role that the family plays in 
the mixed welfare. There is no privileged treatment o f families. The dependent status o f
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‘wife’ is encouraged, though poorly, through social security provision but not through tax 
law or through family policy. Contrary to the ‘conservative’ welfare tradition, 
motherhood in Spain cannot provide an alternative route to welfare and social status. The 
family is a site of informal welfare given the fragile relationship of its members with 
either the state or the market. Finally, the social protection system does have a 
redistributive impact, functioning as an important solidarity mechanism among different 
types o f workers. The principle of status-maintenance, that is, the basis o f entitlement for 
the male-breadwinner gender policy regime is broken in significant circumstances to 
protect specific groups of workers, with significant repercussions in gender relations.
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Chapter 5
The Policy Process:
Social Actors and Dynamics of Social Security Reforms
Introduction
Having answered the first research question, this chapter inaugurates the part o f the 
research devoted to the policy process. The findings o f the previous chapter suggested 
that the public cash benefits system displays gender stratification with regard access and 
quality o f the benefits. The option to strengthen the professional character of the system 
of protection, and the creation of a secondary assistential citizenship status, has not 
favoured the equality between men and women in access to cash benefits o f the social 
security system and the level of generosity of the benefits. One plausible explanation for 
this gender segregation in the social protection system was introduced in chapter 3. While 
the beginning of democracy brought fundamental strategic shifts in certain welfare state’s 
spheres, eliminating any remaining connection with the previous authoritarian regime, 
such change did not occur in the social protection sphere. There has been a high degree of 
continuity with regard to the previous design of social protection under Franco. Once 
democracy was consolidated, policy change was achieved in a number of fundamental 
welfare state spheres and yet the social protection system continued to be maintained as a 
fundamental professional system with minor protection schemes for those outside the core 
of the protection. The family and women’s unpaid work continues to be essential if 
unacknowledged elements of the social protection system at a high cost to women’s 
independence.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the factors that might explain the configuration 
of the present social protection system and could have been potentially constraining for 
the development of a more gender equality oriented social protection. This will include an 
exploration of the influence of the Women’s Rights Institute -IM- in the general social 
policy.
This chapter will provide a framework for chapters 6 and 7. The investigation’s 
results reported in the following chapters will focus on the second research question 
introduced in chapter 1. That is, to what extent are women represented by social actors or 
as social actors in the policy-making process? And how are gender equality issues
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targeted as objectives in the social protection policy process? . Thus, the later empirical 
chapters will complement the insights o f this chapter in an attempt to integrate analysis 
derived from primary documentation with that of the material obtained from the 
interviews with the principal social actors.
Relevant issues in the policy process
The starting point is that the design of a specific social protection system is 
conditioned by political decisions. Thus, exclusion from the decision-making processes 
has negative implications for the excluded group. Public policies are not understood to be 
neutral, on the contrary, it is assumed that the risks protected and the methods of 
protection are a result of political options.
Therefore, in the study of agenda setting two aspects must be considered. One, the 
topics that are contemplated as main objectives in the agenda and two, the social actors 
who intervene in the process. From a gender perspective, the interest is to develop a focus 
of analysis that underlines women’s roles and the relevance o f gender related topics in the 
policy-making and implementation processes.
Both aspects are also important for understanding the social actors who are 
excluded from the process and the topics that have not been considered as objectives of 
the policies. That is, to go deep into the study of the ‘absences’, the ‘non-issues’, or as 
Hill (1997) puts it, considering policy not just as a course o f action but also o f inaction 
and examining the non-decisions as well as the decisions taken.
“Attention should not focus exclusively on decisions which produce change, but must also 
be sensitive to those which resist change and are difficult to observe because they are not 
represented in the policy-making process by legislative enactment” (1976: 13 quoted in Hill 
1997: 7).
As has been widely discussed in the literature, there are multiple factors that 
intervene in the policy process conditioning any final outcome. To start with, the creation 
of public policies has to be understood as a dynamic process. Although a clear distinction 
used to be made between the ideological nature of the agenda setting process and the 
pragmatic nature of the implementation process, scholars have recently remarked on the 
convenience of considering the cyclical and fluid character o f the whole process. In 
particular, it is precisely in the last implementation stage when the materialisation o f the
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policies is going to define their true nature and the real scope of the initial objectives. 
Moreover, it is important to outline, as Kingdon (1995) does, that the success in one of 
the stages does not necessarily imply success in the other.
What should then be the centre o f attention when studying the policy process? More 
than looking in a unilateral direction, the investigation requires attention to different 
issues that interact in a multidimensional level. According to Kingdon (1995), problems, 
policies and politics are the three processes by which agendas are set and alternatives are 
specified. This raises the questions, how does a given condition get defined as a problem 
for which action is an appropriate remedy? What values affect the processes? And how do 
political processes affect the agenda?
One of the key elements that needs to be investigated is the power relations between 
the actors. That is, to look at how the power is distributed since, clearly, when certain 
decisions are taken, some stand to gain and others to lose. As a political process, some 
actors have a more legitimated role than others and that entails a potential conflict about 
the unequal distribution of power (Hill 1997).
In chapter 2 I argued that, from a gender perspective, the influence o f the political 
factor in policy outcomes, that is, patterns of working-class formation and trends of power 
alliances, had to be analysed from the point of view of the impact that these relations 
might have on women’s policy intervention and structures o f gender roles. From this 
point of view, the analysis of corporatist relations is highly relevant to the extent that it 
explains the nature of such power alliances. Policy agendas dominated by corporatist 
arrangements eventually sideline those groups not represented by labour relations. The 
idea is that strong corporatist relations between the government and employers and 
employees’ organisations in policy-making do not benefit, in principle, the introduction of 
gender issues in the agenda, since this needs a framework of representation distinct from 
that of corporatist arrangements.
However, a framework of corporatism might not be detrimental to women’s 
interests if, given women’s access to the labour market, trade union representation shifts 
towards a more balanced presence between men and women. This might have policy 
implications such as trade unions targeting policies that specifically affect women. For 
example, policies directed towards reconciling the gap between paid and unpaid work. 
Moreover, the government’s attitude towards women, and in fact the attitude of political 
parties in general, also has implications for the final outcomes. An administration more
100
sensible to gender matters might work in favour of women’s interests even within a 
framework of corporate relations.
Moreover, the actions of the actors involved in the process are deeply rooted in 
values, paradigms and ideas. The belief systems of society and of the actors who 
intervene are decisive in the sense that a social construction of reality provides a specific 
perception of problems and references to solutions. Again, this implies that the problems 
that are not recognised as such by the actors involved in the process will not have a 
consideration in the agenda. Social problems need to be identified as problems to be 
included in the agenda and solutions to those problems need to be seen as feasible by 
those intervening in the process. Consequently, the definition of alternatives and the 
availability of information are powerful resources in the selection of conflicts. Lindblom 
(1990: 4) notes that “much problem solving also takes the form not of altering any state of 
affairs but of altering people’s perceptions and evaluations”.
However, problems might be ideologically recognised by actors and formulated in 
the agenda setting but might at the same time be left aside when policies are put into 
action. “In some cases, policies which are the concern o f politicians may be no more than 
symbolic, formulated without any intention to secure implementation” (Hill 1997: 134). It 
will therefore be necessary to distinguish between definition of objectives and their actual 
implementation through concrete policies.
Another fundamental dimension in the study of the policy process is the importance 
of structural factors influencing the course of action. This implies, the need for an 
examination o f the institutional framework where the interactions between the political 
actors take place, and the opportunities and limitations this institutional framework 
imposes in the process. Institutional constraints also condition the very strategic options 
of actors. The possibilities for certain objectives to become real depend, to a large extent, 
on the administrative feasibility of such changes. Also, the socio-economic and political 
climate determines whether there are favourable circumstances to carry out certain 
policies. In the case o f a political change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic 
one, the weight o f such structural factors will be determined by the degree of dependency 
from the previous political regime.
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The impact o f 'consensus' and neo-corporatism on gender issues and the women’s 
movement. The transition period (1975-1982)
The agenda setting during the first years of democracy was highly conditioned by 
the institutional frame inherited from the authoritarian regime. The political configuration 
of the transition to democracy and the socio-economic environment affected the inclusion 
of gender matters in the political agenda and the performance o f the women’s movement 
within the formal sphere of representation.
Firstly, the very nature of the democratic transition limited the context in which 
the policy agenda was set at the beginning of democracy, with UCD -centre-right- in 
office, to the extent that it signified a shift in the character o f policy-making. One o f the 
first goals at the beginning of democracy was to alter the power distribution. A new form 
o f contemporary corporatism1 replaced the old Francoist corporatist model. I will argue 
that this new configuration of power relations confirmed the exclusion o f social 
movements and social actors not representing labour relations.
Corporatism under the Francoist regime was based on the privilege given to 
certain groups or elites who supported Franco during the Civil War. In fact, Francoism 
represented the interests of an ultra-conservative coalition o f political, ideological and 
military forces vigorously opposed to any kind of progress and modernisation movements 
and in favour of traditional and oligarchic rules. As Giner and Sevilla (1984) point out, 
Francoism can be seen as the successful outcome of widespread efforts among the 
professional groups towards a monopolistic distribution of resources:
“(•••) After the civil war those which were rooted within the acceptable and legitim ate 
sphere (em ployer’s organisations, Catholic organisations, etc.) were given special 
protection. (...) They becam e strong in that they were unchallenged and unm olested by  
rival groups in the distribution struggle for resources, influence and privilege” (1984: 
119).
Gunther (1996) explains that, although the allocation of public funding in the 
different departments of the central administration was decided without any official and
1 As described in chapter 1, neo-corporatism represents the description o f a union system between the state 
administration, employers associations and trade unions for taking on responsibilities o f economic and 
socio-political issues (Fuhrer 1996: 32).
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explicit intervention of external pressure groups, there was a considerable degree of 
interest articulation of a highly particularistic kind.
“It w as particularistic not just with regard to the extraordinarily narrow scope o f  interests 
affected by these decisions, but also insofar as access to decision makers was sharply 
restricted to those o f  upper socio-econom ic status and those w ho enjoyed personal 
connections with influential persons within the regim e” (Gunther 1996: 7).
This influence o f cronyism (amiguismo) in the policy-making was parallel to the 
virtual absence of institutional mechanisms for the articulation of citizens’ demands and 
the complete weakness of professional and workers’ organisations. Giner and Sevilla 
(1984) point out that corporatism under Franco was a corporatism of exclusion, rather 
than inclusion, and of subordination rather than mobilisation. Spain, they argue, had a 
fragile civil society, and poorly organised interest groups. After the civil war those groups 
that supported the regime were privileged and given special protection so that status, 
distinction, and hierarchy were preserved. All other groups, including political parties, 
trade unions and social movements, were deprived of the means of organisation of their 
interests.
In fact, the underlying principle of the authoritarian regime was non-political 
involvement and passive obedience, implemented through a number o f institutions of 
economic, religious and ideological control. As Giner and Sevilla (1984) stress, the 
Francoist corporatism meant, paradoxically, the decorporatisation o f a large subordinated 
part o f Spanish society.
Considering workers’ organisations, during the Francoist regime, the Workers, 
Law-code (Fuero de Trabajo), created at the beginning o f the dictatorship, established the 
“end of class struggle” by law. Trade unions were banned and repressed, they were 
declared illegal and the only possible affiliation for workers was the corporatist Francoist 
union, called “vertical syndicates” (Central Nacional Sindical -CNS-). The Falange 
members were in charge of the bureaucracy of the union. This organisation was directly 
controlled by the state and its efficiency was almost non existent for two main reasons: 
first, because of its official and institutional character and second, because it had a 
massive bureaucratic apparatus which was hard to manage. In such a hierarchical and 
centralised political system, class conflict could not have any recognised space.
From the 1960s onwards some changes took place, the expansion o f the economy 
introduced some flexibility in labour relations, the old trade unions, although still illegal,
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reappeared and critical sectors within the official union gained strength (Miguelez 1995). 
It is in this moment that CC.OO. (Comisiones Obreras) was created as a spontaneous and 
decentralised movement and ideologically independent (Fiihrer 1986). In 1958, the 
Collective Agreements’ Law (Ley de Convenios Colectivos) enabled the creation of a new 
system of industrial and labour relations. The necessity to increase economic productivity 
led to collective negotiations between employees and employers’ organisations within the 
enterprises as a way to reduce labour conflict. This had a positive impact on unionist 
movements, particularly for CC.OO., despite its position outside the law, moved from 
being a spontaneous and decentralised movement to a structured and co-ordinated 
organisation. During the economic development of the 1960s, this trade union was more 
or less accepted although there were still important regressive movements. From the first 
signs of economic crisis in 1967, government repression gained strength again, 
culminating in the well-known ‘1001 process’ that imposed large prison sentences on 
several unionist leaders. Nevertheless, social and economic changes that took place at the 
beginning of the decade still maintained the confrontational power of trade unions and 
their great public support.
Hence, the main goal of the transition, particularly from 1977 to 1979, was 
primarily political.
“A  com m on strategy o f  this period was the consolidation o f  democracy, the creation o f  a 
new  institutional framework for econom ic development, the legitim isation o f  the em ployers 
organisation and the integration o f  trade unions in the dynam ic o f  political reform” 
(Rodriguez Cabrero 1997: 123).
Social and political actors agreed on the necessity o f creating new institutional 
structures of communication to overcome the old corporatist Francoist model. The only 
possible way to achieve this objective was through consensus and through a commitment 
to inclusiveness of all social and political actors in the decision-making process. What 
Bermeo (1992) calls ‘political learning’ was a fundamental element in explaining the 
success o f the transition. Political learning means the “process through which people 
modify their beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crisis, frustrations and dramatic 
changes in environment” (1992: 274).
The concept of political learning is in our case translated into the changes in 
strategies and discourse of social actors in the reconstruction of democracy. After a long 
period of confrontation and polarisation between left and right and oppression o f civil
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society by the Franco regime and ‘facto powers’, the reconstruction o f democracy needed 
a change in the elite’s perception of one another. Bermeo (1992: 275) notes that “the 
likelihood that a democracy will be reconstructed increases with the diversity of the elite 
that experiences cognitive change”. In the Spanish transition, the concessions given by 
both ends o f the political spectrum were unthinkable in previous moments, the right 
accepting the legalisation of the communist party and the left accepting the monarchy.
As for trade unions, Fiihrer (1996) analyses their double political and social role at 
the beginning of democracy. On the one hand, they were contributing, together with 
political parties, to the consolidation of democracy, on the other hand, they were the 
defenders of the working class against economic and institutional power. As the author 
puts it “the character of the democratic transition consolidated unionist organisations as a 
factor of order and at the same time as a counter-power force” (Fiihrer 1996: 21). Given 
this social and political responsibility, trade unions defence of workers’ rights was 
performed within a wider context of democratisation. Both traits gave the two main 
unions, UGT (Union General de Trabajadores) and CC.OO. considerable institutional 
power. The transition period as a whole has to be seen as consolidating unionism’s place 
within the decision-making processes. The social protection scheme was consolidated as 
one of the ‘preserves’ of labour relations in a post-industrial context where labour 
relations were constantly being redefined and trade unions lost part of their mobilisation 
capacity.
Accordingly, in this new political framework, the opinions o f the parties, unions 
and employers’ organisations became relevant in the decision-making process of social 
policy, starting the ‘political economy of the pact’ (Mangen 1996). Pactism would from 
that point on have a new and fundamental dimension in the formation of economic and 
social policies. The main pacts signed during the first years were important overall in 
political terms and not so much in visible social or economic achievements. Several 
authors have pointed out that the transition should be analysed in terms of negotiation and 
multilateral agreements. Giner and Sevilla (1984) note that:
“The fact that the negotiations were not circumscribed to constitutional matters but also 
included programmatic ones was to be decisive for the shape o f  future events. Negotiating  
parties gave each other assurances about their future conduct, thereby ‘fix in g ’ policies and 
setting limits to their respective demands” (1984: 124).
2 The most important ones were the Moncloa Pacts of 1977, an agreement on prices and income policies, 
and the ANE, National Agreement on Employment of 1981.
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Trade unions took part in most of social agreements although they were mainly 
involved with wage agreement matters.
The rise of neo-corporatism and the nature of the political transition confirmed the 
exclusion o f social movements and social actors not representing labour relations. As has 
been argued earlier, strong corporatist relations are not necessarily bad for the 
introduction of gender issues in the agenda. The power of trade unions in policy-making 
can have a positive effect if  policies that specifically affect women are targeted. 
Moreover, an administration more sensible to gender matters might work in favour of 
women’s interests even within a framework o f corporate relations.
However, as we shall see next, none of the two possibilities were present in the 
early years o f democratic Spain. Trade unions still had a traditional affiliation profile, that 
is, full-time standard industrial male workers.4 The increase o f female employment rates, 
described in chapter 3, did not have significant repercussion in membership trends. Their 
employment’s conditions (flexible work and mainly in the service sector) were not 
encompassed yet with trade unions’ affiliation structure.
In relation to the political interest o f gender, other important aspects concerned 
with the political, economic and institutional environment o f the transition framed the 
difficulty o f integrating gender issues into the political agenda.
To begin with, the consensus needed the de-radicalisation o f the political 
discourse of the majority of social and political partners. The de-radicalisation of political 
statements of the different parties, as one of the prerequisites for political consensus, 
implied the rejection of those issues where right and left found most disagreement. Issues 
concerned with gender equality and women’s emancipation were, among others, areas 
where consensus was hard to reach, and thus, where less emphasis needed to be placed.
Thus, the introduction of gender issues in the demands o f the legitimised actors 
‘suffered’ in the bargaining dynamics.
3 The political participation o f trade unions focused on the social harmonisation process: negotiation tables 
with the employers organisations and/or with the government, through global pacts or agreements on 
specific issues, and on institutional participation in certain public bodies with the aim o f controlling and 
following the management of public institutions, where labour and social policy decisions are taken. At 
present, the most representative trade unions (CC.OO./UGT/CIG/ELA-STV) have formal representation in 
the tripartite bodies o f the National Institute of Social Security (INSS), National Institute o f Health 
(INSALUD), and National Institute of employment (INEM), among others.
4 In 1984, the metal sector accounted for around 30% of the representation in both unions. The second most 
important affiliation group was the building sector (14% in CC.OO. and 6% in UGT (Fiihrer 1996 and Ortiz 
1999).
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Feminist claims were postponed in the political demands of left parties and trade 
unions by giving priority to more consensual and supposedly general issues. A clear 
example o f this is shown in the revision of the electoral programmes of the two main left 
parties, the PCE and the PSOE, during the first general elections in 1977. None o f the two 
parties formally included the legalisation on abortion although they supported this 
demand verbally.
The policy-making of the Constitution is another example. At the moment when 
the Constitution was written, left and right were deeply opposed on issues such as the role 
o f the family and women’s rights outside marriage. While the left (PCE and PSOE) aimed 
for the recognition of freedom and equality in marriage and the right to divorce, the right 
(UCD and AP) were strong advocates of traditional catholic marriage and openly against 
divorce. The need for compromise forced the left in this case to de-radicalise its ideals 
and admit a more conservative statement. Divorce was not explicitly recognised and the 
defence of sexual freedom and de-institutionalisation of marriage was reduced to 
recognition of the equality principle within marriage (San Jose 1986). The relationship 
between the feminist movement and political parties deteriorated as a consequence o f the 
consensus reached by the main political actors.
The character of the democratic transition through consensus also implied that 
feminists had to renounce particularly demanding topics and subordinate the fight for 
women’ rights to the more general fight for democratic rights. As Scanlon (1990: 97) 
argued, in Spain, more than in other countries, “women have felt the necessity to co­
operate in the general political battle for democracy”. In the new consensus politics and 
with the de-radicalisation of political parties, there were a number of demands that had to 
be dropped. The rejection of feminist claims by left parties together with the enrolment of 
a large number of feminists in political parties and trade unions provoked frustration in 
the feminist movement. A complicated internal debate arose around the issue o f “double 
militancy” and the necessity of an autonomous organisation of the feminist movement not 
affiliated to political parties. As San Jose (1986) asserts, the change of context from a 
period of absence of freedom to the democratic transition, had to necessarily affect the 
relationship between the feminist movement and other social and political organisations.5
5 The treatment given to the female problem  in the Constitution was answered by the Unitary Platform o f  
feminist groups o f Madrid (Plataforma Unitaria de Organizaciones Feministas) who organised a meeting 
under the title “Women, victims o f consensus” (San Jos£ 1986: 111). In Catalonia, the critical movement 
was also intensive, including the organisation of campaigns against the Constitution.
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There were also institutional factors that affected the contents of the policy agenda 
and that prevented the recognition of the political interest o f gender. The fact that the shift 
from dictatorship to democracy was led by a reform and not by a political breakdown 
meant that there was not a real de-legitimisation of the Francoist institutions either by the 
political elite or by the Spanish society in general (Guillen 1994). There was not any 
major purge of the staff from within the state apparatus. Most of the professional cadre 
remained unchanged, including those who had a political role. According to Gunther 
(1996) this was possible because in the last years o f the Francoist regime, the state 
administration recruitment processes were dominated by technocratic and apolitical 
criteria, and also, state bureaucracy in Spain at the beginning of democracy was not 
overstaffed.
Moreover, there was an important degree of institutional deficit left by the Francoist 
administration that limited the possibilities for action during the transition. The 
authoritarian regime left an already designed system of social security. The system had 
numerous structural deficiencies in terms of the protection offered, the institutional 
structures that provided that protection and the badly administered expenditure. One of 
the main objectives of policy-making during the first years of democracy became the 
study of these deficiencies and their possible solutions. The economic crisis of the 1970s 
was an additional difficulty when considering a global reform of the social security 
system based on long-term objectives.
Despite large number of documents produced by the social partners, the reforms 
undertaken during this period were partial reforms of limited scope. The main focus was 
on the reorganisation of the system.
In relation to all these issues, the social protection system played a crucial role in 
containing potential social conflicts deriving from a difficult economic and political 
situation. This is what Rodriguez Cabrero (1997) has called the conflictive nature o f the 
Spanish welfare state. From the late Francoist years, social benefits have been the 
material and political exchange for wage constraint and the fundamental content of the 
social agreements. The fact that the social protection system provided concessions to 
wage controls in a context of reactive policy-making and economic crisis certainly had an 
impact on the introduction of policies dealing with gender inequality. As was argued at 
the beginning of this chapter, problems need to be identified as problems to be included in 
the agenda. During this period, there were immediate issues that the social protection
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system had to deal with and that limited the consideration of other type of issues that the 
social protection systems could also deal with.
In short, the specific political and social configuration of the transition period made 
difficult the representation of the organised feminist movement as a social agent in the 
policy-making processes. The transition was crucial in the determination of the issues that 
were objectives in the agenda-setting in social policy and in the configuration of a new 
model of policy-making based on a neo-corporatist scheme. In this case, and as usually 
happens, the ‘non decisions’, or the decision to maintain existing structures o f power, 
implied a continuity in the inertia of the system and in the long term it meant a 
conservative legitimisation of inequalities.
Gender policies and social policies. Two unrelated spheres o f  intervention?
From the beginning of the 1980s, gender equality issues became more prominent 
in the design of the political agenda. Changes in Spanish society towards awareness o f  
democratic rights of all social groups and the increase of female representation in the 
democratic institutions contributed to the increasing presence of gender matters in the 
public sphere. Gender is now included in ideological discourses of political organisations. 
This was also possible thanks to a shift in policy style (Goma and Subirats 1998). After a 
period where policy-making was characterised by the reactive nature of the policies, that 
is, policy intervention appeared only as a response to existing problems, from 1982 
onwards, a more anticipatory logic in the policy style is introduced. Processes o f societal 
change that impose new challenges to pre-existing policies now drive legislative 
intervention. The eruption of these ‘emerging questions’ in at least some public policy 
domains is, as Goma and Subirats (1998) remark, a consequence o f new social values in a 
changing post-industrial society, adding new dimensions to traditional conceptions o f the 
welfare state. The influence of EU directives in the introduction of these new spheres o f  
intervention was also very important, although the degree of europeanisation, that is, the 
influence of the EU on national policy,6 varied greatly among the different public
6 Applied to the Italian Cohesion Policy, Graziano (1999) gives a profound definition o f europeanisation as 
“a more or less accentuated process o f sovranationalisation and complexification o f the decision-making 
which manifests itself in the emergence o f new institutions o f sovranational government, in the redefinition 
of the competencies o f national and regional government institutions and in the diffusion o f policies derived 
from principles and values which to some extent are innovative with regard to national policies” (1999: 4).
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policies.7 Still, the legislative ‘spill over’ of Europe can be seen as a policy learning 
process that touched all policy domains and that consisted of institutional adaptation at 
national and regional levels to EU standards.
Thus, from 1982 onwards, and once the transition was completed, there was 
substantial progress in the field of formal equality between men and women. As has been 
explained in chapter 3, the commitment was practically translated in the creation of the 
Women’s Rights Institute (Instituto de la Mujer -IM-) in 1983. The IM was responsible 
for gender equality policies through the equality of opportunities plans (PIOMs). These 
programmes created a legal and political framework for the introduction o f gender 
equality issues within the core of the policies.
The questions however remain as to what the effective power and the legislative 
dimension of these programmes have been, and to what extent these policies have been 
able to challenge traditional institutional domains where public policies develop. The next 
chapter will analyse the capacity of the IM to intervene in the policy-making process and 
to introduce a feminist agenda. Nevertheless, we already know that gender issues were 
not introduced, at least in a systematic way, among the policy objectives o f the social 
protection system. The IM’s equality programmes focused on areas that were indirectly 
linked to the social protection system, such as equal opportunities on employment and 
political representation, but they did not tackle issues dealing directly with the 
configuration of the social protection system. Before the first PIOM in 1988, no action 
was taken with regard social protection matters. The first PIOM devoted one, out o f six 
sections, to social protection and the family. A panel o f experts integrated by IM and 
Ministry o f Labour officials was created to study the most relevant issues. Thanks to the 
work of this group, certain changes were promoted such as the improvements in the 
length and income of the maternity leave (1989 reform) and in income levels o f minimum 
widow benefits. However, these new measures coexisted with the 1985 reform on 
pensions, which, as we have seen, had negative effects for women. Although the second
o
PIOM (1993-1995) had more concrete objectives in comparison to the previous one, it
7 Gom& and Subirats (1998) have classified all public policies according to their degree o f europeanisation. 
A high degree of europeanisation is found on industrial, energy , environmental and telecommunications 
policies. A medium degree of europeanisation is found on employment, gender equality, social protection, 
and health policies. As explained in chapter 3, the Equal Opportunity Programmes of the IM were created 
under the direct influence o f the Action Programmes of the European Union.
8 The objectives of the second PIOM (1993-1995) were: 1. To apply egalitarian legislation; 2. To promote 
an equal participation o f women in the processes o f creation and transmission o f knowledge; 3. To balance - 
qualitative and quantitatively- the participation o f women in the labour market sphere; 4. To spread a social 
image o f women more adjusted to the present reality ; 5. To promote an equal share o f domestic
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continued to leave ‘unproblematised’ issues dealing with social protection. This second 
programme instigated important legal changes already initiated by the first plan,9 which 
signified critical progress in removing barriers for gender equality. However, as happened 
in the precedent years, these reforms coexisted with labour and social security reforms 
that reinforced in practice the two-track social protection scheme for men and women.
Therefore, the issues that did dominate and influence the policy objectives need to 
be explored. In what follows, attention will be paid to the factors that acted as constraints 
for the implementation of a real gender equality policy during the early years o f the 
socialist government.
The first distinctive feature o f the policy-making between 1982 and 1989 was the 
primacy o f economics over politics. The goal of modernisation of the economy and the 
enhancement of the economy’s competitiveness was given preference in relation to any 
other problem. Industrial rationalisation programmes, restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policy, and strict public spending controls were the main mechanisms used to solve these 
long-term economic problems.
In social protection terms, the reforms made in this period had as basic objectives 
the adjustment of the social security system to the requirements o f modernisation and 
liberalisation of the economy. Moreover, the efforts were concentrated on solving the 
system’s old problems that still questioned its viability. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
some o f the most important problems were the limited nature o f the protection and its low 
intensity, serious management deficiencies10 and a significant degree of fraud and 
improper use of certain protection categories such as invalidity benefits. Social security 
reforms attempted to make the system more efficient and rational and were also aimed at 
controlling public expending.
responsibilities; 6. To increase the social and political participation o f women; 7. To encourage women’s 
access to decision-taking jobs; 8. To improve the socio-sanitary aspects that specifically affect women; 9. 
To socially integrate marginalised women’s groups; To integrate equality policies in the international 
context.
9 Three important legal changes were. First, the reversal o f the burden o f proof in cases o f sex 
discrimination (inversion de la carga de laprueba) introduced in 1990. With this new measure the 
employer and not the employee is the one that has to prove that discrimination has not taken place. Second, 
the Worker’s Articles o f Association (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) was modified in its article 28. The 
concept o f ‘equal pay’ was substituted for that other of ‘jobs o f equal value’. This ‘equal pay for jobs of 
equal value’ attempted to resolve the problem of wage discrimination caused by the underpayment of  
women doing the same or similar work to men in the same employment. The measure was implemented in 
the 1994 labour market reform. Third, the “zero cost” (coste cero) in maternity leave aimed at reducing the 
costs o f maternity to the employers, through social security paying the costs o f the substitute worker.
10 In 1982 there were over a hundred institutions for the management of the social security. Moreover, there 
was no central administration body for the social security’s financing and there was not a unified and 
systematic legislation for the understanding o f social security rules and regulations.
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However, the expenditure on social protection actually expanded due to a major 
increase in the number of recipients of invalidity and retirement benefits. The reason for 
this was that, indirectly, social security was channelling socio-economic tensions 
provoked by the economic reforms. The industrial rationalisation programmes, which 
consisted o f the closing down of industries and the adoption o f economic liberalising 
measures, led to massive job losses in certain economic sectors and to a decrease of the 
salaries’ purchasing power. The social protection system, mainly through early 
retirement, invalidity benefits and unemployment benefits,11 largely contained the effects 
of this economic restructuring by giving protection to the workers involved, containing 
potential destabilising forces that could have led to a social crisis. The implementation of
1 9these programmes required so much of the budget it was not surprising that other 
programmes, for instance more gender-related schemes, were not put forward.
The whole environment of policy reform was framed under specific political 
circumstances of the first socialist period. In the end, the measures adopted by the 
government were highly unpopular and they could only be implemented thanks to a 
combination of a number of elements in the policy process.
The first and most important one is the unilateral character o f the policy-making of 
that period. Most o f the economic and social policy reforms were made with the absence 
of pactism. In fact, between 1982 and 1989, PSOE did not depend on the support of any 
other parliamentary group to pass its legislation. During the first terms of the socialist 
government, the Parliament had a narrow influence in the policy process while the cabinet 
of Gonzalez had direct influence over the contents o f the political agenda. As Gunther 
(1996) argues:
“The government’s sense o f  security in office (based upon its huge parliamentary majority 
and the lack o f  a credible electoral threat at that time posed by any opposition party), 
coupled with the fact that it did not have to bargain or compromise with other parliamentary 
parties, were important assets which enabled the party to adopt bold and unpopular 
economic restructuring policies” (1996: 26).
11 In 1986, invalidity benefits represented 29% of the budget o f contributory pensions and 27% o f all 
pensioners o f the contributory scheme. Both percentages have progressively been reduced in -5.5% of the 
general social security budget and -3.54% in the number of claimants for 1996 (Anuario Estadisticas 
Laborales). Retirement accounts for more than 52% o f the budget for public pensions since 1986. As for 
unemployment, Spain expends far more on this contingency than EU average. In 1980 there was 9.7 points 
more of expenditure between Spain and EU average. In 1994 the difference was 10.2 (SEEPROS 1995).
12 Contributory benefits accounted in 1977 for 72% of the budget for cash benefits o f social security, in 
1989 the percentage increased to 90% (Informe Economico Financiero 1996).
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Right after the victory of the socialist party (at the national and local level), the 
Prime Minister made a statement o f ‘programmatic corporatism’ (Giner and Sevilla 
1984). This referred to the opening of a new policy-making process based on the dialogue 
between the government and the emergent ‘social forces’, that is, organised labour and 
organised management. However, corporatism was going to remain more as an abstract 
and ambiguous element than a real threat to government policies. As Giner and Sevilla 
(1984: 135) argued, “the goals of socialist ideology had to wait for the updating and 
transformation of the antiquated arrangements and institutions inherited by it”. 
Nonetheless, and according to Rico (1986) the government was accepting employers’ 
demands for salary adjustment and labour flexibility in the belief that it was necessary to 
free employers from labour constraints in order to achieve economic growth and 
employment creation. The Social and Economic Agreement (Acuerdo Econdmico y  
Social) signed in 1984 by the employers’ organisation (CEOE), the government and one 
of the trade unions -UGT-, was beneficial for the first two parties and detrimental for the 
third one. As Rubio asserts:
“The em ployers found in the agreements a useful instrument to reconcile labour relations to 
its own interest and necessities. This mechanism is also extended to the possib ility  o f  
offering an image o f  social cohesion which creates an opinion clim ate where the em ployers 
demands for salary adjustment and labour flexibility appear legitim ated” (1986: 228).
Secondly, the finance ministers were given great power in the allocation and 
priorities of the budget. As Gunther (1996) explains:
“Frightening statements about the deteriorating state o f  the econom y w hich accom panied  
claw -back  bargaining tactics (in which previous concessions to spending ministries were 
taken back and their budgetary allocations slashed) w ere em ployed in efforts to keep the 
growth o f  spending under control” (1996: 25).
Thirdly, a technical character dominated the policy process of that period. The 
criteria that controlled the reforms affecting the conditions o f entitlement to the 
contributory system were not the ones that appeared in the agenda setting such as 
redistributory justice or equality, but those of rationality and economic efficiency of the
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nsystem. The reforms were implemented following technical reports. These documents 
contained continuous reference to ‘adjustment’, ‘reorientation’ and ‘better management’ 
to justify the need for reform. The restrictive actions taken were justified by putting the 
blame on the antecedents of the system. The technical character of the implementation 
stage meant they were beyond the judgement of the public. However, as Hill (1997) 
notes, to give prominence to bureaucrats and technicians within the administration is also 
a political option, since they can execute a hidden political role.
Confrontation versus dialogue. The conflictive nature o f  the policy process
The reform of 1985 opened up a tense climate of confrontation between the unions 
and the government that was progressively intensified until the Programme for Youth 
Employment in 1988 was instigated. This programme included features of flexibility in an 
attempt to stimulate employment growth and was the last o f a number of restrictive and 
aggressive measures implemented in the absence of pactism, which culminated in the 
confrontation between the government and the workers organisations. Trade unions 
organised two general strikes, the first one (1985) was against the 1985 reform of the 
pension system and the second general strike, in December 1988, was a reaction against 
further liberalising measures of the labour market in a context of economic recovery. 
These strikes, particularly the second one that had huge support from the general 
population, forced the government to give concessions that led to a new period of co­
operative agreements.
The new strategy of unity (Miguelez 1995) of the two main trade unions -UGT and 
CC.OO.- allowed for this new direct confrontation against the economic and social policy 
of the government. After the break down of UGT and PSOE relations, unions abandoned 
their previous division and entered into a strategy of co-operation. Moreover, the new 
legal framework that came out of the Organic Law of Unionist Freedom (Ley Organica 
de Libertad Sindical) approved in 1985, also gave trade unions the necessary 
independence from political parties to undertake a strategy o f confrontation. This new law 
institutionalised trade unions’ power of intervention in the bargaining and collective 
agreements within enterprises. The law established that trade unions capacity to intervene
13 Such was the case o f the consultative paper El Libro Naranja, written in 1985 by representatives o f the 
social security administration. It was the most immediate antecedent o f the 1985 social security reform. The 
document was severely criticised by employers and employees organisations
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in labour relations and institutional representation would be determined by an electoral 
system of representation within the enterprises and not directly through affiliate 
representation.14 This new situation gave trade unions considerable powers of 
representation in a period of affiliation retrenchment but, as will be examined in detail in 
the following chapter, did not favour the integration of women’s demands in the 
dynamics o f the organisations.
In fact, as Ortiz (1999) argues, despite the ‘period o f euphoria’ (1977-1978) when 
membership reached percentages o f up to 40-50%, the percentages have always remained 
very low (15%). These membership rates are among the lowest in Europe and yet the 
industrial disputes’ rate, defined as the number of working days lost because o f conflict 
between employers and employees, is among the highest (Ortiz 1999).
Nevertheless, the conflicts between trade unions and the government had no visible 
effects in govemability15 and further liberalising economic measures were still being 
adopted, as well as the progress towards the professional character of the system. This 
was possible because union pressure aimed at attenuating the consequences o f these 
policies to the central core of workers, maintaining a relatively reduced number o f  first 
order social risks. The groups that were affected most by the liberalising measures were 
those whose interests were not represented by any of the social and political partners 
involved in the process. Therefore, from a gender point o f view, the opposition o f trade 
unions to the governmental reforms was relative. The design of the social protection 
system that came under the 1985 reform was never really challenged by trade unions 
because it did not damage the expectations of their most solid clientele. Social security 
consolidated specific circuits of distribution, as a sort of what Ferrera (1996) calls 
‘welfare clientelism’. As for the employers’ organisation, the CEOE, even when it was 
not actively involved in policy reform, it has prioritised private market solution to chronic 
social security problems, far less attention being paid to the peripheral labour market in 
which Spanish women are over-represented.
In addition, and as Rodriguez Cabrero (1997) argues, the relative freeze o f welfare 
state development has not implied, until now, a crisis o f legitimisation that has not been
14 The workers organisations that reach at least 10% of the votes in the elections (15% at regional level) 
have the right to a number of important issues: the right to negotiate and sign collective agreements o f  
general application; the right to independent unionist representation within enterprises; and the right to have 
representation in the tripartite public bodies.
15 Six months after the general strike o f 1988, PSOE revalidated its term o f office for another four years.
115
politically controlled. The strengthening of the occupational character of social security 
coexisted with an extension of welfare rights. There are large groups o f citizens that 
although lacking access to the core protection system, do find access to other protection 
schemes at, generally low-income levels. This sort o f ‘patronage’ maintains a 
considerable degree of complexity and multiplicity in determining the type of protection 
given and its gendering impact. On the whole, the logic behind the system of protection is 
clear in its main traits but becomes puzzling in many situations. It should not therefore be 
difficult to understand why issues such as gender equality cannot easily find their way 
through the principles that govern the system of protection. The system tries to cope with 
a set o f acquired rights and, given the fact that there is always a limited budget for it, it 
does so through the precept that, eventually, ‘everyone will get something’.
In 1989 there was a new cycle of co-operation between the government and trade 
unions. As has already been mentioned, after the victory o f PSOE in 1989 and in a 
context o f economic recovery, the government and trade unions agreed social and labour 
reforms. UGT and CC.OO. promoted a “Priority Union Proposal” (.Propuesta Sindical 
Prioritaria) that had as principal objectives employment growth, the improvement o f 
social protection and income redistribution. According to Montoya (1997) this proposal 
opened the way for the 1989 reform and the 1990 law, that established for the first time a 
unified system of non-contributory benefits for all those claimants not entitled to 
contributory benefits. Therefore, the agreements permitted the expansion of expenditure 
on social services, the increase in the unemployment protection, the universalisation o f  
health care, and created the basis for the non-contributory pension law in 1990.
During the 1990s, social protection in Spain was conditioned by a new economic 
recession from the end of 1991, which together with the requirements o f the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 justified a new cycle of restrictive and liberalising measures. In 1992, in 
the economic policy field, the socialist government led the “Plan o f Convergence o f the 
European Community” which deeply affected labour market flexibility policy. In this 
case, europeanisation meant the control of public deficit and budget constraint. The need 
to have a more rational and efficient social security system was partly also a requirement 
from the European Union.
In the 1993 elections, PSOE extended its period o f office although with a 
substantial decrease in the number of seats in the Congress. The loss of the absolute 
majority in the Congress o f Deputies brought a new political structure in which the
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government had to negotiate with other parties and where the power to establish 
economic and social policies was substantially reduced. Specifically, the new single­
minority government of PSOE needed the legislative support of the Catalan centre-right 
nationalist party CiU. This had important implications on policy-making in terms of 
budget priorities. Policy issues were largely intended to impose greater budgetary 
austerity and liberalisation of the labour market. The labour market reform of 1994 was 
the deepest liberalising reform of the socialist period. It created new labour contracts with 
very limited or no social protection, more power was given to the employers by reducing 
the costs o f redundancy and temporary employment agencies were legalised.
The project for a selective privatisation of public enterprises was initiated as well as 
the strengthening of the assistential nature of social services. A new model o f public 
funding also came as a result of the new power relations, with a substantial increase in the 
flow of resources from the central government to the various regional governments (15% 
of IRPF) (Gunther 1996; Goma and Subirats 1998). This new period o f liberalising 
economic and labour policies was again taken to be justified by the new recessive cycle of 
the economy.
According to Adelantado and others (1998) the political climate o f the last socialist 
government helped to create a favourable atmosphere for the financial world and the 
employers’ organisation to raise demands for the privatisation o f the public pension 
system. This general neo-liberal environment reduced the power of confrontation of trade 
unions. The two general strikes organised (the first on May 1992 -half day- and the 
second one in January 1994) did not stop the government from transforming the 
liberalising projects into actual labour market reforms.
Nevertheless, trade unions still had considerable power over labour relations in the 
form of single pacts with the government or the CEOE concerning single issues.16 In this 
sense, the 1994 reform promoted the development of collective agreements as regulatory 
elements of labour relations and conditions of employment. To implement the idea, 
several issues have ceased to be regulated through state rules, for instance, the 
organisation of salary structure.
16 In 1991 a new institutional channel for the social dialog was created: Social and Economic Council 
Consejo Economico y  Social -CES- . A consultant body for economic and labour affairs. The objective of 
the Council is to reinforce the participation of economic and social agents in the economic and social life.
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Although the direction of labour and social reforms did not work in favour of 
ameliorating gender inequalities, the government, driven by the IM, introduced legal 
changes aiming at establishing formal gender equality. The introduction o f the clause 
‘equal pay for jobs of equal value’ in the Workers’ Bill of Rights is a good example. This 
principle o f equality was adopted in a reform that, because of the type of labour flexibility 
imposed, appeared to be hostile to women. The targeting of employment flexibility would 
affect groups with unstable and precarious relationships to the labour market, namely, 
young people and women.
The Future o f  social policy: The Toledo Pact
From 1995 onwards there was a shift in the character o f policy-making processes. 
Direct confrontation seems to be abandoned at the cost of giving up global demands and 
focusing on more partial objectives. It was in this context that the Toledo Pact was 
created and signed by the majority of political parties and trade unions. The pact was a 
further step in the reassertion o f the nature of continuity for the future policy-making 
process in two broad senses: in the sense o f the issues that had to be objectives in the 
agenda and also in the sense of the actors legitimised in the process.
As discussed in chapter 3, the Toledo Pact implicitly proposed increasing the degree 
of proportionality between benefit and contribution, and thus moving away from the 
principle of redistribution and social equality and reproducing the inequalities in previous 
incomes. This new pact, although situated within a social context of spectacular changes 
in the labour market and social realities that affected mainly women, did not contemplate 
any kind o f measure in favour o f a more equal gender distribution of benefits. From its 
inception it could be argued that the Toledo Pact did not incorporate into its 
considerations the serious needs of underrepresented sectors o f the population.
In terms of the social actors, the Toledo Pact guaranteed the legitimisation and 
exclusive role o f the social agents integrated within the corporatist relations’ structure. 
The employers’ organisation did not sign the final document although it was certainly 
putting pressure on reducing social security costs for the employers. Trade unions and the 
government opposed CEOE’s interests for an increasingly privatised pension system. 
Nonetheless, the employers were able to see through the Toledo Pact some of their 
demands, such as the development of private pension schemes.
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The constitution of political relations that came under the frame of the Toledo Pact 
reaffirmed the resistance of the legitimised social and political actors to introduce changes 
in the distribution of power, both in terms of capacity to intervene and to participate in the 
policy-making process. New labour performance patterns affected by labour market 
flexibility and new gender roles produced by the breakdown of the strict division between 
the public and the private sphere are not mirrored by the introduction of new social actors 
onto the scene. Furthermore, the potential of state feminism to act as mediator between 
women’s interest and the state was not supported.
The Toledo Pact was the direct reference for the last important reform on social 
security in 1996 and under the rule of the Conservative Party (PP) (General elections 
March 1996). The government and the trade unions (UGT and CC.OO.) signed the 
Agreement on Rationalisation and Consolidation of the Social Security System. The 
employers’ organisation did not sign the agreement, presumably due to their disagreement 
about the maintenance of the purchasing power of the pensions.
Once more, as had happened in previous reforms, the 1996 agreement did not 
introduce any kind of global reform to the system. The main goal was, as it has always 
been, the revision of the economic-financing system within which social security is based. 
The structural problems of the system seemed to involve only the economic aspect. Issues 
concerned with the new needs of protection produced by a changing social reality were 
not considered. In this sense it is unsurprising that there is no measure taken to protect 
women in their domestic and family activities in order to allow them the development of 
their professional careers.
Conclusions
The degree o f policy legacy from the previous Francoist regime conditioned the 
policy process o f the early democratic period in terms of the number of issues inherited 
from the past that became prior objectives in the agenda and also in terms of the social 
actors who led the policy change. The importance of structural problems, from 
administrative and institutional deficiencies, to the political and economic environment, 
forced the exclusion from the policy agenda of objectives of a less ‘urgent’ nature. It is 
difficult to know if  in a less constraining context, gender issues would have been put 
forward. What we can be certain about is that, in an environment of consolidating 
democracy and economic crisis, gender equality was not considered to be at the top of the
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list o f political objectives. Also, the neo-corporatism of the first years o f democracy re­
established the legitimate role of industrial labour relations, which entailed a potential 
conflict between the social actors who had been legitimised and those that had not, at 
least within an institutional framework, such as the feminist movement.
Once democracy was consolidated under a long period of a social-democrat 
government, the ‘gender issue’ was ideologically recognised and formulated in the 
process o f agenda setting although the course of social and labour policies suggest that it 
was somewhat marginalised when policies were put into action. The social protection 
system played an instrumental role in the socio-economic transformation of the country, 
which also constrained the introduction of new issues into the agenda.
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Chapter 6
Policy Access of Women’s Advocacy Groups 
-Views on Gender Equality-
Introduction
Chapter 5 has given some clear grounds for understanding the factors that have 
shaped the policy process and its implications in terms of gender. However, there are a 
number of key questions that need to be addressed to complete the picture that has been 
sketched and to respond to the research questions formulated at the beginning of the 
study. We still do not know what the capacity of women’s advocacy institutions to 
intervene, either directly or indirectly, in the policy process has been. How gender issues, 
in relation to the social protection system have been conceptualised by the actors 
intervening in the policy process and what the discourses and ideologies that embrace 
social actors’ strategies are.
With this in mind, the explorative nature of the qualitative approach that will be 
used in these next two chapters to interpret the interviews and documents, undertaken as 
primary research material, aspires to answer the questions formulated in the first chapter. 
That is, to what extent are women represented by social actors or as social actors in the 
policy process? And how are gender equality issues targeted as objectives in the social 
protection agenda?
In chapter 2 we discussed the importance of overcoming the political exclusion of 
women in order to construct real gender equality policies. There are very interesting 
questions regarding women’s political participation, in particular whether this 
participation confronts the way we think about politics and the perception o f political 
boundaries (e.g. the difference between formal and informal politics). These questions 
will not be pursued further here since our main concern focuses on a specific aspect of 
political representation. What Phillips (1996) calls the ‘politics of presence’ is articulated 
in this research through the study of the policy access o f women’s policy machinery. As 
explained in chapter 1, the concept of women’s policy machinery is used to include not 
only the governmental institution, the Instituto de la Mujer -IM-, but also women’s bodies
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within trade unions, which are the CC.OO.’s Women’s Secretariat and the UGT’s 
Women’s Department.1
Policy access, as was also defined in chapter 1, refers to the capacity of these 
women’s advocacy organisations to intervene directly, as part o f the policy process, or 
indirectly, by acting upon the actors involved in the process, in those policy arenas 
dealing with social protection issues. As explained in chapter 1, the capacity o f women’s 
advocacy groups to influence the administration and unions’ general policies greatly 
determines the chances that gender equality and discrimination issues might have in 
obtaining specific consideration. The research will then focus on whether gender policies 
and equal opportunities policies are strategically integrated with other public policies or 
whether they are designed and implemented in isolation.
The relationship between the two women’s policy machinery will determine the 
capacity o f the two bodies to intervene in the policy-making as a pressure group 
representing women’s interest. Do these two bodies share a common strategy for action? 
Or are their respective interests conflictive? The relationship between the two bodies will 
be closely related to the influence of the feminist movement in each o f them. The last 
section of this chapter will explore the two bodies’ strategies for gender equality and the 
circumstances that might have worked in favour or against the accomplishment of their 
goals.
Policy access o f  women inside trade unions
One of the most reiterated objections to women’s bodies within the unions since 
their creation has been their lack o f representation. With regard to the CC.OO., the 
demands o f the Women’s Secretariat for female representation were already present in 
1988, in the main official document of the union. The director of the Secretariat asked for 
the establishment of a 25% quota of representation (TUdoc5). The proposal was rejected 
however, introducing just a recommendation to be developed in the future. The union was 
then criticised for not having responded to women’s demands, failing to establish 
mechanisms for the increase of female representation in the union’s organisational 
structures.
See appendix 1 for the description of the interviews.
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Three years later, in 1991, the Secretariat urged the incorporation, into the union’s 
Articles o f Association, of two new articles referring to the proportional representation of 
women on the boards of direction (TUdoc6). The contents o f the articles were, first that 
female representation in the boards of direction would have to be, at least, proportional to 
the level o f female affiliation in a given area. Second, that each federation and regional 
division of the union would have to create a department similar to the central one. 
Increases in terms of budget and infrastructure were also demanded. The main objective 
was to integrate women, and women’s issues, within trade unions’ dynamics (Tudoc6). 
However, and again, the requests did not pass. In the congress’s election the proposal of 
the two new articles received 74 votes in favour and 88 against. In the end, the request 
was considered as a non-compulsory recommendation. More recently, in 1993 and 1994 
(TUWdocl and TUWdoc2), the director o f the Women’s Secretariat was still demanding 
mainstreaming (transversalidad), i.e. the principle of integration of gender issues and 
women’s demands in the global action of the unions, as well as proportional 
representation. There have been no formal commitments on the part of the union towards 
either o f these issues.
Nevertheless, compared with the UGT, the Women’s Secretariat of the CC.OO. 
has been more successful in gaining representation inside the union. The Women’s 
Department of the UGT is a more recent creation and has a lower statutory level. When 
the department was fully created in 1990 the only reference to women’s participation 
within the union was a recommendation “to make an effort in order to increase female 
representation in the executive committees to reach proportionality with the percentages 
of female affiliation” (TUdoc5). Although in the UGT there is a quota system (between 
80% maximum and 20% minimum representation at all levels of the Executive 
Committee, congresses and electoral lists) the quota is, as the respondents expressed, not 
implemented.
However, as has been argued, although women in the CC.OO. received more 
straight forward recognition within the union, the battle for representation was still as 
imperative as in the Women’s Department of the UGT.
What are the obstacles for their intervention inside trade unions? In an attempt to 
identify the problems, the first thing that needs to be said is that low female membership 
rates cannot count as an explanatory factor. A result o f changes in the labour market
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structure giving rise to new employment sectors with larger numbers o f female 
employees, have meant that women have become an increasingly important part of trade 
union membership. Coupled with this, the traditional member profiles, that is, workers of 
the metal and building sectors, have become less significance. In 1996, female union 
density reached 27% in both trade unions, with the majority of members in the education
o
sector and around 40% in the public sector. This suggests that factors other than 
membership need to be looked at in order to assess the real difficulties women’s advocacy 
groups inside trade unions face in accessing decision-making structures and in integrating 
equal opportunities policies in unions’ strategies. In fact, as argued in the previous 
chapter, the nature o f the trade unions’ membership does not explain the power of these 
organisations. From 1985 onwards, trade unions’ institutional power has been based on 
electoral representation rather than on membership. Trade unions’ legitimacy through the 
election system certainly has its consequences in terms of the representation o f groups, 
such as women, that have not belonged, in an explicit way, to traditional corporatist 
arrangements. To the extent that these traditional corporatist arrangements were funded 
under the framework of industrial relations, women were included but in a subordinated 
position since the image of the male industrial worker was constructed through 
assumptions of sexual divisions of labour. As one interviewee argued:
“There have been substantial changes over the last years in affiliation and yet it is taking a 
long time for the union to realise that there has to be a change of strategy. We know now 
that the labour market is changing and that trade unions will have to become more open to 
other workers different from industrial workers, but changes occur very slowly” (TUW2).
Supporting this point, another respondent pointed out:
“We still operate with the same codes as in the past, when unions were working class, 
industrial and male organisations. However, this is no longer so. After the economic re­
structuring, unions are not so industrial, not so working class and no so male, they are 
being more and more feminised and the service sector is gaining more representation” 
(TUW3).
2
In 1985, the metal sector accounted for around 30% of representation in both unions and the building 
sector 14% in CC.OO. and 6% in UGT. In 1996, metal and building sectors descended to approximately 
22%. The sectors that experienced substantial increases have been the public sector (7% in 1985 and 23% in 
1996); education (2% in 1985, 7% in 1996) and services (11% in 1996) for UGT. (Fiihrer 1996; Ortiz 
1999).
3
Information provided by Francisco Borges, Secretarla de Organizacidn, CC.OO., February 1999.
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One of the issues that needs to be explored is how the officials from women’s 
policy machinery are seen in the whole structure of their organisations, and what their 
specific role is. In particular, whether their actions are seen as complementary to or 
conflicting with those of the unions. The key question regards the extent to which women 
can push forward gender equality demands in organisations that in principle cannot easily 
integrate such perspectives.
The ‘communist’ trade union, the CC.OO., was able to integrate the feminist 
discourse within the general discourse of communism at a very early stage. This openness 
to gender issues was in fact a common trait throughout the communist party, which, as we 
have seen in chapter 3, gave birth to one o f the most important democratic feminist 
movements (movimiento democratico de mujeres). Since 1978, the issue o f discrimination 
against women has been present in the unions’ records. Nevertheless, this was not a 
‘happy marriage’. The ‘woman trouble’ could be incorporated into the principles o f the 
union only as an expression of the capitalist exploitation. As manifested in one trade 
union report:
“Working women, and women in general, freeing themselves from the capitalist society, 
also free themselves from large part of its oppressions and inequalities (...). An analysis 
of the ‘feminine question’ has only a value if is directly related with the economic reality” 
(TUdocl).
From this point of view, the feminist movement was seen as an ally to the working 
class movement, and thus feminists were given recognition inside the trade union as long 
as they could remain loyal to that other more important division of social class.
However, officials of women’s groups within the unions did have a broader 
feminist view. Their reports acknowledged from the beginning the cultural and political 
dimension of women’s oppression. The feminist interpretation of the public-private divide 
was frequently used as the reference for their analyses. They saw themselves as 
successfully representing a feminist reference point and as a kind of pressure group within 
the union. As one respondent argued, the connection between the feminist movement and 
the working class movement was present since the creation o f the Women’s Secretariat: 
“When the Secretaria was created, we argued from the beginning that it had to be a bridge 
between the feminist and the working class movements” (TUW3).
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Another respondent argued that the relationship had to be intrinsic to the two 
movements:
“I think that the feminist movement and the working class movement have to be there 
helping each other because we need each other”(TUW2).
An additional problem for female participation within the unions is the 
organisational patterns. Time constraints and the incompatibility between family 
responsibilities and work responsibilities undermine women’s opportunities to intervene, 
though the issue is not acknowledged by their male colleagues. As one o f the respondents 
pointed out:
“Women that decide to work voluntarily on the organisations do not normally have family 
responsibilities. At the moment we are four women in the Executive Committee and the 
profiles are single, widow, and women with grown up children. At the lower echelons, all 
governing bodies gather on Saturdays, because they do not have union-representation 
recognition, the law only gives that to large enterprises where there is a person, or more 
than one, just working as a trade union delegate within the enterprise. However, Spain is a 
country of micro-enterprises and family business where people that are affiliated and 
work for it have to do it in non-working hours, and that means giving up many things”4 
(TUW1).
Making a similar point, another respondent argued that trade unions were still 
functioning with male uses of time and that represented a fundamental barrier for the 
participation of women. She argued for the abolition of old habits in the way trade unions 
work, in particular the necessity to adapt working hours of the union to female timetables. 
Reference is made to the ‘monolithic image of the worker’ as a male and industrial 
worker (TUW2).
“Men have more spare time to spend in extra-working activities. Women always have to 
combine domestic duties with paid work, and that leaves them with no time to get 
involved in other activities, such as trade union participation. (...) Everything is structured 
around men, timetables, the language and the patterns of organisation, everything is 
designed on the basis of a male social organisation” (TUWdocl).
4 According to Ftthrer (1996) 80% o f the enterprises where union elections take place are small enterprises, 
from 6 to 49 workers.
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Since changes in the structure of trade unions membership have occurred, 
preceded, as they have been, by changes in the labour market, the problem then is how to 
modify structures of power defined through a clear gender division.
One of the solutions that is being put forward is to challenge this gendered 
division of labour in the public and private spheres. As respondents have argued, if men 
and women share domestic work, both will have time to spend in public work. However, 
these proposals would need a whole redefinition o f how trade unions work.
“In some spheres I think the only solution would be to make a radical change in union 
politics and we don’t make that step and I think that is because there are too many fears 
and many problems to face that challenge” (TUW2).
Both feminist bodies have to work within predominantly and traditionally male 
organisations and that places them in a difficult position. While their enrolment to 
workers’ organisations gives them a greater representation power than other non- 
institutional feminist groups, that same condition acts as a barrier to their capacity to 
create strategies o f confrontation within the corporations.
Respondents held that their role in creating awareness of the equality issue 
revealing problems that needed to be addressed is formally accepted and recognised, 
though they still lack the power and mechanisms to guarantee that action will be taken. 
Female officials within trade unions understand that their active representation in the 
highest spheres of the organisations5 is the only way to overcome that obsolete ‘male 
culture’.
Collective bargaining and equal opportunities
Collective bargaining is a fundamental procedure for the enforcement o f gender 
equality law. The outcomes of collective bargaining are to a large extent decisive for the 
implementation of equality legislation. Moreover, in Spain, the coverage of collective
c
bargaining is greater than union density. A large percentage of the labour force (around 
70%) is covered by collective agreements (Kravaritou 1997).
5Female delegates: 19% CC.OO. and 18% UGT (data 1990). Confederate Executive Committee (maximum 
representative body for CC.OO. and maximum decision-making body for UGT) 20% CC.OO. (4 women 
and 16 men) and 9% UGT (1 woman and 10 men). Confederate council o f CC.OO./Confederate committee 
o f UGT (maximum body between congresses -with representation o f territorial and federal structures- out 
of a total o f 151 members, women represent 10% in CC.OO. and 4% in UGT.
6 Coverage o f collective bargaining: the number of workers covered by collective agreement as a percentage
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Collective bargaining and equal opportunities (EO) is a broad field o f research and 
there are many issues to consider. To begin with, the link between equal opportunities 
policy and gender equality cannot be taken for granted. As Bercursson and Dickens 
(1996) have argued, differences can arise from different understandings of what EO 
policy is about. Provisions, which appear to be ‘EO provisions’ in practice, may be 
double-edged for women’s equality, with negative potential in terms o f promoting 
equality.7 Important as it is the whole scope of collective bargaining and EO cannot be 
considered here. Rather, the focus will be on their significance as one fundamental 
dimension of the policy access of women’s union bodies.
According to the interviewees, collective agreements can be paradoxical with 
regard to women’s interest. They can indeed work towards gender equality policies but 
also, gender equality issues put forward through legislation might be undermined in 
reality. Respondents pointed out a number of obstacles in the use o f collective bargaining 
as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of gender equality legislation. Firstly, 
collective bargaining is a gendered process in itself. As Bercursson and Dickens (1996) 
point out, collective bargaining as a concept is not particularly focused on equal 
opportunities and its potential as a mechanism for the achievement of equal opportunities 
needs to be explored. Secondly, there is no formal commitment to the acceptance of equal 
opportunities by unions and employers.
Considering the first aspect, the culture behind bargaining mechanisms is still 
dominated by industrial relations’ framework. In the view of the respondents, actors 
involved in collective bargaining often have discriminatory attitudes. In this respect, 
interviewees argued that the introduction of equal opportunities policy is confronted with 
two separate problems: first there is a problem of unawareness, in the sense that the 
difficulties women face are not identified. Second, there is also a problem of opposite 
demands.
“They understand perfectly well positive action in the case of handicapped people, they 
never think that the measures are discriminatory for the rest. However, when it comes to 
gender they say that qualified women do not have any problem to get promoted. They do 
not understand that there are mechanisms that exclude women from certain key positions 
in the labour market or trade unions” (TUW2).
of those wage and salary earners. Union density: proportion of eligible workforce in membership o f unions 
(Bercursson and Dickens 1996).
7 This is the case of measures which reinforce the principle that women have primary responsibility for 
childcare, or flexibility arrangements for female workers that in practice withdraw them from full-time
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This view seems to suggest that while the importance of equal treatment is 
recognised, inequality of outcome through the disadvantages of women in the labour and 
social structures, is still largely unacknowledged by the actors involved in the process. 
Reflecting on the concept of equality, one respondent noted that:
“From the left in general, issues on egalitarianism seem to have been very harmful 
because to be equal has often been understood as treating everyone equally when not 
everyone comes from the same starting point” (TUW2).
The difference between equality of treatment and equality of outcome has been 
outlined by several authors (Bercursson and Dickens 1996; Kravaritou 1997; 
Bergamaschi 1999) as a main challenge in conceptualising equal opportunities policy. 
While the former focuses on formal and procedural equality, the latter refers to 
substantive equality, and is concerned with the “outcomes of the game rather than the 
rules o f play” (Bercursson and Dickens 1996: 16). Equal opportunities cannot be 
successfully achieved until the two dimensions are taken into account.
However, as respondents argued, one of the most difficult aspects of equal 
opportunities policy is how to make visible issues that appear to be invisible in most of 
the agreements. How to discern the discriminatory effect of apparently neutral 
arrangements, such as pay classification systems. Gender equality legislation leaves room 
for different interpretations and some of the principles are not well defined. This is the 
case in ‘equal pay’ measures, which are intended to reduce horizontal segregation due to 
wage differentials between men and women. As respondents pointed out, the procedures 
that are used to categorise the value o f jobs are not clearly identified and the evaluation of 
female jobs has not been incorporated into the classification programmes.
“We argue that sexual discrimination in the market place lies above all in wages 
differentials, men and women are not paid equally for similar jobs. Therefore, in order to 
apply the ‘equal salary for jobs of equal value’ we need to know first how to define jobs of 
equal value. We need to know what kind of systems enterprises are using to determine jobs’ 
value, and how those systems are applied” (TUW2).
Considering the ‘no commitment’ to the acceptance o f equal opportunities by the 
social partners involved in collective agreements, one of the respondents argue that issues
employment (Dickens 1998).
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that concern women are often ‘swept under the carpet’, meaning that other issues will 
have priority in the bargaining process. When the negotiation first starts, both parts, the 
employers’ representatives on the one hand and the employees’ representatives on the 
other, have very ambitious demands knowing that they will have to give up things in 
order to arrive at an agreement. Once negotiation has started, what are considered to be 
the less important things are treated as ‘bargaining counters’ in order to keep what is 
considered to be the really important demands. As the interviewee pointed out, issues 
dealing with women’s social rights, such as maternity benefits, are rapidly left out o f the 
agenda.
“Maternity leave is the first thing that falls in the negotiation process although it is 
contemplated in the Articles of Association (Estatutos de los Trabajadores) and is 
regulated by law, but they don’t care about the law. It is difficult when it is legally 
recognised, can you imagine if it was not explicitly written on a legal text and we had to 
convince them on the collective agreements, it would be impossible” (TUW1).
Despite all the problems, respondents argued that both levels of intervention, that is 
legislative enactment and collective bargaining are necessary to successfully achieve the 
integration of gender matters into the agenda. A legal framework favourable to equality 
measures is essential, though not sufficient, to address equality issues in collective 
bargaining. Legislation at both, national and supranational level (EU Directives) is from 
the respondents’ point of view the real driving force behind EO policies. What is still 
needed, they argue, is the effective implementation of measures that have formal 
recognition. Women’s representation in policy-making is seen as the only solution to the 
problem. Respondents saw a direct link between women’s presence in leadership position 
and in collective bargaining arenas and progress of equality agendas. One respondent 
argued that:
“It is essential to achieve greater female representation in our internal elections, it is the 
only way to sit on the collective agreements. At the moment 98% of the people that 
negotiate the collective agreements are men and although we try to train them and explain 
the situation, it is hard to obtain anything from them. We need a quota to have greater 
representation in the elections but the quota in itself is useless, we need to change the way 
trade unions work” (TUW1).
The actors that intervene in the agreements see gender equality issues as irrelevant 
and therefore women’s success in this field greatly depends on their own capacity to
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intervene as full participants in all the stages of the agreement process, from the 
formulation of the policy to its implementation. Transparent evaluation o f progress, 
effective monitoring and control mechanisms to guarantee commitment are other issues 
seen as necessary for effective implementation.
From the evidence drawn on so far, there is a clear tension between women’s 
unions bodies representing the specific interests o f women and their belonging to the 
general body of workers’ organisation. Whilst, these bodies obtain recognition and are 
formally accepted by the traditional structures o f the organisations, when their demands 
clash with the consolidated interests of certain groups within trade unions, they are 
generally undermined. Although there is an evident conflict of interest, this antagonism is 
not allowed to come before the common cause all workers are seen to share as a more or 
less ‘united workforce’. Women’s unions bodies have limited official role and that is a 
clear obstacle for their capacity of action. The conflict exists not only in the culture of 
trade unions but also in the interests and subjects to be represented. However, women 
within trade unions cannot pursue a strategy of direct confrontation since their ‘policy 
access’ is surrounded by problems due to their fragmented representation.
Policy access o f the IM
To understand the capacity of the IM to intervene in the policies of the 
government, attention needs to be paid to the origins o f the body. Why and how was the 
IM created? Who pushed for the creation of the IM? How do the interviewees see the 
creation of the IM and how do they position themselves in terms of their relationship with 
the government on the one hand and the feminist movement on the other?
The creation of the IM in 1983 was a result of an ideological commitment of the 
socialist party but the existence o f double militancy (women feminists and socialists) was 
crucial. The IM would not have been created without the push coming from a number of 
women within PSOE, with a clear feminist background.
The feminist character of IM’s directors and their actions and strategies was 
clearly stated throughout the interviews. They all highlighted their involvement with the 
feminist movement before the IM was created. The words ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’ were 
widely used by all interviewees when referring to actions or strategies developed by the 
IM, establishing thus a sense o f belonging to the feminist movement. However, as 
outlined in chapter 3, at the time the IM was created, the Spanish women’s movement
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was debilitated for a number of reasons. Thus, IM officials considered themselves as a 
sort o f ‘elite’ o f the feminist movement, working for the movement but to a certain extent, 
without it. In this sense, the IM can be seen as a kind of feminist lobby within the 
government. Two of the respondents expressed this relationship between the feminist 
movement and the IM at the moment of its creation:
“The demand (to create the IM) was not so much outside, in the streets, as inside. Outside 
there was the feminist movement, of course, but the feminist movement at that time was 
very alternative. The ideological commitment of the party, following the social- 
democracy approach was very important, but that was sustained, supported, and argued by 
a group of women, and Bustelo8 was the soul of the whole thing”(IM2).
“I think there has always been a good feedback between the feminist movement or the 
women’s movement and the IM because we all came from there (from the feminist 
movement). There was a great respect to start with and a very receptive attitude towards 
the movement. What happens is that, as far as I can remember, the contributions were on 
very concrete things” (IM1).
Thus, the institutionalisation o f the feminist movement through the creation of the 
IM can only be understood within the political context o f a social-democrat party that 
shared with the feminist movement views on gender equality. Moreover, and as argued in 
chapter 3, the solid majority of PSOE’s first governments also contributed to the 
consolidation of such commitment. As Sainsbury (1999) argues, political parties display 
very different degrees of political commitment to gender equality and left parties usually 
offer a promising arena and target for feminist activism.
The international context had also worked in favour of the IM since its creation. 
The experience o f other countries and the expansion o f European legislation on gender 
equality contributed to the political legitimacy of the IM. Doubly militant women within 
PSOE started to demand the creation of an administrative body for gender equality issues, 
before the socialist party came into power, as a consequence o f similar experiences in 
other European countries. European equality policies were used as legitimisation 
instruments for the IM’s equality programmes.
8 Carlota Bustelo, first director o f the IM and the founder o f Mujer y  Socialismo a group within PSOE’s 
executive committee, created before the IM, in charge o f creating an institutional framework for feminists 
within the party.
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“The entrance in the EU was fantastic because we could go all the time to Brussels and 
bring ideas back, the first PIOM was the transposition of the second EU Equality Plan” 
(IM1).
“We used it as a reference, as a legitimisation, as experience. It was not just the 
elaboration of concrete policies, we also took from them many concepts, and many ways 
of acting. In Europe there was a practice of regulations that went a step further from the 
strict principle of formal equality, such as measures of positive action” (IM2).
Nevertheless, the feminist background of the IM and the independent character of 
the directors, in the sense that they seemed to be more devoted to feminism than to party 
politics, defined a particular relationship with the government. As one respondent pointed 
out, the configuration of the IM was not well institutionalised and structured.
“We were a kind of extra-system institution, with few administration rules and with a 
composition of people that came from the feminist movement. We tried afterwards to 
make the institution more professional, in the sense of having women experts on 
administration, but at the beginning, the IM was nourished from the lines of the women’s 
movement” (IM1).
Was the IM’s lack of administrative and political weight level a limitation for 
IM’s policy influence in policy-making? There is not a clear agreement. Two o f the 
directors argued that a basic problem was that the director of the IM was not situated in 
decision-making, thus having little possibility to really influence the process. According 
to this view, the problem was that the IM did not take part in the creation o f the policies, 
it did not have a voice when the policies were being created and discussed.
“We knew that we had to intervene in the policy-making process, we believed in the 
mainstreaming of equal opportunities policies, we knew that we had to be involved in the 
great formulations of state policies but we had very rudimentary tools. I always said that 
the problem was not to have the budget for us to do the policies, but I think that a body 
with more real strength within the administration would have been more effective” (IM1).
However, it is also argued that, although not enough, the power o f the IM was 
sufficient to achieve important political goals.
“The IM has always worked subsequently more than before the formulations. I always 
said that it would have been necessary to have a body with more political power, with
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direct influence in the place where policies were being defined. In that sense, the IM 
could have done more, but in any case, important things were done, we could not act with 
the idea of “all or nothing” because in that case nothing would have been done. The 
abortion law, for instance, that has always been one of the most important battles for us, 
was never passed”9 (IM2).
Another IM’s respondent argued that the problem was not the low political and 
administrative rank given to the IM.
“ It was not a question of giving more power to the IM. The IM was a General Directorate 
(Direction General) and more than that it would have had to be a ministry. At ministerial 
level, the co-ordination of the different policies is more difficult. In theory you gather at 
the same level but then the General Directorates implement the programmes. In this sense 
the IM was well situated because it had an administrative level where mainstreaming was 
possible. (...) Each ministry has its own behaviour, its own mechanism, and no one thinks 
about women’s issues, you then need an organisation that can constantly raise the 
problem. It is evident that such organisation cannot be a parallel one (i.e. a specific 
ministry), because you cannot create a counter-society for women” (IM3).
However, whether the administrative and political level given to the IM was or 
was not sufficient, the IM as a General Directorate still had room for improvement in 
terms o f policy intervention. IM officials recognised such deficiency and introduced 
within the second equal opportunities plan a new section on “social and political 
participation and women’s access to decision-making positions” (IMdoc2) that did not 
exist in the first one. The concrete objectives in this field were to increase the number of 
women in the higher levels o f the public administration and public enterprises and to 
“persuade” private firms of the “convenience” of including women in their governing 
bodies. The IM created a number of training programmes on equal opportunities policy 
for civil servants. It also carried out campaigns to raise public awareness o f the problem.
Furthermore, women’s policy machinery intervention in governmental policies 
requires an effective co-ordination or ‘mainstreaming’ (transversalidad), meaning the 
implementation of gender equality policies within all areas o f public policy. This policy 
co-ordination was a major objective for the IM, since its political power very much
9 In 1983 the government introduced the abortion bill. Abortion was legal under three circumstances: in 
case o f danger to the life or health of the mother; in case of (reported) rape; and in case o f malformation of 
the fetus. Pressure from the socialist feminists to widen the strict restrictions o f the bill did not succeed, the 
bill remained in its original conditions until the end o f the PSOE’s period o f office in 1996.
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depended on its chances to intervene in the rest of social and labour policies to really 
make sense o f the, otherwise isolated, gender equality policies. However, interviewees, 
although making continuous reference to the need to integrate IM’s policies within other 
governmental policies, also argued that they lacked the power to make it effective.
The strategies of policy co-ordination were established through three main 
mechanisms. Firstly, there was a horizontal co-operation between all the different 
ministerial departments that were dealing with areas o f relevance for gender issues 
(employment, education, health, etc.). Secondly, a mixed Parliament/Senate committee 
for women’s issues was created. And thirdly, the IM established the Advisory Council 
(Consejo Rector), which was a representative body for IM’s intervention in other policy 
areas and for other women’s advocacy groups’ intervention in IM’s policy strategies.
The horizontal co-operation between the ministries consisted of bilateral 
agreements signed by the different ministries and by the IM10 to incorporate gender 
equality programmes in their agendas. However, in reality, this co-operation framework 
was limited to the appointment of a delegate from the IM in each inter-ministerial body to 
supervise the effective integration of gender equality programmes in the agendas o f the 
given department. In practice, there was no compulsory commitment on the part of the 
inter-ministerial bodies to implement the recommendations given by the IM delegates, it 
was thus, largely dependant on the political will o f the specific ministry.
11At the legislative level, the creation of a mixed committee Parliament/ Senate of 
women’s rights, was also an instrument for the integration of gender policies within other 
sectors’ policies. As one of the interviewees pointed out, this mixed committee:
“Was a very interesting instrument because it obliged the ministries to at least, explain 
things. (...) The IM could ask for the appearance of the ministers and they, even if it was 
just because they had to talk in front of the opposition, had to prepare the work and 
explain what they were doing in relation to the equality programme” (IM1).
IM’s directors judged both actions as significant achievements, in the sense of 
placing issues on the agenda that were absent before. Through those two mechanisms, 
gender discrimination issues acquired a political status. Nevertheless, the efficiency of
10 During the second PIOM, the IM signed agreements with the Ministry o f Education (to develop non­
sexist education), the Ministry of Health (to improve women’s health) and with the Ministry o f Justice ( to 
deal with the specific conditions of female prisoners) (IMdoc2).
11 Comision Mixta Parlamento/Senado de derechos de la Mujer.
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these two instruments depended very much on the political disposition since there was no 
concrete implementation procedure.
The other mechanism to accomplish policy co-operation was the Advisory 
Council, a representative body that fulfilled a double role. On the one hand, the IM could 
intervene through this entity in other public policies areas and on the other hand, the 
Advisory Council was also an entity for the intervention in IM’s policy formulation for 
external women’s associations and bodies. This last aspect of the Council will be 
analysed in the following section. In relation to the first aspect, the panel would in 
principle serve as a gathering point for all those institutions and non-state organisations 
dealing with women’s issues and the purpose was to analyse the actions undertaken by 
the different ministries in gender equality and from there, establish the adequate action. 
However, as will be also analysed in the next section, the Advisory Council lacked a 
number o f elements needed to fulfil this objective.
Some of the respondents recognised additional problems for the policy 
intervention of the IM. One of the problems identified is the different level of 
responsibilities between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. The IM was an independent body attached to the Ministry o f Social 
Affairs. Within this ministry, the IM was responsible for the elaboration o f all gender 
equality policies. However, whilst the Ministry of Social Affairs was responsible for the 
administration of certain social protection schemes, such as non-contributory pensions, 
social services, and assistential benefits, it had no power over the configuration o f these 
benefits. This was a problem since, as one respondent argued, the ones that were 
supposed to have more knowledge on the functioning of the benefits did not have any 
budgetary or legislative power to change it (ML3).
In a similar way, one respondent also argued that the relation between the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security and the IM was not balanced enough. The IM did not 
participate in the policy-making of labour and social security policies while on the 
contrary, the Ministry of Labour did have formal representation and participation in the 
policy-making of the equality plans (PIOMs). Although the IM was able to introduce
19gender policies in some of the labour and social policies, the IM was absent in the early 
process o f the policy agenda. For this reason, one respondent concluded that the IM
12 The ‘High Committee for Professional Training’ (Consejo Superior de la Formacion Profesional) was 
created in 1986 with IM's formal representation.
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would have been better placed as a body attached to the Ministry o f Labour rather than to 
the Ministry of Social Affairs.
However, another interviewee did not share this view (IM2). Although the 
Ministry o f Social Affairs was not as powerful as the Ministry of Labour, the IM was, 
according to her, much better off where it was. The two ministries o f social affairs that 
were in power from 1988 until 1996 were staffed by women clearly identified with the 
feminist movement and who had very close relations with the IM directors. The good 
relationship was translated into a considerable increase of the IM budget. In fact, the IM 
had been growing constantly in terms of the amount of public expenditure it received. 
From 1988 to 1995 the budget tripled in nominal terms. This view suggests that within 
the Ministry of Labour, the IM would have been excluded and given no priority attention 
since its representatives had no declared feminist consciousness.
Another problem addressed by one respondent was that the Ministry o f Social 
Affairs had too many remits.
“It wasn’t just the IM, the truth is that there also was a Youth Institute (INJUVE) and in 
each ministry some of us were specialised and we attended all the different councils. I 
was also attending the INJUVE. So, I ask myself: did it make sense to have a Youth board 
and a Women’s board? What was the role of the IM in the policy of the Youth Institute 
that belonged to the same Ministry? Maybe it played a less important role than the one 
played in labour policies. I think that the Ministry of Social Affairs had too many remits: 
women, juveniles, handicapped, elderly,...” (ML3).
This last issue refers in fact to a problem that lies at the heart of the 
institutionalisation processes of women’s issues. As Sapiro (1998) has accurately put it, 
the segregation of gender issues into specific institutions might end up in ghettoising the 
problems both from other related problems and from experts and leaders in other fields.
Nonetheless, one of the concluding points from the previous chapter was that the 
difficulties facing the integration of gender policies into mainstream policies were linked 
to the nature of the policy process and to the socio-economic environment where social 
and labour policies developed. In this context, the power of the feminist movement as a 
whole, whether institutionalised or not institutionalised could have been decisive in terms 
of influencing the policy process and the actors involved. As we shall see next, several
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factors prevented the two most important women’s advocacy groups from pursuing joint 
policy strategies and interventions.
Relationship between the women's advocacy institutions (IMand TUW)
In principle, the two bodies of women’s policy machinery, the unions and the IM, 
had important reasons to search for common strategies of action. Firstly, respondents of 
the two bodies considered themselves as a kind of pressure group within their institutions, 
although lacking the power to intervene in the policy process. Secondly, both shared a 
common feminist background. These common factors could have favoured internal 
cohesion between them, which could have given them more chances to put pressure upon 
the inter-ministerial institutions in charge of the policy implementation.
However, the channels of communication between the IM and the women’s 
sections o f trade unions were not well formalised, which limited their possibilities of 
success in policy-making intervention. The main channel for that formal communication 
was the previously mentioned Advisory Council and as has also been said, the success of 
such a committee as a body fostering coalition building was limited.
At first, the Advisory Council was nothing more than a very limited consultative 
body where experts only were called from time to time to give their views on specific 
issues. IM’s strategies were then the result of the work of a group o f professional women 
and there was clearly limited access to other groups representing the feminist movement. 
From the second PIOM onwards (1993) the composition o f the Advisory Council 
changed, representatives o f women’s associations and trade unions were substituted for 
the experts and it became more of a permanent consultative body.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Council never challenged the policies o f the ministries 
nor did it have a real impact on the IM policies. The council never had a legislative 
dimension inside the IM and the work done by this committee could never go further than 
suggestions. This was obviously a reason for a kind of resentment between feminists 
outside the IM and the ‘femocrats’. IM’s directors recognised the committee’s limited 
role as an obstacle to achieve their goals.
“There was a tension with the feminist movement. We had many discussions because the 
movement was asking for a council, such as the Youth Council.13 We did not create such 
council, and I think it was a mistake on my side, or that I didn’t have time because it
13 The Youth Council, Consejo de la Juventud was an independent body with proportional representations
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posed many difficulties. But it was a mistake because we should have constituted a 
committee, some kind of body with legal status” (IM1).
“We tried to create a council where the feminist movement and the private sector could 
have representation, but in the end it could not be done. I saw that it was necessary to 
introduce the private sector into the politics of the IM. We thought about it, we even made 
a draft of the council but at the end, we did not have time” (IM3).
One plausible explanation for the failed role o f the Advisory Council in providing 
access to women of trade unions and other non-state groups, might be found in the 
general political context. Underneath their common feminist strategy, the different groups 
were divided along lines reflecting the general political divisions and confrontations. On 
the one hand, the large majority o f the first two terms of the PSOE’s office did not require 
political consensus with other political parties, and this applied to all public bodies. IM’s 
officials had no pressure whatsoever to build formal dialogue across all political forces. 
Moreover, the absence of a conservative or liberal feminist tradition (see chapter 3) 
implied that women of the socialist party did not share a common basis with women of 
the larger opposition, the conservative party.
On the other hand, a division also existed within the left. The differences between 
the socialist and the communist parties also impregnated the relations between feminists 
of either side. This is what the official of CC.OO.’s Secretariat was arguing in connection 
to their relation with the representatives o f the IM. The respondent pointed out that, 
although both bodies had a good relationship, it was highly conditioned by their different 
political ascription. According to her, women of PSOE were more reluctant to participate 
in a common project with them.
“They (IM) were more willing to have a more fluid relationship with the ‘socialist’ union 
UGT. We have always had more difficulties given that for a long time we have been 
labelled as the ‘communist’ union” (TUW2).
Also, the Women’s Department of the ‘socialist’ trade union (UGT) affirmed that 
although in fact the relationship with the IM was very good, there were periods of no 
communication given the general confrontation between the trade union UGT and the 
PSOE governments.
of all governmental and non-governmental groups dealing with youth issues.
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“Institutional relations are always good. With the PSOE, when they were working on 
something they were asking, not always, there has been periods when the general 
relationship between the government and trade unions were bad and that impregnates all, 
but still they were asking us” (TUW1).
For IM representatives, the reason for the separation between the two main bodies 
for gender equality was the different field of performance. Each body targeted different 
groups of women. While the IM was dealing with women of all conditions, women’s 
departments of trade unions were logically focusing on working women.
“They had a worse situation than us. There was a kind of mutual comprehension, each one 
had its role, and the relationship is very conditioned by that role. What happens is that 
women in the trade unions were asking things to us that they were not able to obtain in 
their trade unions” (IM2).
The co-operation between the two women’s departments o f trade unions have 
been less problematic, also due to the fact that UGT’s Women’s Department was created 
in 1990, a period of co-operation between the two trade unions. Both interviewees argued 
that they had a consensus on the most fundamental issues and that common proposals 
were presented before going into the negotiations with the government.
Despite the internal difficulties each body faces with regard to access within their 
own institutions and despite the obstacles for the two groups to work together, both 
bodies shared, in broad terms, the same views with regard the best way to accomplish 
gender equality. In what follows, attention will be paid to how the two elements of 
women’s policy machinery articulated a specific strategy towards gender equality by 
rejecting others. I will be referring to the ‘gender equity model’ developed by Fraser 
(1994). As explained in chapter 2, the author establishes three possible strategies: the 
care-giver parity, the universal-breadwinner and the universal-caregiver, to pursue gender 
equity.
The rejection o f the ‘care-giver parity strategy ’
The care-giver strategy, that is, the demand to place care work in the private 
sphere at a level with waged work, has never been a preference in Spain for any o f the 
women’s advocacy groups nor for feminists in general. As was previously argued in the
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study, family policies in democratic Spain have been determined by the historical legacy 
of dictatorship. These policies were considered a Francoist inheritance and so they had to 
be avoided. Franco’s rhetoric about the virtues of the family was made in parallel to a 
complete denial of any liberating policies for women. This association of family policies 
with the expression of a conservative, catholic and anti-feminist ideology remained long 
after the end of the authoritarian regime. As Alberdi argued,14 although there was a 
radical change in the family model with the democratic transition, there never was any re­
definition of family policy, not only from the government but also from the left and 
feminist groups. These groups never recomposed their approach and so the family 
remained as an unspeakable issue.
The rejection of family policies by feminism is clearly formulated by IM’s 
respondents. Since its creation in 1983, the IM never considered the possibility of state 
support to the private female role of mother or carer because o f the negative connotations 
of the family as an institution. Family policies were not seen as promoting the 
independence of women. As the following two quotes show, the interviewees shared 
similar views on this issue.
“We clearly stood for the incorporation of women into the labour market. And now 
looking backwards I see that we are probably responsible for creating more expectations 
than what we could actually provide. There are generations of women that were outside 
the labour market and still are. In the old times there was literature and mysticism about 
how important the role these women played was, now that does not exist but there is 
nothing in exchange” (IM2).
“For a long time the IM did not want to tackle the issue. I think that was a right choice 
because is very easy to mistake women’s policies with family policies and if the family is 
placed as the visible object, you run the risk of hiding individualised policies for women. I 
thought that in my period, we were already in a situation where we could have considered 
family policies. But family policy has to be understood as a way to eliminate role 
differences between men and women so that both partners work outside and inside the 
house. If family policies are linked with women’s responsibilities, then is better not to 
touch it” (IM3).
14 Conversation with the author in June 1999.
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As argued in chapter 5, both women’s policy organisations promoted and
1 ^encouraged partial improvements in the pre-existent configuration o f maternity benefits. 
The reforms did improve the conditions of the existent benefit but maternity and child 
bearing continued to be uncovered outside the labour market. Even within the labour 
market, the effectiveness was still conditioned by job stability. As one interviewee 
outlined, the first year of maternity leave is an option just for those women that have a 
permanent or durable employment since no one dares to take one year maternity leave 
with a precarious contract. Moreover, maternity leave is not adapted to real situations 
such as the need of professional promotion that is broken after one, two or three years of 
maternity leave (TUW1).
The commitment to the universal-breadwinner strategy.
The rejection of the ‘care-giver parity’ strategy has been correlated with a 
commitment to the ‘universal-breadwinner’ strategy, that is, to defend women’s social 
rights through their access to the labour market. Although both women’s advocacy 
institutions did not always work together, they shared similar goals. Their general aims 
have been to promote positive action programmes to eliminate sexual discrimination in 
the work place, to facilitate women’s entrance into paid employment and to encourage 
legal changes.16
However, they were faced with a number of problems for the success of their 
policies. Firstly, although legal changes were achieved, this did not necessarily imply a 
change in reality in terms of women’s access to employment. Secondly, labour market 
reforms were promoting women’s access to paid employment though not with equal 
conditions with men. And thirdly, their strategy did not integrate the intervention in the 
social protection system.
15 The 3/1989 law on maternity allowance and maternity leave and the reform of 1994.
16 The first PIOM promoted within the National Plan for Professional Formation (FIP) programmes of 
positive action to fight against sexual discrimination in the work place. The programmes were developed 
under agreements between the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the 
Institute for Employment (INE) and the IM. IM also developed employment and occupational programme 
funded by the state and the European Union -through the European Social Fund-. During the second PIOM 
the Workers’ Articles o f Association were modified in its article 28.The concept o f “equal job” was 
substituted for that other of “job o f equal value” referring to equal salary. The reform was implemented in 
the 1994 reform. Women’s bodies o f trade unions introduced NOW projects developing positive actions 
within the enterprises, training courses in non-discriminatory practices for members and representatives of 
the unions in the enterprises.
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With regard to the first point, one interviewee compared ‘legal modernisation’ 
with ‘ideological modernisation’ in the sense that progress in the legal sphere has been 
made but not put into action. The speed of legislative change is in this case greater than 
the speed of “mental” change, meaning that before the measures could be implemented, 
there would have to be a shift in social values first in order to recognise gender equality as 
an issue in society (IM3).
Another respondent recognised an advanced legislation but addressed different 
problems for its implementation:
“Spain is among the most advanced countries in terms of gender equality legislation in 
Europe. However its success is conditioned, first by the features of the Spanish labour 
market, and second, by the interpretation of the law. Many judges make a very restrictive 
interpretation of the laws. It is essential to articulate mechanisms for the fulfilment of the 
rules” (TUW2).
17Considering labour market reforms, respondents argued that employment 
flexibility was the only possible way to facilitate women’s access into paid employment. 
The conditions o f flexibility imposed by the reforms had the potential to lead to a dualism 
in the labour market structure in terms of gender, which was opposite to the goals of IM’s 
equal opportunities policy. However, there was no alternative but to accept it. One 
respondent argued that the reforms have to be seen not from the perspective of what could 
have been better, but of what could have been worse.
“We thought that without the flexibility women were not going to enter into the labour 
market. Now I think that maybe it could have been possible to make the labour market 
more flexible without diminishing social benefits, but at that moment the option was 
either women do not enter at all or they enter in not very good conditions” (IM2).
Likewise, another IM’s official argued that their position with regard the 1994 
reform was ambiguous. They were defending the access of women to the labour market in 
equal conditions and they knew that the introduction of women in the labour market 
through part time employment was going to be an obstacle for that equality. However, 
they accepted the reform thinking that with high levels of unemployment they had to 
welcome the creation of new jobs, no matter what the conditions of the jobs were.
17 The 1994 reform boosted part time employment growth. However these part time short-term jobs were 
socially unprotected, maternity leave was excluded and there was no right to unemployment benefit 
afterwards.
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“It is very difficult to go against a reform that is setting out the creation of jobs, even if 
they are flexible and part time jobs, especially when we knew that there are many women 
that still have family obligations. This might change on the long term, but the problem of 
the domestic work will not be solved until women enter the labour market. Therefore, we 
thought, the reform was bad on the long term but good in the short term, and that is why 
we accepted” (IM3).
Still, the obstacles to the success of women’s access to social rights through the 
labour market were also conditioned by another fundamental factor. The determination of 
women’s advocacy groups to provide women’s rights through paid work was not coupled 
with intervention in social policy and yet intervention in that sphere is essential to achieve 
any gender equity strategy.
Both groups focused on concrete issues to obtain partial improvements on social 
protection. One o f the most important demands for women in trade unions has been the
1 Aimprovement of the Domestic Service Regime in terms of social protection rights. Also 
both bodies have called attention to the deficient treatment widow pensions receive in 
comparison to retirement and invalidity pensions. Efforts have been made to improve the 
generosity o f these benefits.
Nevertheless, representatives of both women’s advocacy groups were aware of the 
fact that the demands and the partial improvements in the social protection o f women 
signified modest progress since the global conception of the configuration of the benefits 
was not being challenged. The lines established by the different reforms, from the 1985 
reform to the 1996 Agreement, which reinforced the contributory principles of the system 
and settled the grounds for the assistentialisation o f the non-contributory benefits, were 
not being confronted. Maternity benefits remain as a benefit only available to women 
workers and the readjustment of widow pensions do not solve the issue o f the 
individualisation of women’s rights. Furthermore, although both bodies tried to promote 
female employment in professional categories or sectors where they were 
underrepresented, there was substantial gender segregation in the labour market. In such 
conditions, the labour market could hardly serve as a mechanism for many women to 
access social protection.
18 According to the respondents, this regime accounts for a double discrimination since the majority o f  the 
members are women and a large percentage of them are immigrants.
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So, why did women’s advocacy groups not target social security? Why was there 
not any major questioning of the configuration o f the social protection system? First of 
all, and as has been said earlier, they had major limitations given their difficulty to 
influence and to participate in the policy-making process. Besides this there were 
additional factors constraining their attitudes and actions towards social protection issues.
Looking first at the IM, its goals when it was first created and before the 
elaboration of the first PIOM in 1988, were to demand changes in all spheres o f society 
given very evident sexual discriminations. From its creation in 1983, the first goal was “to 
make the photograph” (IM1), that is, to do a diagnosis of reality. This first period was 
characterised by immediate demands given very perceptible discriminations. It is evident 
that the historical legacy conditioned a great deal the activities of the IM at least during 
the first years. The IM was devoted to setting down the grounds for future actions. The 
creation o f data sources to analyse discrimination, the training o f professionals and 
technicians on the field, the development of strategies o f action and procedures to act, 
were all tasks that needed to be settled down before any other more elaborated policy goal 
could be placed forward:
“We have to place ourselves in that historical moment to understand, because there wasn’t 
anything, not even statistics to analyse discrimination”(IMl).
When the first PIOM was created, the IM was still working on those “structural 
issues”. The director at the time argued that one of the important achievements of the plan 
was the attainment of an administrative culture around gender equality by constituting
♦ 1 Qsimilar institutes at regional and local levels. The plan, according to the director was 
also important in terms of resolving very basic deficiencies, such as the creation all over 
the country of refuges for battered women, the creation of counselling services to report 
sexual discrimination and women’s rights campaigns. In general, the IM created 
awareness and publicity on women’s rights issues.
“We worked inside the system on fundamental issues (...). Now looking backwards, and 
specially now that we are posing more structural objectives, I realise that we worked a lot
19 Similar bodies were created in all Autonomous Communities from 1988 to 1994 (IM 1994a). All these 
bodies have developed equality plans that consisted of adaptations to the PIOMs.
20 In 1982 there was not any public institution offering support to victims o f domestic violence. In 1991,46  
centres were created and in 1992 there were 81 across the country. These refuges were run by local councils 
and regional governments and sometimes with the participation o f the voluntary sector (IM 1992). In 
relation to information and counseling centres, in 1992 there were a total o f 129 centers, 11 o f which were 
directly administrated by the IM. The most frequent services were legal advice, career service and social 
resources (IM 1992).
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from inside to solve very basic deficiencies: the creation of a national network of refuges 
for battered women, the creation of information points for women, etc” (IM1).
Therefore the kind of tasks that the IM was doing before and during the first 
PIOM were related to the policy legacy after a period of non-democratic rule. They were 
dealing with things that aimed to prepare the grounds for future actions. They were 
therefore stronger on short-term objectives than in long term ones.
Moreover, respondents argued that the non-intervention in the field of social 
protection was to a certain extent compensated by the support they gave to other welfare 
policies. In a general level, the universalisation of rights such as health care and education 
were seen as a positive thing for women. As one respondent pointed out:
“The great bet of PSOE was education, that is the classic thinking of the social- 
democracy, education is where they place the future of a country. Is the bet for the future 
generations, and that applies to women’s generations as well. We have thought about 
ideas we had in the past, but all that is related with who we were, the age we had, the 
historical moment we lived in” (IM2).
They considered that a universal health system and the extension o f the 
compulsory school for children were policies that would benefit women.
“Our other strong ideological belief, that has its importance within a global political 
concept, is that at least I believed that the universalisation of certain systems would 
benefit women. In this sense, the generalisation of the health system, the extension of 
compulsory education from three to six years old, or the creation of assistential policies 
such as programmes of home-based care service for the elderly, were all important steps. I 
now consider that those policies have been conceived from the idea of the male 
breadwinner family. They have followed the foundations of the classic welfare state, but 
in that moment all those policies were positive for us because it meant a confluence of 
interests in equal opportunities” (IM1).
Another respondent also argued:
“I agree that the model of social protection is not substantially modified but we have to 
know that we come from a very precarious situation and the general widening of the state, 
with all its deficiencies, always favour women, because we come from a worse past”. 
(IM2)
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Similar opinions were given with regards the creation of non-contributory benefits 
in 1990. The director of the IM when the non-contributory pension law was passed argued 
that the non-contributory scheme was created knowing that it was going to affect mainly 
women. She agreed that the scheme was deficient in many senses but, again, she 
articulate the idea of ‘better little than nothing’:
“When non-contributory pensions were created it was well known that those benefits 
were mainly for women. But, where were we coming from? There was nothing before, 
and is very important to keep that in mind, because when you think about starting such a 
wide task, if you think what is the best way to do it, you never do it. Politics has this side 
of ‘non-satisfaction’. I think it is better to have a pension, even if it is a very low pension, 
than no pension at all. We knew that these pensions were for women, but we could not 
make great demands because the budget is always limited. If we talk about cash benefits, 
the problem is always an economic one, because the system has always limited 
possibilities. Everything has to be seen as incomplete steps” (IM3).
There are also other types of factors that help to explain why women’s policy 
machinery did not question the global conception of the social protection system and why 
they did not critically analyse social policy issues from a gender point o f view. The 
technical character of social security issues makes it is fundamentally difficult to 
intervene.
IM officials did not have the degree of technical knowledge and experience 
required to understand and to propose alternative options to a given scheme o f social 
protection.
“It is true that we did not question, what we would now define as the analysis of the 
impact, from a gender point of view, of the policies. I think we did not consider it 
theoretically and I even think that we did not have the required expertise in order to face 
that challenge. For instance, the majority of women that have been involved in gender 
equality issues were lawyers or sociologists but really we did not have experts in taxation, 
or in social security, (...) we knew little about social security and taxation. But if we 
consider the starting point it seems to me that the evaluation is extremely positive, in the 
sphere of legal changes and in the sphere of a culture of equality important things were 
achieved. It is true though that we did not get into the core of the policies. This is not an 
excuse, but I think that has to do with theoretical background of feminism and with the 
real power of state feminism or socialist feminism or however you want to call it” (IM 1).
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Respondents from trade unions also pointed out that they had to face the same 
kind of technical problems. The lack of information and methodological tools was a 
fundamental obstacle in assessing the gender impact of social protection policies. In fact, 
one of the demands made since the creation of the departments was to incorporate gender 
as a variable within the statistical data in order to identify discrimination and inequality. 
Social security, as IM’s directors also argued, is a field that requires very specific 
technical grasps. While it is relatively easy to “convince” the policy-makers o f the unions 
about direct and evident discriminations, it is much harder to do so in the case of more 
indirect discriminations, since it implies a high degree o f expertise in the field.
“I, as the representative o f  the w om en’s department, attended the negotiation process o f  
the Toledo Pact with the trade union representative (T U I). I realised that he had many 
contradictions with regard to wom en, there were many things w e could not agree on, 
and so w e tried to convince him, but the problem is that social security is som ething  
very technical. I f  the experts tell you that what you want is not possible to introduce, 
then you trust them” (TUW 1).
Moreover, they also argued that their framework of action was very conditioned 
by the structure of the system.
“W e have a contributory and professional social protection system , and although w e can 
try to introduce measures to benefit wom en, w e know that their performance is highly  
conditioned by the structure o f  the system ” (TUW 2).
There is also a considerable weight o f every day problems in the tactics o f the 
union, and as the interviewees recognised that is negative for gender issues, since to 
tackle the gender problem would require a questioning of the whole social protection 
conception. Another constraint that operates against integrating gender issues into the 
general demands of the trade unions is the unions' interest in keeping the economic 
sustainability of the system in the short-medium term.
“M any tim es the colleagues that negotiate these issues focus on that technical vision to 
make sure that the system does not break and many tim es specific w om en issues or 
w om en’s necessities go to a second front” (TUW 2).
A similar thing happened in the Toledo Pact.
“The first and absolute priority o f  the union w as to guarantee a pension system  by law, 
that was the first priority and that meant that anything else w as secondary. Therefore, they
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did not want to accept new  concepts for discussion, they thought that was going to distort 
the first objective” (TUW 1).
Towards the universal-caregiver strategy
By comparing the past demands of the two women’s advocacy groups, or the 
feminist movement in general, with their proposals for the future, the gendered division of 
labour between public and private spheres has become more pressing. Women’s advocacy 
organisations have moved from specific and concrete goals to wider structural demands. 
Social protection is now included within the strategy of challenging notions of work, 
power and family. The share of domestic responsibilities is now seen as a necessary step 
to achieve real equality.
The IM reconsidered the possibility of including family policies in IM’s strategy 
during the creation of the second PIOM. In contrast with the previous plan, the new 
programme explicitly recognised the need to tackle the problem of the unequal 
distribution of tasks within the domestic sphere.
Women within trade unions have recently also paid more attention to the necessity 
of sharing domestic responsibilities. Parental leave is a good example. Respondents 
argued that parental leave has to be a compulsory right independent from the right of the 
mother.
“It is very important to work on a change o f  mentality in terms o f  share o f  fam ily and 
dom estic responsibilities, but moral calls do not produce changes, both levels are 
important” (TUW 2).
Therefore, although women’s advocacy groups needed time to tackle the issue, 
they are now in a position where the matter can be brought up, given the development of 
the theoretical discourse of feminism and changes in social reality. As one respondent 
argued:
“W e are now  in another moment, important progress has been made from the theoretical 
point o f  view , and w e now discuss a much more global discourse, a m uch m ore external
21 The objectives in this matter focused, among other issues, on the increase o f public offer in full time 
nursery school for children under three 3 years o f age. To combine school and labour schedules. To 
promote alternatives for the assistance o f dependent family members (home care services, day care centres, 
etc.). To promote and incentive parental leave for the father as well as for the mother.
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discourse, than the one w e had before. W e are now  ready to challenge the very
conceptions o f  work and power” (IM 1).
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that there is combined effect of internal -organisational- 
and external -socio-political- factors that work both in favour and against the policy 
access o f women’s advocacy groups. The long rule of a social-democrat party committed 
to gender equality, the inscription of trade unions as socialist and communist 
organisations and the stimulus from EU directives and legislation towards gender 
equality, have offered a positive institutional framework for the recognition, at a formal 
level, o f women’s policy machinery. However, the success of these bodies in attaining 
equality policies has been substantially constrained by their lack of power and 
representation at the decision-making level. The organisational patterns o f the institutions 
where these bodies work, the conflict o f interests between women’s rights and other more 
consolidated social groups, and the specific circumstances surrounding labour and social 
policies have restrained the capacity for action of women’s advocacy groups. An 
important degree o f policy legacy and the general political situation affected in a 
particular way the relationship between the two women’s bodies.
Feminists’ strategies for equality have concentrated on providing economic 
independence to women through the labour market. For historical reasons and the 
background of feminism, the possibility o f raising caring and childbearing to an 
alternative citizenship status was rejected. However, if  the focus has been the labour 
market and if the social protection system relies fundamentally in the labour market it 
might appear surprisingly enough that, although targeting intervention in the labour 
market structure, the principles of foundation of the social security in relation to the 
labour market were not being questioned from a gender point of view. The fundamental 
problem is that gender equality strategy was not co-ordinated with labour and social 
policy strategies. Parallel to the stated promotion of gender equality through the labour 
market, the labour market and social protection reforms undertaken were introducing new 
forms of gender inequality. The following chapter will provide further discussion in 
relation to the factors constraining or facilitating gender equality in social protection.
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Chapter 7
Understandings o f ‘Solidarity’
Introduction
“Solidarity is a normative, rather than an analytical concept. Like concepts of freedom, 
justice, equality or democracy, it can be taken to have more than one meaning; like any of 
these concepts, it excites approval without necessarily specifying content too closely” 
(Spicker 1991: 18).
‘Solidarity’ is one of the words used extensively to explain and justify the 
functioning of the social security system in both written documents and interviews with 
representatives o f the Ministry o f Labour and trade unions. The concept clearly stands as 
a central legitimating criterion for social security performance. Foliowihg,Spicker (1991), 
the aim will be to explore the different uses of the concept rather than attempting to 
conclude with the most accurate definition. The meaning of the word has suffered 
transformations over time and I will pay attention to the impact that all potential 
meanings might have on gender relations, distinguishing also between discourse and 
outcomes.
What is understood by solidarity? Who is benefiting from that solidarity? Who 
creates solidarity? Social protection systems are solidaristic to the extent that they protect 
the members of society who, for a number of different reasons, cannot protect themselves. 
Originally, these systems of protection were conceived to provide workers with an 
income replacement during periods of work interruption, either temporary 
(unemployment and sickness) or definitive in character (retirement and invalidity). In this 
sense, and as was introduced in chapter 1, democratic welfare regimes introduced the 
possibility of solidarity and equality in real terms of risk redistribution. While economic 
factors, the need of capitalist economies, and political factors, the legitimacy of the ruling 
political elite are basic elements in explaining the raise of solidaristic social protection 
systems, the complexity of mechanisms that lead to the evolution of these devices needs 
to be considered. Different welfare traditions vary greatly in their approach to and their 
understandings of what the social bases of solidarity are and whose interests are being 
defended.
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Within the conservative-corporatist tradition, solidarity has originally been 
associated with horizontal income redistribution, mainly “generational solidarity”. This 
consists o f income transfer between the working population and the population of 
pensioners guaranteed through a consolidated and generous public pensions system, the 
basic principle being that those that are payers first will most likely be receivers latter. By 
contrast, the liberal welfare tradition does not channel solidarity principles through the 
social protection system, redistribution is not a policy goal in itself (Mau 1999). There is 
no extensive status maintenance but a basic low pension level designed to protect poverty 
and social adversity. However, solidarity is comprehensively sustained through other 
welfare spheres, this is the case of the universalised National Health Service in the UK. 
Thus, redistribution takes place through taxation and not through employment 
contributions as in the previous case. The social-democrat welfare type sustains the 
solidarity principle within the social protection system through an embracing notion of 
citizenship rights where all members of the community are holders of rights and 
obligations. Solidarity is not limited to a concept o f income redistribution between present 
and past generations of workers nor is it confined to extreme situations, but is guided by 
more universal principles.
Therefore, the definition of such a central concept in policy design is the result of 
complex socio-political processes. Depending on the factors that determine the origins of 
a given social protection system, some dimensions and meanings of solidarity will be 
privileged while others will be hidden. Far from being value-neutral, central concepts in 
social policy, such as solidarity, develop from a set of social constructions that reflect a 
concrete form of perceiving reality. Similar to the gender constructions that feminism has 
found in the notion of citizenship, I will argue that definitions of solidarity can rely on 
strong assumptions about ‘familialism’, which implies suppositions about gender roles 
and sexual divisions of labour. Depending on what notion of solidarity prevails, gender 
equality might be either encouraged or prevented. Familialism is then considered as a 
dimension of variation in social provision centred on the family and women’s unpaid 
work.
Class, generational and territorial understandings o f  solidarity
From the beginning of democracy, solidarity within the Spanish social protection 
system has been fundamentally expressed as compensating for unequal income situations
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between the workers of economic sectors, and between generations of workers through 
state transfers. The pillars of the social protection system were built on the consolidation 
of a principal contributory scheme, with certain elements of redistribution (or solidarity) 
and with an assistential level of benefits on the margins of the system.
The previous discussions have revealed how the social protection system in Spain 
acted as a ‘safety mechanism’ to prevent social and economic conflicts during the early 
democratic years. The system ‘offered’ solidarity to workers of the industrial economic 
structure that helped to smooth the transition towards a post-industrial economy. In this 
way, the massive job losses in certain economic sectors caused by industrial 
rationalisation programmes were counterbalanced through early retirement, 
unemployment benefits and invalidity protection. As one interviewee held:
“The w hole process o f  industrial rationalisation was done at the cost o f  social security, 
especially  at the cost o f  an increase o f  ten, som etim es eleven tim es permanent incapacity 
subsidies, that is, invalidity pensions. This was a very strong bind for social security. It was a 
tribute that the democratic transition had with social security. The system  acted as a 
‘protective cushion’ many issues o f  social character did not explode because social security 
was holding them, but it was dealing with things that were not o f  its correspondence” (M L1).
The social security system also provided solidarity to workers that suffered the 
transition from a rural to an urban economy. To a large extent, this meant that social 
security played an additional role in the economic transformation of the country by 
balancing out the differences between the regions. One interviewee spoke about the 
necessity of preventing rural workers over 50 years of age and recently unemployed from 
migrating to urban areas.1
“( . . . )  W e could have not walked out on the streets! W e would have shot each other! It 
was socially  necessary and convenient to socialise the global w ell being and to do so w e  
needed to protect all those workers that after 30 years working lost their jobs. It was 
desirable to avoid the emigration to the cities o f  those rural workers, because there was 
enough unemployment in the cities already” (M L2).
Recently, trade unions also pointed out the need to avoid similar situations in the
future:
1 The agrarian regime (self-employed workers) had in 1976 20% of all contributory pensions and 17% in 
1980. Moreover, in 1982 18% of invalidity benefits and 20% of retirement benefits belonged to this regime.
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“Early retirement has been used in an abusive w ay to the extreme that, it is not 
exaggerated to argue that, the greatest cost o f  industrial rationalisation in the country was 
suffered first by the social security system and then by the affected workers ( . . . ) .  It would  
be fundamental to articulate m echanisms to stop this cost transfer to the social security 
system ” (TUdoclO ).
Within this framework, solidarity has been understood in what Spicker (1991) 
calls its collective dimension. According to the author, the concept of solidarity has an 
individual and a collective dimension. Although both dimensions can complement each 
other, they might serve different purposes. An individual vision o f solidarity consists of 
the recognition of mutual responsibilities between a group of people (‘mutuality’), whilst 
a collective view gives less importance to reciprocal obligations and more to group 
cohesion (‘fraternity’). This collective view appears to have been important in the early 
reforms of social security where political actors agreed on solidaristic mechanisms as a 
means of preventing social conflict. Social cohesion was then a fundamental objective in 
this period of major readjustments.
In this sense, policies have proved to be very efficient since the general well being 
of society did ameliorate and democracy was consolidated. As described in chapter 3, 
poverty trends went down during the 1980s. The groups that at the beginning of the 
decade had the highest poverty rates, particularly elderly people and handicapped, 
improved their situation considerably to the extent that by the middle o f the next decade 
they were no longer considered among the most vulnerable groups.
Placing the emphasis on this collective notion o f solidarity had two major 
interrelated consequences. Firstly, that other alternatives were rejected. The goal of social 
cohesion and stability was placed before the prerogative of individual rights. Issues such 
as women’s rights for independence and autonomy were to a certain extent set up in 
opposition to the objectives of the social protection system. By targeting social cohesion 
in such a way, the demands for independence of women are not tenable, since 
mechanisms to free them from unpaid work are not put forward.
2 According to Ayala and Martinez (1999), during the 1980s, Spain, together with France and Italy, was the 
country that reduced more the poverty rate of people over 65 of age. According to the authors, this trend 
seems to be consolidated also in the 1990s.
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Secondly, this notion of solidarity was founded on a specific social structure 
where the family acts as a primary welfare institution, and holds one of the keys to social 
stability. The notion of ‘fraternity’ is deeply rooted in a firmly gendered division between 
the public and the private spheres. Women have been excluded as part o f the social 
contract and yet, such definition of collective solidarity depends on a social structure in 
which the family plays an important role. As one interviewee argued, thanks to ‘the 
family’ the whole social structure could develop towards a more stable society:
“In this country w e have not killed each other because o f  the social structure w e have. 
Here in the end, the w ife takes care o f  the ill grandfather, the brother lends m oney to his 
sister to pay the mortgage o f  the house and this is not Sweden where people know very 
clearly that your m oney is yours and mine is m ine and then w e marry if  you want. Over 
there, these things are much better established, in terms o f  individuality, rights are 
individualised and so are obligations. Fortunately, this is changing in Spain but it w ill take 
tim e. But you cannot imagine the advantages that this has brought. D o you think this 
country could have had stood an econom y and an incom e distribution as the one w e used 
to have without our social structure? It would have been im possible, everyone know s that 
there are m any people that live o f f  the grandpa’ pension, in other countries this would be 
im possible, because the grandpa would be on holidays in M alaga” (T U 1).
The idea that has been put forward is that redistribution takes place between the 
members of the (extended) family and out of the reach of the state. The functioning of this 
informal network of solidarity had certainly compensated for the fragile and selective 
state intervention. Nonetheless, this was done at a high cost for women. Even within the 
group of elderly people, who were the clear objects of the policies, women were worse off 
(in terms of income distribution) than men. Women that lived alone and could not 
therefore profit from that informal form of redistribution within families had to live most 
likely on a widow pension or on an assistential benefit, much lower on average than a 
retirement pension (see chapter 4).
Thus, even though solidarity is a mechanism of inclusion, it can in turn also 
become a mechanism of exclusion. “It is in the nature o f all forms o f inclusion that they 
imply some kind of border. Those who fall outside the border are liable to be rejected” 
(Spicker 1991: 24). In this sense, solidaristic redistribution does not necessarily mean 
egalitarian redistribution because solidarity is supported in an unequal distribution of 
resources between men and women.
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From the collective to the individual dimension o f solidarity
The social security reform of 1985, widely investigated in previous chapters, 
maintained this structure of class, generational and territorial solidarity although it pushed 
forward its ‘individual’ dimension. The principle of maintenance was strengthened. This 
closer link between contributions and benefits creates a sort of interdependence between 
individuals based on a generalised reciprocity. On a contributory pension system founded 
on a ‘Pay As You Go’ basis, people contribute in the expectation that they will ultimately 
receive a return. However, women, either because they do not belong to the world of 
productive relations or because their membership is not ‘strong’ enough, might not be 
included as part o f the relevant group that recognise a level of mutual interdependence. 
When there is a very clear gender segmentation in the labour market, as happens in Spain, 
the provisions of social rights through labour market participation is always problematic 
for women. Since the operating measures of the 1985 reform were limited to the 
professional and contributory level, the non-contributory or basic level became a simple 
subsidiary and exceptional level, remaining for very extreme cases with strict conditions 
of eligibility. The system still maintained minor forms of protection that in practice stand 
for a secondary route to citizenship rights.
Both Ministry of Labour representatives that were in office when the 1985 reform 
was put forward, focused on the positive aspects of the measures taken in the sense that it 
improved the efficiency and rationality of the system and ultimately also the solidarity o f 
the system.3 Adaptation and improvement and not transformation seemed to be the 
driving force behind policy-making of this early period. According to the respondents, the 
principles of solidarity ‘sounded right’ but in practice they were ineffective and that is 
why the reforms were needed. The interviewees argued that new understandings of 
solidarity could not be introduced until the pre-existing ones worked effectively.
3 According to one respondent, the main objectives completed in the 1985 reform were: to achieve greater 
proportionality for contributory pensions. To eliminate improper use o f the system. To establish an element 
of solidarity for the lowest pensions. To reduce the distance between average pensions and real salaries. 
And to eliminate the specific conditions o f the special regimes (ML 1).
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The disincentives that discouraged the introduction of new policies were driven by 
earlier patterns of government activity, since previous interventions also shape notions 
held by administrators and politicians about what is viable.
Moreover, respondents constantly justified the reforms by arguing that they were 
partly directed to “catch up” with the rest of the European countries. However, as the next 
quote shows, the way towards European harmonisation is seen as rather unidirectional 
and one of the most urgent tasks:
“Our system  has accumulated in all the aspects, around forty years o f  delay. Until the 
transition it w as not possible to convert the different forms o f  protection, the special 
regim es and the creation o f  a unique administration for social security. It took tim e to 
incorporate all the institutions o f  social security. With the integration into the EU, there 
w as a need to adapt many things because they were not adjusted to European legislation. 
The internal test to make all this suitable had to be done between 1984 and 1985. In the 
1985 reform many issues were corrected and it was all practically put on a level with EU  
standards” (M L2).
The puzzle is that interviewees do not seem willing to recognise the wide variety 
that exists within EU standards. The model used as a reference, the continental type of 
welfare, greatly determined the steps taken to improve the system. The objective was to 
consolidate an insurance system based on the protection of labour market risks and with 
mechanisms that break the proportionality criteria between contributions and benefits for 
certain working conditions. But the conservative-Bismarkian model is used as a reference 
at the cost o f not recognising different policy responses that different countries give to 
similar problems.
“A ll contributory system s have elem ents o f  solidarity. Within the contributory system  
there is inter-sectorial social security solidarity. We stand for the continental system , the 
German contributory system , and in this w e agreed with the unions. A  system  o f  subsidies 
like the British or the Danish are very dangerous, because they are not based on a system  
o f  insurance and, thus, it depends to whether there is or there is not enough budget to 
finance it” (M L2).
As appears in the previous quote and in other sections (TU2, ML1, and Ministry 
of Labour and trade union documents) European welfare states tend to be divided 
between the two main liberal and conservative welfare models. Spain’s inclusion within 
the latter type explains its major traits. However, differences between the different
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countries seem to be captured by one model and yet, as previously argued, solidarity 
adopts rather different forms in different countries. It is not just a question of spending 
more, as one o f the interviewees suggested, it is also a question of how to spend and how 
to finance, and a wide range of options can be found even within the same ‘regime-type’.
Behind this issue lies the attitude of public opinion towards certain forms of public 
provision. In one way or another interviewees referred to the absence o f a civic 
consciousness present in all consolidated democracies that leads to a responsible use of 
public goods. After forty years of an authoritarian regime where public institutions were 
used to control and repress society, Spanish society was not seen as mature enough to 
adopt a different understanding of the role of public institutions. The legitimisation of the 
state, it has been argued, takes time to consolidate under a new democracy. Democratic 
values are entrenched within the social structure. This would explain, according to the 
interviewees, why the conditions of access to benefits had to be tightened up to avoid 
misuse of public resources and why non-labour market related benefits had to be so 
restricted.
“The civic culture that is needed to have a reliable and real welfare system  was absent in 
Spain for m any years. A long democratic experience generates a kind o f  education where 
people have been socialised in a perception o f  justice. However, in this country there was 
not any civ ic consciousness, democratic institutions, rights and ob ligations... that 
individual responsibility that is needed for a public system  to work is also a result o f  the 
society  where you live. I f  that does not exist then you have to have very strict laws 
because the fundamental principle is that if  something can be corrupted, it w ill be 
corrupted” (M L2).
The interviewee attributed this lack of “consciousness” to Latin and Catholic 
countries and different from other parts of Europe.
“In the Latin countries the tendency is to think that the public belongs to no one. In Spain, 
no one has ever thought that morality has som ething to do with the correct performance o f  
public institutions. In this situation, the only possibility to resolve it is with the law, to 
restrict it, to reduce the possibilities o f  fraud” (M L2).
One respondent also suggested that there was even a general expectation of fraud 
occurring when PSOE came into power:
“The system  was considered to belong to no one, this is not ours an d  therefore w e have to 
s tea l fro m  it, and people were even proud to do such a thing. M oreover when we
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(socialists) arrived to power, people thought that w e did not know a thing and the 
expectations o f  fraud went even higher” (M L2).
In a different context, another interviewee also pointed out that social protection 
benefits that were detached from the labour market were not being demanded by Spanish 
society. According to him, the Secretariat of Social Security carried out a survey to 
determine the degree of support for non-contributory pensions and the result was that the 
majority o f respondents were not convinced of the positive effects o f these types of 
benefits (ML1).
However tenuous, the fact that the approach did not conflict with public opinion 
was a reassurance factor for policy-makers. As Kingdon (1995) asserts, social and 
political agents will not generally confront certain issues if they consider that public 
opinion in general does not consider them as problems that need immediate solution. In 
the first years of democracy, public opinion was also more concerned with questions of a 
more ‘general character’.
Trade unions shared an agreement in general terms as to the way the social security 
system was being configured. Placing the debate in terms o f working class rights against 
the interest of the capital, their reports during the 1980s emphasised the need to maintain 
the social protection system as the principal instrument of redistribution, solidarity and 
social cohesion in society. The need for intergenerational and class solidarity was being 
emphasised and they defended the scheme of ‘compulsory solidarity’ as the central axis 
of the social security. Despite the fact that they did not intervene in the 1985 reform,4 they 
also had prior demands for the social protection system to resolve some o f the problems 
inherited from the past.5 In broad terms, their demands followed the lines o f the reforms 
undertaken by the administration.
4 In fact, the 1985 reform was one of the factors that provoked confrontation with the government and that 
ended in the general strike of 1988 (see chapter 5). However, the confrontation was more related with the 
fact that the government did not try to find consensus with the workers organisations, than with the actual 
contents o f the reform.
5 In relation to social protection, trade unions alluded to the excessive number o f special regimes and their 
inadequate financing, insufficient and inefficient state contribution, problem of fraud and the inefficient 
system o f collection and inefficient and bureaucratised systems o f management (TUdoc4, 5 and 6).
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Changes in solidarity
During the 1990s, a debate on the future of the public pensions system started to 
take place among all implicated sectors. Once the socio-economic context changed, 
triggered by the globalisation of markets, the role of social security and the discourse on 
social protection needed to be revised. In relation to solidarity discourses, the meanings 
changed following general shifts in the political discourse and also a change of 
environment in labour relations between the government, employers’ organisations and 
the unions. Solidarity is now used by trade unions in a broader sense though under the 
same principles. “Class solidarity” has progressively been replaced by “income 
solidarity”. Moreover, old age, or the ‘generational contract’ is no longer the only concern 
when referring to social protection.
The wider understanding of solidarity motivated by a changing labour market 
structure allowed workers’ organisations to have a more precise identification of how 
notions o f solidarity affect different types of workers. The view o f labour relations based 
on the opposition between the rights of working class and the interest of capital led to a 
more unified view of the social protection system. This change in the understanding of 
solidarity enabled them to articulate demands for solidarity for both those workers in need 
of protection and demands for ‘justice’ for those that pay more and, proportionally, 
receive less. The mechanisms of redistribution were meant to be one of the key elements 
of the debate.
In a climate of total consensus, the groups involved in the Toledo Pact, signed in 
1995, not only trade unions and the government but also the majority of political parties 
in Parliament, agreed on the major issues that needed to be tackled for the consolidation 
of the social security system. The contents o f this ‘solidarity pact’ have two different 
implications. Firstly, the financing of the system was the most important aspect behind 
the new wave of reforms of this period. Who should pay for solidarity, how and how 
much to spend on solidarity were key issues. I will argue that ultimately to reduce the 
debate on social security reform to the financial aspect hindered the possibility of 
broadening the discussion to issues addressing non-economic concerns. Secondly, the 
Toledo Pact was the starting point for the redefinition of benefits such as changes in 
contributory principles, retirement age, occupational regimes, or derived benefits, which 
evolved new meanings of solidarity. As we will see, such redefinition of benefits did not
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take into account the implications of collective and individual dimensions of solidarity in 
terms of gender relations nor did it challenge assumptions on familialism.
The financing of the social security system was clearly the driving force behind 
this new wave of reforms. If in the previous decade the push came from the adaptation 
needs, this time the most pressing and energetic justification that administration and trade 
unions’ representatives used to explain the new reforms was by denouncing the existence 
of two inter-linked threats: privatisation attempts and financing pressures.
In 1992, a process of discrediting the social security system started to grow from 
within the financial world and other groups interested in a capitalisation system. Private 
reports6 were published stressing the economic non-sustainability of the public pensions 
system and employers’ organisations were using these arguments to push for 
privatisation. As a result, the efforts of trade unions and the socialist administration were 
concentrated in proving the system’s economic sustainability. Unions’ strategy and 
indeed the strategy of all the parts involved in the Toledo Pact, was constantly justified by 
arguing that there was strong pressure of a ‘neo-liberal’ sort to dismantle the public 
pensions system and to promote private methods o f protection.
For the interviewees, and it is also reflected in their pre-reform documents, the 
dilemma was to choose between their own option of a public social security or the 
progressive privatisation of the system. As one interviewee argued:
“The argument at that moment (Toledo Pact) was whether it was possible to maintain the 
actual system  o f  redistribution or w e had to m ove towards a system  o f  capitalisation. For 
the first time the conservatives (PP) in this country signed a document supporting a 
redistributive system. ( . . . )  W e thought it was a w ise  political operation to stabilise the 
pensions system  and to legitim ise it before society, driving away one o f  the spectres o f  
neo-liberalism  that wants to see the end o f  a public social security system and introduce 
an alternative system o f  capitalisation” (TU 2-1-).
As one trade union report noted, the 1996 Agreement that followed from the 
Toledo Pact was signed “with pressure from certain interested economic sectors to 
transform our public system into a private system based on a ‘non-solidarity’ principle” 
(TUdoclO). Concepts such as solidarity, social cohesion and justice are set up in 
opposition to liberalism, individualism and privatisation trends. One Ministry of Labour’s 
official argued that the basic lines of the Toledo Pact were:
6 Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya BBVand CEDA.
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“First to say no to a system  o f  capitalisation, no to a minimum system  o f  social security 
and no to leaving next generations without protection. It closed up the possibility o f  
establishing a compulsory private schem e, which w as our worry. The pact said yes to a 
reform, to an improvement o f  the system and to open up w ays o f  solidarity. But to 
strengthen solidarity does not mean to oppose it to the reduction o f  the contributory 
character. Solidarity has to com e from outside” (M L1).
One of the most straightforward consequences o f this situation is that other 
alternatives in the configuration of the protection had to be put aside or ignored in favour 
of a purely financial debate. Within this, there is no room for discussions on the 
possibility of introducing more gender-sensible understandings of solidarity. As the next 
quote shows, the very notion of change is seen as a threat.
“The truth is that when som eone speaks about seriously m odifying the social security, 
there are reasons to be scared. What it traditionally means is an attempt to finish with the 
system , to say this is not possib le , we have to change the m odel an d  the only alternative is 
to g o  to  a  system  o f  individual capitalisation . I think w e would have to make changes to 
adapt the system  to the labour market and the new circumstances, etc. But one thing is to 
m odify it, to improve it, or to reform it and a very different thing is to change it. A ny type 
o f  reform has to carry the financing part with it otherwise you risk to reduce the future 
pensions” (M L1).
Moreover, by placing so much emphasis on guaranteeing the economic 
sustainability of the social protection system, ‘solidarity’ is being redefined by limiting its 
scope. The role of social protection as a social cohesion and integration factor is under 
threat. Administration and trade unions’ reports do describe the potential exclusion 
processes caused by the changing nature of work and the changing conditions o f social 
and personal life. However, according to policy-makers these new risks and needs cannot 
be dealt within the social protection system. Social protection should be restricted to those 
that make contributions to the system. Only those that have paid into the system through 
contributions might be entitled to receive a benefit similar to the contribution’s levels. As 
we will see next, the idea behind the changes in entitlement rules promoted by the Toledo 
Pact was the redefinition of responsibilities. That is, what responsibility should the 
various actors, namely workers, families and the state, take, not just in welfare provision, 
but also in the financing of the protection. From here, the main agreement is that social 
security has to be fundamentally contributory, and the protection o f people outside the
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pure contributory system has to be seen a problem of social exclusion and poverty and 
thus being the state’s responsibility to provide that protection. Given the fact that the state 
is still unable to provide sufficient security to large sectors o f the population, the family 
continues to play a major role in welfare provision.
In this context, the notion of solidarity loses part of its meaning. The social 
protection system increasingly limits itself to distribute income among ‘equal 
contributors’ at different moments of their lifetime. However, exemptions are sustained. 
Certain redistributive mechanisms within the contributory system, such as minimum 
pensions policy and the privileged conditions of some occupational regimes created to 
protect traditionally male employment situations, have not been modified or eliminated. 
This might show that the purpose of the actors involved in policy-making is still to protect 
old corporatism and privileges, which have been consolidated over the decades. 
Pensioners and specific working categories, for instance rural workers in the South have 
on the one hand, great decision-making capacity in trade unions and, on the other hand, 
they have critical voting power, especially within left parties. In contrast, the needs of 
those groups, such as women, that have no direct representation in the policy process and 
whose interests are not so well articulated are largely left behind though formally 
acknowledged.
With regard to the redefinition of benefits, and as has been investigated in chapter 
4, the main ‘redefinition’ was the strengthening of the contributory principles in the 
entitlement rules.7 One of the reports read: “it is necessary to reinforce the contributory 
character in a way that, although maintaining the solidarity principles, a greater effort of 
contribution could be offset by a greater benefit” (TUdoclO).
Moreover, the changes in the conditions o f entitlement and generosity o f benefits 
resolve what is a major concern for policy-makers, that is, the protection o f high-income 
workers for the sake of the social security system. For example, two of the interviewees 
said that:
“The ceiling o f  the maximum pension cannot be too low  because high earners would  
leave for a private scheme. Solidarity has to go along with justice, solidarity cannot create 
injustice, because that would be the end o f  solidarity, i f  you press too much, people leave” 
(T U I).
7 The increase in the number of years to calculate the amount of retirement pensions and the change in the 
percentage o f reference wage for contribution records less than twenty five years.
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The protection of the interests of those who are defined as the most ‘reliable 
clientele’ is the first concern:
“The first thing the government wanted to do in the 1996 Agreem ent w as to freeze the 
maximum pension. W e were totally against it because w e think that the contributory 
system  has to protect also high-incom e workers, i f  w e do not protect them they go to a 
private schem e. We have to guarantee 10% o f  the GDP through social contributions and 
to make the contributory system to be majority in society, it can only be the principal 
system  i f  w e keep within it the workers that are better o f f ’ (TU2).
As part o f the same reasoning, policy-makers, under the frame of the Toledo Pact 
and the 1996 Agreement, supported the development of private pension schemes as a 
complementary source of protection. The Agreement depicts the idea that the 
development of the complementary systems of social provision might be beneficial to 
guarantee the public system. Complementary schemes can permit that those groups in the 
maximum limit o f contribution for a public pension find an income complement through 
the private pensions’ scheme (TU2).
Another measure introduced under the same principle o f protecting stable and 
high-income workers was the expansion in retirement age. The goal has been to 
discourage early retirement and encourage late retirement, benefiting the permanence in 
the social security of those affiliates. Again, although the measure might create additional 
obstacles for those seeking first employment, the priority is the protection of the 
‘legitimate beneficiaries’. The discouragement o f early retirement parallel with the 
encouragement of late retirement, instead of introducing flexibility in access to and exit 
from the labour market, introduces an additional rigidity in the system.
The invisibility o f a ‘gender problem ’
Chapter 4 revealed the extent to which the implementation of the changes in the 
entitlement rules negatively affects non-standard workers while privileging standard 
workers. Trade unions opposed the changes in contributory principles of the 1985 reform 
on the basis that the changes would leave out of the contributory scheme certain groups 
that were situated in a precarious or irregular situation in the labour market (TUdoc4). 
However, the changes introduced in the 1996 Agreement show a high degree of
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continuism with the 1985 reform, going a step further in the strengthening o f entitlement 
rules.
In relation to one of the changes introduced, the reduction in the percentage of the 
reference wage given to contribution records under twenty five years, one interviewee 
agreed that the change would damage the expectations of many women, since most of 
them tend to retire with shorter working careers. However, the categorisation of this 
group as ‘not in need o f protection’ justified the introduction o f the measures. The 
interviewee argued that when his department presented the proposal, the Women’s 
Department expressed concern for the predictable reduction of women’s pensions:
“They found out that workers with less than twenty five years o f  contribution w ere m ainly  
w om en, and w e were going to cut down their pensions considerably, and they were right. 
But then w e looked at our data and found out that m ost wom en w ho had less than twenty  
five  years o f  contribution, given their salaries, were going to have a minimum pension so 
the change w as not going to affect them. W omen that really lost m oney w ere those w ho  
were entering the labour market at the age o f  forty and with average salaries over 150.000  
pesetas. They might be lots o f  wom en but that particular group is not in need o f  labour, 
they are not w orking wom en, they are teachers, nurses, professionals, that have stayed at 
hom e because it was more convenient and at forty they have decided they wanted to 
work. Normal workers do not enter the labour market so late and with 150.000  
pesetas/month salary. W e cannot protect them and w om en workers o f  the union realised 
w e were right and they accepted it” (T U I).
This division of what constitutes a working or a non-working woman denies the 
work that women carry out at home. Someone entering into the labour market at the age 
of forty might have been devoted to caring duties, but since the activity is not recognised 
as a work that needs some compensation the only protection that has been offered is for 
those who are in situation of need.
The circumstances of women who do unpaid work are not identified as problems 
that should be dealt within the frame of collective social responsibilities. As outlined 
earlier, women’s needs are not included in a framework of mutual reciprocity. As one 
agent from a women’s department of trade unions put it, the concessions given to women 
in terms of social rights have been done from the point of view o f protectionism, more 
than from the point o f view of rights and obligations (TUW2). Indeed, individual incomes 
are already regulated through taxation and it is not the role of social security to decide 
who needs to work and who does not. The right to work is never made conditional upon
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the subjective judgement of how necessary it is for the person to earn a living. In this 
sense, the logic applied to women’s social protection appears to be a different one from 
the general principles that govern the right to work and the right to social protection. 
Moreover, the argument also shows the resistance, on the side of trade unions, to 
accepting the issue of gender equality outside the framework of working class struggle. 
The distinction between working class and non-working class women avoids placing the 
debate in terms o f women’s right as a group. Moreover, since women within the family 
play a fundamental role in filling in the gaps left by the lack o f social provision, the 
emancipation of women from that role would threatened the actual structure of the 
welfare state.
The attention given to derived benefits, that is widow benefits, is another clear 
example o f the unwillingness to recognise gender inequality patterns in the provision of 
social rights, a gendered sense of solidarity and the lack of recognition of non-waged 
private work persists. In this respect, one respondent from the trade unions argued:
“I think that w idow  pensions should not exist. W idow pensions should be cancelled and 
substituted by non-contributory pensions for those wom en that have not contributed to 
the system , those who have contributed should have their own pensions and those who 
have their own resources...nothing. B u t...I  am not sure w e can counter balance the 
power o f  wom en at hom e...they  would say to their husbands: what is the need o f  
contributing to the social security if  you w ill die first and I am not going to receive  
anything?” (T U I).
To a certain extent, widow pensions are maintained as an extension of individual - 
male- retirement rights. The respondent also suggested that orphan benefits play the role 
of complementing single retirement rights:
“I f  w idow  pensions are suppressed then orphan pensions have to be increased, 
otherwise you create strong tensions. People that have contributed for ten, twenty or 
thirty years and all o f  a sudden they die, where does all that m oney go? W hy should 
I g ive m y m oney to som eone that has never worked sim ply because she or he did 
not want to?” (T U I).
The work performed in the private sphere, such as child bearing or domestic work, 
is not valued as work and it is the family income, not the individual income, the one that 
is taken into account for the entitlement to the benefit. Women who have no contribution
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record that would entitle them to a retirement pension and cannot be classified as having a 
“lack of resources” have no right to a benefit:
“( . . . )  A s a joke, when w e talk here about wom en I always say, w ell, I have a w ife that 
sim ply does not want to work, she is lazy and does not want to work. What she likes is the 
hom e and the children, then ...w hy do w e have to protect that woman? I protect those 
w om en that want to work but cannot, or those w ho do not have enough for living”. “( . . . )  
O f course is a joke, but what I mean with this is that w e have to avoid situations o f  over­
protection, inadequate protection for groups that do not need it” (T U I).
Since 1991, trade unions have been demanding changes and improvements in
o
relation to the scope of widow benefits. The women’s unions bodies formulated the 
demands. However, although trade unions explicitly recognised the need o f such changes, 
the measures have not been put forward in any of the agreements so far. As the last 
Agreement o f 1996 read:
“From the evidence o f  the available statistics on pensions amounts and its evolution in the 
recent past, it can be affirmed that within the system deficiencies are maintained with 
regard to the degree o f  solidarity. This is particularly the case o f  w idow  and orphan 
benefits, which, according the criteria o f  the signatories, will have to be translated in 
certain normative changes”.
Notwithstanding, the changes “will be implemented gradually depending on the 
available funds of the system of social security” (MLdoc7). It is not, therefore, an 
immediate objective.
In relation to the general views that representatives of the administration and trade unions 
have on gender equality, the implicit assumption underlying their arguments was that 
gender inequality in social security is just a reflection of gender inequality in the labour 
market. Given the fact that the central axis o f the system is articulated around professional 
principles, then gender segregation in the labour market is reproduced in the social 
protection system (ML2) (TU2). Following this, the idea that has been put forward is that 
in order to tackle the problem of gender inequality the focus has to be placed on the 
labour market. Female lower activity rates, lower salaries and lower qualifications are
8 One of the demands has been to increase the percentage of the reference wage to calculate the pension to 
75% and to place the benefits on a level with the minimum wage. Another demand that has been put 
forward is the legal right of non-married couples (of the same or different sex) to have access to derived 
benefits (TUdoc9).
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identified as the main factors explaining gender segregation in the labour market and 
subsequently in the social protection system.
This claimed gender neutrality in the establishment of policy rules contrasts with 
the different performance of men and women on social protection benefits. Gender is an 
essential variable in explaining access to benefits and yet it seems to be ignored in the 
design of the policies.
Given the fact that, according to the policy-makers, gender discrimination does not 
exist in the social protection system in itself, the specific circumstances of women are not 
considered per se but as part of circumstances of underprotection. As trade union 
representatives argued, female population is not targeted as a group in need o f policies:
“When w e design policies w e think about situations o f  under-protection, independently o f  
the group, w e do not analyse gender, w e analyse age and the fam ily situation” (T U I).
All the new measures accentuate the dilemma between core-periphery or standard- 
non-standard employment. Changes in the labour market are being followed by a 
supporting realignment of the social protection system. Labour flexibility is associated 
with increased patterns of gender segregation, lower pay and less employment protection. 
The changes that have been described suggest that there have been movements away from 
collective notions of solidarity and movements towards individual dimensions. The 
groups that recognise a level of reciprocity between their members are narrowed down 
and the interchange refers only to the central mercantile sphere.
The patterns of responsibilities that this type of solidarity describes exclude groups 
of workers and citizens pushed to the boundaries of the labour market. In what follows 
attention will be paid to the articulation of solidarity in the margins o f the system.
Solidarity on the social periphery
When non-contributory pensions were created in 1990 the main objective was to 
eliminate the most severe poverty. According to one of the architects o f the law, these 
benefits were seen as necessary by technicians of the social security department.
“The 26/1990 law com es forth from the ones that were working in all this process and 
thought it w as necessary to eliminate situations o f  poverty. N ow  poverty trends might be 
caused by the labour structure, but then, there were many people that did not contribute 
and had no right to any pension. W e saw that it was necessary to create non-contributory
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pensions. W e thought that the creation o f  these benefits was essential because apart from 
the incom e, non-contributory pensions also give access to the health system  and to social 
services. Those benefits were within social security, and outside social security there was 
very little” (M L1).
Therefore these benefits came as a policy response to a specific under-protection 
of certain groups, namely, elderly people with no resources and no access to other type of 
benefit, and not as a more universal and general form of benefit.
This type of solidarity in the ‘outskirts’ of the welfare state strongly relied on the 
family as a primary institution of welfare. As explained in chapter 4, entitlement to non­
contributory benefits depends on the family income rather than of individual income. One 
respondent highlighted the implications that this familialism has for women:
“A  wom an m ight have never worked and have no incom e, but i f  she lives in a fam ily  
where there is an incom e above the limit, that wom an has no right to a pension. These 
pensions were created from the point o f  v iew  o f  fam ily assistance rather than individual 
assistance. They are complementary to social security pensions” (M L3).
The point was strengthened by another interviewee who argued that it was 
necessary to establish an income limit for non-contributory pensions in order to keep a 
certain form of income redistribution between families.9 Only those elderly that live by 
themselves or belong to a low-income household should be entitled to a non-contributory 
benefit (ML1).
The idea that solidarity has to come from within families is also reflected in the 
provisions o f services in kind. One of the representatives from the Ministry o f Labour 
pointed out that in the discussion about whether it was better for elderly people to live in 
residences or whether it was better to remain at home, the final decision was to support 
the latter. From 1991 onwards, the Ministry of Social Affairs supported the creation of 
daily care institutions where old people could spend the day and do activities but live with 
his or her family.
“There has been a policy to foster fam ily care for old age on the w hole because the 
administration has no resources to be in charge o f  it. The fam ily has acted as a buffer for, 
it still does and I hope it w ill continue doing so” (M L3).
9 The income limit is more flexible if the pensioner lives with his or her family (see chapter 4).
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What seems to be unacknowledged in the cases described is that in these 
circumstances family fundamentally means women. When solidarity is articulated in 
family terms, the bulk of informal care the state is placing in families is usually added to 
the domestic work that women carry out at home. In 1993, the Centre for Sociological 
Research carried out a survey on informal help to elderly people.10 The study proved that 
informal care was not just largely female but had also a very specific profile. The help 
was provided on a permanent basis and mainly to pensioners. However, the gender 
implication of public/private divisions of work is not clearly identified by respondents.
Current discussions on non-contributory forms of protection are still limited to the 
financing and not to shifting the fundamental criteria. The important limitations imposed 
in the contributory system are not encompassed with the widening of the protection 
provided by the non-contributory scheme. There has been no re-examination of the 
entitlement principles of non-contributory benefits. For example, the main concern of 
policy-makers in the 1996 Agreement, in relation to non-contributory benefits was to 
make the state fully responsible for the financing of these benefits (TUdoc8). As 
previously argued, a clear distinction must exist between those who receive a benefit they 
have been paying for through contributions during the working life and those who have 
not paid but need protection and who the state is financially responsible for.
“W hy should w e, the workers, pay the expenses o f  social exclusion problems? ( . . . )  I f  the 
state does not fund the non-contributory part o f  the system , w e would have to lower the 
amounts o f  the pensions for those people that have contributed to the system . I f  that 
happens that would be the end o f  the public pension system  because people would prefer 
to go to a private schem e” (T U I).
The separation of the sources of financing tackles in fact an old problem in the 
social protection system. Contributions of employers and employees have always been 
more responsible for the financing of the system than the state.11 There is a need to make 
a clear division between benefits paid through employment contributions and benefits 
paid through state transfers. Moreover if state transfers are fully channelled through a 
non-contributory system, the access and quality o f these benefits could improve because
10 Carers’ profile: 83% were women, 87% of these women did not have formal education, 50% were 
housewives and 22% employed. With regards the dependant person, 92% were pensioners and the help that 
was given was permanent in 75% of the cases CIS (1993).
11 In 1980, contributions from employment accounted for 89% of the financing o f the social protection 
system while the state contributed in 9 ’5%. In 1990, the first form o f financing was reduced to 72% while 
the state’s contribution increased to 25%. In 1995, the relation between financing from employment and
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more resources could be placed into it. However, all these issues are problematic. Firstly, 
the redistributive mechanisms within the contributory side are the main financial burden 
for the system and yet they remained unchanged. Secondly, the state’s compromise to 
finance the whole non-contributory side of the social protection system has to go parallel 
with an increase of the state budget, which for a number of reasons is not going to 
happen.
Considering the first aspect, the report that was used as the reference for the 
Toledo Pact identified the threat to the economic sustainability o f the system with three 
factors. Firstly, there is an increase in the number o f pensioners; Secondly, the new 
contributory pensions have higher incomes produced by inflation readjustments and the
1 9‘substitution effect’; And thirdly, minimum pensions within the contributory pensions
I ^system are a great financial burden. The three factors are exclusively associated with the 
contributory side of the system and not with the ‘solidaristic’ one.14
Considering the second aspect, the very existence of minimum pensions in the 
contributory side hinders the improvement of non-contributory benefits. To level the 
quantities o f non-contributory pensions and contributory minimum pensions would 
disincentive the contribution (ML1).
“There is no country in the world that has a guaranteed minimum contributory pension, in 
Spain we have it and that distorts everything. If we increase non-contributory pensions to 
the same amount as the minimum contributory pensions, people would be discouraged to 
work” (TUI).
However, as the respondent stated, there are other possibilities. A contributory 
system can still have a maximum and a minimum limit but without a minimum period of 
contribution requirement. The state would complement the pensions of those pensioners 
below the minimum limit, as one respondent argued:
“That is a possibility, but what does the government say? To guarantee a  minimum  
pen sion  to everyone is not p o ssib le  because there is not enough resou rces , so they say, if
from the state was closer to EU standards (67’6% and 29’6% respectively). (Ministry of Labour 1999).
12 The increase in expenditure due to the difference between the amounts o f the pensions that go o ff the 
system and the amounts o f the ones that enter. In 1997, new pensions were 39% more expensive than old 
pensions. This increase in the amounts o f the new pensions accounts for 40% of the pensions’expenditure 
(Gomez 1999).
13 The minimum policy o f the contributory side costs around 11% o f all pensions spending and 43% of it is 
financed through state contributions (Gomez 1999).
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you -trade unions- are ready to extend the pensions’ calculation period to the whole 
working life, then we discuss that measure. What is the problem? The problem is that if  
you extend all the calculation period to the w hole working life you cut dow n the pensions 
considerably, particularly the pensions o f  the more stable and long careers” (T U I).
It is not very difficult to guess that the workers that would be more affected by the 
measures would be those in key areas of trade union membership15 and given the obvious 
fact that trade unions defend the interests of their members such a proposal is not 
supported.
Interviewees of both unions claimed that there was no intention in the near future 
to modify the configuration of minimum contributory pensions, their only aim is to make 
the state financially responsible for the minimum complements of these benefits. Since 
minimum pensions will not be eliminated, the non-contributory scheme is condemned to 
remain at a minor subsidiary level.
Technical problems, such as the existence o f a black market and informal 
economy outside the visible circuit of GDP are also put forward as additional difficulties 
in improving the scope of non-contributory benefits:
“If  a universal form o f  protection is introduced in a society where 25% o f  the population  
has non-visible income, all these people would enter into social protection, and they  
would ruin it. This does not happen in Sweden where they say that the percentage is 
around 2 or 2.5% that means that all incom es are detectable” (M L2).
According to this view, establishing more generous non-income based benefits 
depends on the level of economic development, is just a question o f having more 
resources.
“A ll countries have included more universal forms o f  protection, is a variable associated  
with the level o f  econom ic development. It is necessary to have rates o f  em ploym ent c lose  
to 100%. Northern countries for instance, have em ploym ent rates near 90% and in this 
cases, together with the fact that these are countries with higher incom e per capita, it is 
possible to universalise benefits. In Spain, like in Ireland or Italy w e are still far away
14 The expenditure on contributory pensions is 58% o f all economic resources of the system. With 
retirement pensions representing 68% of all expenditure on contributory pensions in 1997 (Gomez 1999: 
497).
15 33% of the total affiliation belong to the public sector and the federation of retired pensioners (similar 
composition in both unions) represents 10%.
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from those indexes. A ll the countries have follow ed that feature, Germany, France, 
B elg iu m ... and w e fo llow  it but many years later” (M L2).
Another respondent also spoke about the existence of an important degree of fraud 
in non-contributory pensions. In his view, local councils are not always accurate in 
determining the number of components of the family (TU2-2-). However, his colleague 
also present in the interview did not share the view, according to her, the fraud in non­
contributory pensions, compared to the fraud of other pensions is not relevant (TU2-3-).
Moreover, the state’s compromise to finance the whole non-contributory side of 
the social protection system has to go parallel with an increase of the state budget.
Interviewees argued that the main obstacle to develop a more fiscal welfare state, 
was again the lack of public support. In this respect, interviewees agreed that there is 
room for improvement since Spain has a low fiscal pressure compared with the rest of 
Europe.16 In comparison with the rest of EU countries, some countries such as Germany 
or France have low percentages of direct taxation but instead they show high percentages 
of social contributions, other countries like the U.K. emphasise taxation more than direct 
transfers. In Spain the relation between the two main forms o f financing are not 
compensated enough and thus perform worse than the rest of the EU members.
Nevertheless, interviewees do not see the approach of Spain to EU standards as 
happening through a development of fiscal welfare forms. Interviewees referred to a 
number of surveys that have shown the unpopularity o f raising taxes. The general public 
do not seem to make the connection between an increase in taxes and a more generous 
welfare system. In 1995, the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) carried out a survey 
on public opinion and fiscal policy. Only 17% of respondents believed that taxes were a 
mechanism to better distribute wealth in society. 68% were in disagreement with the idea 
that in order to have more and better public services and social benefits, taxes had to 
increase and 83% thought that in Spain people had to pay too many taxes.
16 According to Garde (1999), the global fiscal pressure (direct, indirect and social contributions) as 
percentage o f GDP was, in Spain in 1996 8.6 points below EU average. In the case o f direct tax as 
percentage o f GDP Spain performs 4% below EU average (EU 39%; Spain 35%; Germany 31%; France 
23%; U.K. 47%; Italy 39’6%; Portugal 31%). In relation to indirect tax as percentage of GDP, Spain is 2% 
below EU average (EU 31%; Spain 29%; Germany 28%; France 27%; U.K. 35%; Italy 26%; Portugal 
43%). In relation to social contributions as percentage of GDP Spain performs 7% above EU average (EU 
29%; Spain 36%; Germany 41%; France 43%; U.K. 17%; Italy 34%; Portugal 26%).
Income Tax as percentage o f GDP: 11’4% in the EU; 10’3% in the OECD; Spain 7 ’8%; Germany 9 ’4%; 
France 6.5%; U.K. 9 ’4%; Italy 11%.
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Tax evasion was seen as a generalised phenomenon. 39% of respondents thought 
that there was “a lot” of tax evasion and 44% considered there was “quite a lot”. In 1997
1 7the Institute o f Fiscal Studies (IEF), carried out another study on the perception of 
citizens towards the welfare state that also concluded that the role of taxes was not, in 
general terms, very popular. Equality and solidarity was more directly linked with public 
expenditure than with tax payments. According to the report, the idea that public services 
and benefits justify the payment of taxes has evolved in a positive way over the last years. 
However, when the question is asked in relation to the degree of adequacy between tax 
payments and the services and benefits that are received, the majority o f the population 
believed that the taxes paid are barely adequate or not adequate at all to maintain the 
public services and benefits available. The main reason given was again the bad 
administration and management of state resources.
However, I would argue that to rely on whether there is or there is not enough 
public support for the development of certain policies could be misleading. Policies are 
sometimes anticipatory of changes in the perception of social problems, and they are not 
always introduced as a reaction to a given social reality. Not all political initiatives are 
popular and yet some are introduced for the common interest o f society. In this case the 
role of politicians or policy-makers is to find the reasons and arguments why a given 
policy should be accepted. Eventually, policies that are at first rejected can be 
implemented without a major cost in terms of public support.
So if  non-contributory benefits remain as a minor protection scheme, what is the 
protection offered to those in the periphery of the labour market or even outside it. What 
is the policy response to flexible and unstable employment? The actual trends o f the 
reforms seem to indicate that solidarity will progressively be identified as an assistential 
protection, as measures against poverty and exclusion.
However, here again there is a difference between discourse and the actual 
proposals that have been put forward. All trade union reports dedicate a great deal of 
attention to new exclusion forms and new protection needs. The space dedicated in all 
trade unions’ reports contrasts with the little measures proposed to tackle the problem. 
Both, UGT and CC.OO. documents have continuous reference to the new forms of 
poverty and exclusion generated in periods of economic crisis and affecting groups
17 Ciudadanos, contribuyentes y  Expertos: opiniones y  actitudes fiscales de los Espaholes en 1997. (IEF 
1998).
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outside social security. Women are never mentioned as a group particularly affected by 
these new trends, they are supposedly included in the structural long-term unemployed 
and the ‘new excluded’ as a consequence of labour market flexibility. Explaining 
strategies of positive action, for instance, one report refers to the need to combat new 
forms of exclusion (single parent families, long term unemployed, young people with 
school failure, immigrants and refugees) as well as traditional forms o f exclusion 
(homeless, drug addicts, prisoners, mentally ill people, etc. (sic) (TUdoc8). Of course, 
women are within all these categories but the abstraction in this case contrasts with the 
specific consideration that other groups receive. It also draws attention to the fact that 
certain episodes in life histories such as single-parenthood and poverty in old age are 
treated under the general (masculine) plural when in fact they are largely feminised 
circumstances.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored the barriers o f the integration o f gender within 
understandings of solidarity in the social protection system. The degree o f policy legacy 
from the previous authoritarian regime has been an impediment to a policy change from a 
traditional conception of solidarity based on class and age to a more open conception 
where gender equality could be integrated. The system of social protection designed 
under a framework of industrial relations was adapted and not transformed and thus there 
was little room for the introduction of policies more sensible to gender equality issues. 
Moreover, the instrumental role of social security in a period of major economic 
transformations also mortgaged the capacity of the social security to adopt a leading role 
in putting into practice ideological concerns.
Collective solidarity was given prominence since the main objective that social 
security targeted during the 1980s was social cohesion. Policies directed towards the 
fulfilment of individual rights were not as important as policies directed to bring stability 
to the country, starting from a societal organisation founded in the family institution. 
Nevertheless, protecting the rights of a specific profile of workers also preserved the 
individual dimension of solidarity. The redistributive character has been articulated 
through inter-generational solidarity (since today’s pensions are paid with the 
contributions of today’s workers); solidarity between different income levels (the 
maximum and minimum limits for pensions create an internal redistribution) and between
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different sectors o f workers (occupational regimes); and finally, inter-territorial solidarity 
(without a centralised pension system, the different productive, economic and 
demographic regional realities would have an effect on pension distribution).
The whole framework of action was seen as successful in the sense that some of 
the most important social conflicts and problems, such as old age poverty or rural and 
industrial unemployment were attenuated. However, the social context started to change 
at the beginning of the 1990s and yet the introduction of gender equality issues into the 
social security continued to be blocked. The new wave o f reforms were driven by a purely 
economic debate. Instead of having a more complex discussion about alternatives to the 
configuration of the outline of the protection, the dilemma appeared to be in form of a 
dichotomous choice, either yes or no (to a public pension system). As Felipe Gonzalez 
attested in the interview, it is only the issue of economic sustainability that receives 
attention and not that other problem of social sustainability.
“They say that the Toledo Pact was signed because o f  a problem o f  sustainability. We 
have believed that the problem o f  social security was an issue o f  real and econom ic  
sustainability. Real in the sense that a system  is or is not sustainable on time and 
econom ic because the trouble is how to find the resources to finance it. But ( . . . )  the 
problem o f  sustainability o f  a social security system  is not so much, or not only, an 
econom ic problem but also a social issue”.
The idea put forward by the former Prime Minister was that the reassurance of a 
protection system that privileges standard workers against non-standard workers will be a 
potential source of social conflict and inequality given new labour market trends and 
demands for equality of many groups in society. The resistance to the de- 
commodification of at least some spheres o f social protection appears as a fundamental 
restriction for the access of women into the core realms o f solidarity.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions 
Further Reflections on Welfare and Gender Regimes
Aims and methods
My approach to this field of research started from the theoretical and empirical 
supported claim that gender stands as an analytical category in conceptualising welfare 
states and that, conversely, the welfare state, as an institution, is an active force in the 
structuring o f gender relations. My first research question attempted to investigate to what 
extent, and in which way, the Spanish social protection system affected men and women, 
trying to distinguish differential patterns in access to social rights. My second research 
question referred to the importance of political factors in shaping policy structures and 
outcomes. Specifically, the investigation focused on the access to policy-making of 
women’s advocacy institutions, defined as their capacity to intervene directly, or 
indirectly, by influencing the actors involved in the process. Finally, I was concerned with 
how gender equality issues are targeted as an objective in the policy process.
The decision to integrate aspects concerning policy outcomes and structures in this 
investigation carries a number of inherent advantages and disadvantages. To be sure, what 
can often be counted as a disadvantage in one respect might be an advantage in another. 
The determination to choose one approach and, subsequently, reject others can only be 
justified by the purpose o f the study.
Starting with the advantages, analysis of each research question has been 
moderated for the sake of the broader picture. This decision was partly determined by the 
fact that Spain has not been subject of comprehensive attention from scholars in the field. 
Thus, there is a lack of familiarity with regard to how the system of social protection and 
the welfare state in general work. Given the absence of Spain from most comparative 
investigation, background information was essential. Moreover, placing the welfare state 
in its historical context has often permitted me to probe present trends and arrive at a 
greater understanding of issues.
I explicitly argued in the introduction to this study for the importance of the 
political aspect for an understanding o f the gender dimension of policies. While studies of
177
social policy have historically not given significant attention to the issue o f political 
agency, contemporary studies have underlined its significance, not only to understand 
why and how policy structures are configured the way they are, but also to explain how 
processes o f change are articulated.
Finally, an important advantage of the research design has been its capacity to 
explore the “absences”: for gender is often a ‘hidden dimension’ o f social protection. The 
examination of the understandings of words, which ostensibly are gender neutral, such as 
‘solidarity’, was a prerequisite in order to come to grasps with the trace o f a gender 
dimension. Furthermore, the information obtained from the interviews with the actors 
directly implicated in social policy and with those dealing with gender policy, proved to 
be of the most relevance in explaining policy outcomes and structures.
Considering the disadvantages, there is an evident problem of scope. All issues 
could have been covered in greater depth by treating each research question separately. 
Moreover, in relation to the first research question, my ability to consider the impact of 
different social protection schemes on gender relations has necessarily been confined to 
secondary statistical data analyses. In some cases, the absence of gender as an analytical 
variable impeded discovering what the precise outcome of certain policies would have 
been.
The internal heterogeneity between gender categories was an additional issue that, 
although addressed in some of the chapters, could not be pursued in greater depth in the 
empirical analysis. Further research on gender and social protection would require 
gathering primary data to find out the impact of central variables, such as education, 
income, labour market or household position on men’s and women’s access to social 
provision.
The interaction between different levels of government is another important 
research perspective that was beyond the scope o f this investigation. Although social 
protection in Spain is determined at central level, certain powers have been transferred to 
the autonomous regions, such as, for instance, the administration of assistential benefits. 
Decentralisation is an ongoing process and its relevance in policy formation and 
implementation cannot be underestimated. Future research would have to take into 
account how the different ‘home nations’ and regions develop autonomous social policies 
and how policy-making at that level is determined by national and European legislation. 
Also, efforts on data standardisation will have to be made to allow for comparison among 
the Autonomous Communities.
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There are other outstanding tasks beyond the remit of this thesis. An interesting 
question that could, with profit, be explored further would be the way in which gender 
equality is understood and recognised as a relevant concern in society, since social actors’ 
attitudes usually mirror views and beliefs in society. An additional relevant question 
would be how gender equality is perceived in labour relations. Although the way in which 
the state legislates social and labour policy already mediates employers’ behaviour, public 
policy concern on gender equality might sometimes fall on deaf ears if  it is not 
accompanied by receptive attitudes on the part of entrepreneurs. Moreover, the question 
o f what is that employers win or loose by following a gender equality strategy, needs to 
be addressed. If gender equality is a public benefit and concern, then attention has to be 
paid to the extent to which different social groups have to bear the costs of such equality.
The utility o f  theoretical perspectives
One of the strengths of feminist theory has been its ability to contest well- 
established and undisputed foundations of concepts. Although, as described in chapter 2 
there are various theoretical approaches, feminism as a theoretical and social movement 
has developed by articulating questions that go to the heart of established ways of 
thinking. While traditional theoretical debates engaged in the problematic relationship 
between central concepts of citizenship, -i.e. equality, freedom, solidarity-, feminism has 
questioned the general consensus about such notions. The principle o f ‘radical doubt’ 
(Giddens 1991) has been a fundamental axiom in the articulation of feminist theory.
In this study, the theorising of the public/private divide has been the starting point 
for the analysis of the gender dimension analysis of social protection. The idea has been 
to disentangle values relating to social citizenship within social policy that, albeit being 
considered as neutral, determine gendered policy outcomes and structures. The 
public/private divide and the connection between the state, the family and the market are 
crucial components in understanding the implications of identified and non-identified 
needs and risks for men and women.
The investigation also addressed the concept of political equality. Political 
participation and political discourse have been outlined throughout the thesis as 
dimensions of gender and its relationship with the welfare state. In this sense, the 
literature on policy-making and equal opportunities policy has been very helpful for the 
empirical research of the policy process, the single most important lesson being that this
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process is not free from power dynamics: conflict of interests, ideological beliefs and 
perceptions of problems shape policy structures. Moreover, it has also been 
acknowledged that there are different stages in policy-making. The mere existence of 
equal opportunities policies, for instance, does not guarantee the integration o f gender 
equality in major policy concerns. Equality might be recognised at the stage o f agenda 
setting but this goal might still not be implemented afterwards.
Critical findings
The findings o f chapter 4, together with the background provided by chapter 3, 
have given clear evidence of the first research question, which attempted to distinguish 
stratification patterns in men and women’s access to social protection. Summarising the 
research results, the way in which gender stratification in the social protection system is 
sustained carries a number of important consequences. These are:
1. The dualistic character of the protection offered.
Firstly, there is unequal access according to gender labour market stratification. 
Accordingly, the principle of social insurance based on labour market participation and 
the weight o f cash transfers create a differentiated gender pattern of access. The generous 
protection to the core sector of the labour force contrasts with the very weak subsidisation 
of those situated in the periphery. Women have had increasing difficulties in accessing 
direct contributory benefits, for which access is strict but which afford a high level of 
generosity. Over the years, there has been increased selectivity in qualifying for these 
benefits. Income maintenance regulation coupled with labour market flexibility and high 
unemployment rates -especially high for women- create polarisation of social protection. 
The complementary non-contributory scheme is not strong enough significantly to 
alleviate the poor circumstances o f those not covered by the main protection system.
Secondly, women are negatively affected by the existence of ‘clientelism’, the 
social protection system preserves a critical patronage role in protecting specific groups 
of workers. There are separate insurance programmes for occupational categories, often 
with widely differing regulations concerning contributions and benefits. Moreover, there 
are redistributive mechanisms that, although providing an easier route to social protection 
for many women, have not been designed to compensate specifically female working 
patterns. The initial retirement pension and the minimum pensions’ policy are two
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measures o f redistribution that given women’s more poorly remunerated jobs and shorter 
careers, provide them with enhanced access to social protection. However, it has been 
argued that in some cases, the redistribution impact of these mechanisms has diminished 
over the years. Furthermore, some of these redistributive mechanisms have been 
transformed from their original configuration, which aimed to protect certain categories 
o f weak, though stable, workers to a sort of safety net of social assistance within a purely 
occupational scheme. This sort of organisation keeps a considerable degree o f complexity 
and multiplicity in the protection provided, since benefits which are partly state funded 
remain in the contributory side.
2. The importance o f the family.
The family plays a crucial though specific role in the organisation of welfare. Social 
protection arrangements assume an indispensable role o f the family as a principal 
institution o f redistribution. Chapter 4 has shown that there are a number of schemes - 
mainly minimum contributory pensions, widow benefits, and non-contributory benefits- 
that provide an easier route for many people, mostly women, to access the social 
protection system though they often receive below subsistence protection. The importance 
of the family is twofold: firstly, some of these ‘minor’ benefits rely on the family to 
establish entitlement, reinforcing dependency and providing a secondary route to 
citizenship. Secondly, these mechanisms form part of a more complex strategy where 
individuals and families organise their everyday life. The state partially contributes to 
these informal arrangements that take place among family members. It offers protection 
knowing that the income people receive from their marginal benefits is more likely to be 
added to other, either individual or familial, incomes. It has been argued that given the 
poor quality of certain benefits, such as minimum or widow pensions, the system might 
be encouraging or tolerating women’s work in the non-regulated sector. Under certain 
circumstances, this work is not regarded as an independent way of making a living, but 
rather, as a complement to other sources of income.
At the same time, and paradoxically, since the beginning of the modem welfare 
state, the family has not been considered as the unit for considerable parts of social 
provision. The family is a site o f ‘informal’ more than ‘formal’ welfare. This is evidenced 
in the narrow scope of maternity and family benefits. Spain, for example, is among the 
most generous European countries concerning maternity leave. However, maternity is 
protected only as a labour market risk and family protection exists only as a prevention of
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poverty. This marginal existence of monetary transactions for childcare or family 
responsibilities is not compensated through either availability of social services or 
through tax deductions. Tax regulation, which is mostly individualised, is in marked 
contrast to social security cash benefits. As regards fiscal welfare, the state, although it 
used to, does not significantly encourage, through taxation, a preferred family type. Since 
1989, separate taxation is usually a better option than joint taxation. Moreover, although 
there are tax exemptions for families, these are rather insufficient in compensating for the 
costs o f dependants. Again, it is very difficult to identify the ideology that sustains the 
whole of the welfare apparatus. Different logics, introduced at different times, coexist and 
sometimes contradict each other.
3. The state, family and market linkage
As a consequence of the two factors previously discussed, the social protection system 
cannot offer ‘defamilialism’, that is, a guarantee of women’s rights outside family 
dependencies. Women’s independence is still outstanding. Firstly, because they are 
excluded from the privileged ‘core’ group of protected workers. Direct benefits are the 
only social security benefits that can provide generous and sufficient protection, though 
women have important restrictions to access. Their ‘inclusion’ in social security is often 
based on a ‘dependency’, such as is the case of widow benefits, or on an individual basis 
but given the right to generally low benefits. Secondly, because they are forced to fulfil a 
caring role in the (extended) family that is substantially unrecognised, they are impede in 
seeking full time employment.
Positive and negative factors for the promotion o f gender equality
The second research question was devoted to finding out how the potential factors 
in policy formulation and implementation might explain gender inequality patterns in the 
social protection system. Following the framework provided in chapter 5, the 
investigation identified a number of elements positively influencing formal recognition of 
gender equality as a relevant political concept. There were, however, other factors 
constraining the practical promotion o f gender issues in social protection. Chronologically 
ordered, the specific relevant circumstances were:
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1. Policy legacy
The political transition from dictatorship to democracy affected the political 
agenda in more than one way. To begin with, the change from dictatorship to democracy 
was led by a process o f reform and not by a political breakdown. Thus, there was not a 
strong de-legitimisation of the institutions created under the previous regime. There was 
also an important degree of institutional deficit left by the Francoist administration. 
Admittedly, the institutional framework for social protection had already been created. 
The reforms undertaken during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s had as a central 
objective, the system’s improvement in terms of rationality, efficiency and management, 
given serious structural deficiencies. However, how accessibility conditions and 
entitlement rules in social security affected women was not a major concern at any stage 
of the policy-making of the early democratic period. Moreover, the transition to 
democracy developed under a severe economic crisis, which also affected the contents of 
the political agenda. Reforms pursued short-term objectives, and long term goals, such as 
the configuration of social provision, were postponed.
2. Patterns o f neo-corporatism
The political framework in which democracy developed in Spain determined the 
opportunities for women’s policy intervention and the introduction of gender issues into 
the agenda.
The constellation of power relations that resulted in the consolidation of 
democracy reinforced the exclusion from policy-making of those actors not representing 
labour relations. One of the first goals during the democratic transition was to transform 
the previous Francoist corporatist structures. Through a process of ‘political learning’, 
social actors agreed on the necessity to build new institutional structures for political 
dialogue. The opinions of the parties, unions and employers’ organisations were vital in 
the decision-making processes. The women’s movement, which was consolidated as a 
social movement in the decade prior to democracy, working together with leftist 
organisations for political rights lost opportunities to influence directly policy-making in 
the framework of new power relations.
This male-focused consensual neo-corporatism also affected the introduction of 
gender issues in the political agenda. Women’s rights and family issues were sharp points 
of discrepancy between left and right and they were abandoned for the sake of ‘political 
harmony’. The approved Constitution in 1978 did not ultimately incorporate demands that
183
were originally present in the left parties’ agenda. Thus, the introduction of gender issues 
in the demands of the legitimised actors ‘suffered’ in the bargaining dynamics between 
the actors.
3. Instrumental role of social security
The social protection system played a critical part in containing potential 
destabilising forces caused by economic crises and restructuring processes. Since the 
beginning of democracy, what has been called the ‘solidarity principle’ was built through 
the social protection system, by redistributing income between different generations of 
workers and different types of workers. To prevent social conflicts in periods o f economic 
transformation, the social security system has acted in many occasions as a kind o f ‘safety 
net’ to compensate for job losses and wage constraints. The fact that the social protection 
system provided concessions to wage controls in a context of reactive policy-making and 
economic crisis had an impact on the introduction of policies dealing with gender 
inequality. Linked to the neo-corporatist patterns described earlier, social protection was 
consolidated as one of the preserves o f labour relations in a post-industrial context where 
these were being redefined and trade unions lost mobilisation capacity.
4. The political interest of gender equality
From 1982 onwards, gender equality became a legitimated political objective. The 
commitment of the government with traditional social-democrat ideals, and a change of 
policy style, less reactive and more anticipatory, were good incentives for the introduction 
of ‘new policies’ such as gender policies. Policy intervention is not exclusively a response 
to existing problems, it is also motivated by the emergence o f new spheres of action. The 
commitment was materialised in the creation of the Women’s Rights Institute -IM-, 
which, through equal opportunities programmes, attempted to create the institutional 
framework for policy action in gender issues. Moreover, during the 1980s there was a 
considerable increase in women’s participation in formal politics. Also, the broadening of 
certain welfare rights, such as health care and education contributed to improve the social 
conditions o f women fostering the ‘two biographies of women’, meaning the increasingly 
divergent experiences and expectations of younger and older generations.
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5. ‘ Europeanisation’
The repercussions of EU legislation on national policy were twofold. On the one 
hand, European directives and programmes on equal opportunities for men and women 
were a crucial impulse for the assimilation of gender equality as a political concern and 
for the very legitimisation of women’s policy machinery. The Women’s Rights Institute’s 
equal opportunities programmes and the legal reforms pushed forward by the women’s 
advocacy groups were following European guidelines on that matter. On the other hand, 
and moving in the opposite direction, EU convergence’s criteria was also motivating cuts 
in spending through restricting the access to social security, and fostering flexibility in the 
labour market reforms. Both had a negative impact on women’s access, in equal 
conditions with men, to employment and ultimately to social protection.
All the factors described affected in a particular way the two issues that were 
covered in depth in the last two chapters: policy access o f women’s advocacy groups and 
understandings of solidarity in the social protection system.
Equality o f  treatment versus equality o f  outcome
The women’s advocacy institutions under study, the Women’s Rights Institute -IM- 
as the governmental structure and bodies responsible for gender issues inside trade unions 
(Women’s Secretariat o f CC.OO. and the Women’s Department of UGT) presented 
different degrees o f policy access. Both bodies have obtained formal recognition inside 
their organisations. The rest of the social partners did not object to their promote role in 
creating awareness of the ‘gender problem’, revealing issues and outlining solutions. 
However, there was a general lack of power and mechanisms to guarantee the 
implementation of their proposals. ‘Mainstreaming’, defined as the principle o f 
integration of gender issues and women’s demands in the global action of the 
administration and trade unions, was not successfully accomplished in any of the two 
bodies under study.
To begin with women’s bodies in trade unions, a number of restrictions limited their 
chances to intervene and to integrate their demands in trade unions’ strategies. What 
could be considered as the most straightforward explanation, low female membership 
rates, cannot, in fact, count as an explanatory factor for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, female union density increased considerably over the period under study. As a
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consequence of labour market shifts, new employment sectors with larger female 
representation gained more strength in the economic structure and in trade unions’ 
configuration. On the other hand, trade unions’ membership does not explain their 
institutional power. In 1985, a new law conceded more importance to electoral 
representation than to membership. It was argued in chapter 6 that this trade unions’ 
legitimacy through the election system determined the representation’s chances o f groups, 
such as women, that have not explicitly belonged to traditional corporatist arrangements 
where policy-making develops.
Other elements, such as cultural and organisational structures and conflict of 
interests in power relations were identified as main impediments for women’s successful 
intervention. The functioning of collective agreements was given as the best example. 
Collective agreements were identified as paradoxical with regard women’s interests, since 
they can, indeed, work towards equal opportunities policies but also, gender equality 
issues put forward through legislation can be eroded in practice. Collective agreement is a 
gendered process in itself, and there is, first, a problem of ‘invisibility’, in the sense that 
gender patterns of stratification are not usually recognised, and second, there is also a 
problem of opposite demands, other issues are prioritised in the bargaining process. 
Women’s bodies’ intervention in all policy stages was seen as a necessary condition to 
move from equality of treatment to equality of outcome. That is, to move beyond 
procedural equality to also obtain substantive equality.
The tension that exists between women’s advocacy groups representing the interest 
of a specific social group, and their attachment to the workers’ organisations was 
identified as a specific problem that affects women inside trade unions. While their 
association to workers’ organisations gives them a greater representation power than other 
non-institutional feminist groups, that same condition acts as an obstacle to their capacity 
to create strategies of confrontation. The evident conflict of interest cannot be too openly 
declared.
With regard the Women’s Rights Institute, its capacity to intervene in mainstream 
policies was constrained by a number of factors. The institute worked as a kind of lobby 
within the central administration, this trait was both its strength and its weakness. While 
the feminist background of IM’s officials influenced the contents of IM’s policies, this 
independence from party politics was at the same time a problem in terms of its impact 
within government politics. Although there were several channels for policy co-operation 
between gender policies and the rest of social and labour policies, these mainstreaming
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strategies were not effective enough. The mechanisms to create horizontal co-operation 
between the different governmental bodies were positive in helping to create awareness of 
gender issues. Nonetheless, there were no concrete implementation procedures and 
efficiency was in the end subject to the political disposition of policy-makers. Additional 
problems for IM’s policy intervention were related to the administrative and political 
level of the body, the IM being an independent body attached to the Ministry o f Social 
Affairs, which had limited power over policies’ design. Moreover, the division of this 
ministry in different departments according to social groups was seen as an obstacle for 
mainstreaming. The research identified evidence of segregation that could produce the 
ghettoisation o f gender issues, both from related problems and from experts in other 
fields.
Furthermore, the relationship between the women’s advocacy institutions was 
riddled with difficulties. The channels of communication between the IM and the 
women’s bodies of trade unions were not formalised enough, which limited their chances 
to influence policy-making. Beyond their common feminist background, the different 
groups were divided along lines reflecting general political divisions.
Concerning their strategy for gender equality, women’s advocacy groups committed 
themselves to the ‘universal-breadwinner’ strategy, whereby women’s rights are 
promoted through the labour market. The care-giver strategy, which places private care 
work on equal terms with waged work and demands equal treatment in terms of 
citizenship rights, was never seen as an option for women’s advocacy groups. Given the 
conservative manipulation of the institution of the family by the Francoist regime, 
feminists did not want to associate their claims with previous anti-feminist strategies.
However, I have argued that the ‘universal-breadwinner’ gender policy approach and 
labour and social protection policies were moving in opposite directions. Women’s access 
to employment was featured by flexibility and by the lack o f social protection, and, at the 
same time, access to social protection was being restricted. Two main problems 
identified: on the one hand, women’s bodies did not integrate their intervention in the 
social protection sphere; and, on the other hand, and conversely, the social actors 
intervening in labour and social protection policy-making did not prioritise women’s 
equal access to social rights. Considering the first aspect, women’s advocacy groups 
focused on legal changes but this, although necessary was not sufficient to attain gender 
equality, since advanced legislation could conceivably coexist with discriminatory 
practices. Moreover, the global conception of the social protection system was not
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challenged. The ‘technical’ character of social security was part of the explanation. The 
degree of technical knowledge and experience required to elaborate policy proposals was 
a fundamental obstacle to assessing the gender impact of social protection policies. Their 
framework of action was also conditioned by the structure o f the system in the sense that 
the occupational character of social protection already imposes limitations for a gender 
equality approach.
Considering the second aspect, the actors intervening in the policy process did not 
consider women as a group in need of specific policies. As previously argued, women 
were excluded from the group of ‘legitimate beneficiaries’ o f the social protection system. 
Furthermore, issues such as women’s rights were set up in opposition to objectives o f the 
social protection system. This last aspect was explored through meanings o f solidarity.
Solidarity and invisible ‘familialistic> assumptions
The concept o f ‘solidarity’ has been identified as a central legitimating criterion for 
social security performance and has been used in this research to evaluate how gender 
issues were conceptualised by the actors intervening in policy-making. Originally, the 
social protection system focused on the collective dimension of solidarity, which 
attempted to achieve social cohesion. This notion of solidarity was founded on a specific 
social structure where the family acted as a primary welfare institution. Informal networks 
of solidarity operated within the family structure compensating, to a large extent, for the 
fragile and selective state intervention. Progressively, a more individualistic conception of 
solidarity was introduced although women, either because they were outside the sphere of 
productive relations or because their membership was not strong enough were still being 
excluded from the relevant group that recognised a level of mutual interdependence. The 
fundamental problem identified with elaborated notions of solidarity was the 
unwillingness of the actors involved in policy-making to recognise gender inequality 
patterns in social rights’ provision and the importance of non-waged private work that 
women carry out at home.
Later changes in the ‘solidarity’ dimension of the social protection system, motivated 
by the economic sustainability of the system, did not take into account the implications of 
collective and individual dimensions o f solidarity in terms o f gender relations nor did it 
challenge assumptions on familialism.
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Welfare and Gender Regimes
For the purpose of this investigation, mainstream analyses of welfare regimes 
were lacking in two main aspects. Firstly, mainstream welfare typologies could not 
provide a framework for the analysis of gender and welfare state relationship. These 
typologies have always privileged the market-state nexus. By so doing, only the class 
divisions have been placed at the centre, leaving outside other social divisions such as the 
gender one. As has been pointed out in chapter 2, a new theoretical focus that would 
outline the implications of a systematic gender difference in terms of access to social 
rights based on the public/private division was needed. Gender models or ‘gender policy 
regimes’ are analytical attempts to discover the interaction of public and private spheres 
in the organisation of welfare and the awareness of the role of women as providers of 
welfare.
Secondly, mainstream studies of welfare regimes have generally failed to include 
the countries o f southern Europe into the analysis. However, it has been pointed out all 
the way through this research that the countries of southern Europe share common traits 
to the extent that it is possible to consider them as a fourth and distinctive regime-type, 
with reference to the work of Esping-Andersen (1990). Thus, although Spain has 
convergent and remaining divergent components with the rest of the European welfare 
states, it has been argued that the ‘Mediterranean model’ might go aside the conservative, 
liberal, and social-democrat regime-types.
Placing these two issues together, the common and specific features o f welfare 
state formation have different repercussions on gender relations and this brings new 
insights into the relationship between systems of welfare and gender. To develop the 
analysis further, I present the next table whereby the ‘southern model’ is placed alongside 
the ‘mainstream models’ using gender as the fundamental dimension of variation. The 
table supports the idea, introduced at the beginning of the study, that by including new 
countries such as Spain in the study of gender models o f social policy, new interactions of 
the public and private spheres in the organisation o f welfare arise, giving new insights 
into policy intervention.
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Table 8.1 Four Gender Policy Regimes
Regime
Attributes
Welfare
Regime
Ideology
Entitlement
Male Breadwinner or Separate Gender Roles Individual Eamer-Carer ‘Gathering 
General Family or Market Oriented or Dual Earner breadcrumbs’
Support
Corporatist/Statist Liberal
Division of labour 
Husband = earner 
Wife = carer
Unequal among 
spouses
Strict division o f labour 
Husband = earner 
Wife = carer
Social-democrat
Shared tasks 
Father = eamer-carer 
Mother = eamer-carer
Differentiated by gender Equal 
role
Mediterranean
Blurred division of  
labour
Father = earner 
Mother = carer and 
small earner
Unequal among spouses 
and among workers
Basis of  
Entitlement
Recipient of  
Benefits
Taxation
Employment
policies
Principle of  
maintenance
Head o f household
Supplements
dependants
Joint Taxation
Family responsibilities Citizenship or residence Principle of
maintenance/principle
Men as family providers Individual 
Women as caregivers
Joint Taxation
Deduction dependants Deduction dependants 
Priority to men Priority to men
Sphere o f Care Primarily private 
Caring Work Paid
Primarily private
Separate taxation 
Equal tax relief
Aimed at both sexes
Strong state 
involvement
Paid component to Paid component to
caregivers in the home caregivers in and
outside the home
Political Confessional/conserva Conservative-centrist
Tendency tive-centrist
Left
o f need 
Individual
Individual 
Minor deductions
Dualistic
Childcare primarily 
private
Elderly care public 
Unpaid
Corporatist-left
Source: Author’s elaboration from Sainsbury (1999); Korpi (1999); Trifiletti (1999) and this research’s 
findings.
Welfare states in southern Europe have common grounds with the ‘male 
breadwinner model’ o f the conservative tradition. The insurance systems are based on the 
protection o f labour market risks and therefore, the ideology and entitlement attributes 
support a sexual division o f labour whereby there is a main (male) income provider and a 
dependant family. However, welfare states in the south early developed features of 
specific nature.
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The notion of ‘gathering of breadcrumbs’ addressed by Trifiletti (1999) and used 
here to label the Mediterranean gender model seems to me a perfect description of what 
happens in the south. The idea is that within one family unit, individuals gather minor 
sources o f income from either some type of benefits or from the ‘different’ economies, 
i.e. formal and informal economies, which, although neither alone can provide a decent 
living, are of some value if combined with other incomes. For that reason, the welfare 
state is not based on the principle of a strict sexual division of labour (table 8.1) but rather 
a nebulous one, whereby, although there is a main (male) income provider, women 
contribute partially to the family income besides their role as full-time carers.
This entire income gathering happens behind close doors. The family plays a 
crucial role although ‘in the shadow’ and informally, since no real recognition is given 
through any explicit family programme. This is clearly evidenced in the cases of the 
recipient o f benefits and taxation (table 8.1) which, as in the case o f the individual-earner- 
carer model have an individual basis. Equally, care work is not paid, and so the state does 
not promote through concrete policies, the role o f women as carers. Therefore, the state 
acknowledges and implicitly allows these informal arrangements but it does not take on 
the responsibility of guaranteeing a family wage. There has always been an unspoken 
understanding of the fact that individuals that claim certain benefits might ‘hide’ other 
sources of income and that the public administration has almost no control over it. As 
Trifiletti argues:
“Social risks f o r  the individual against which com plex welfare regim es normally m obilise  
resources, are, in Mediterranean countries, coverable and in m ost cases covered in the first 
instance by the fam ily and often by the extended fam ily” (1999: 51).
The social protection system, does, however, give generous protection to a very 
specific social core group, and this is what creates the dualistic character o f the protection 
offered. According to Ferrera (1996), and as this investigation has shown, dualism and 
polarisation is a feature that distinguishes welfare states of southern Europe:
“This dualistic system o f  incom e maintenance tends to generate a peculiar polarisation 
within the social clientele o f  the southern welfare states. On the one hand w e find in these 
countries a group o f  hyper-protected beneficiaries w ho are (or have been) included in the 
citadels o f  garantism o  with job security. These groups receive generous replacement 
benefits for short-term risks and very high earnings related pensions when they retire. On 
the other hand, w e find large numbers o f  under-protected workers and citizens w ho only
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(occasionally) draw meagre benefits and may thus find them selves in conditions o f  severe 
hardship: typically irregular workers in weak sectors without job  security” (1996a: 20).
The ‘instrumental role of social security’ and the ‘patterns of neo-corporatism’ that 
have been previously described are largely responsible for this dual character. Moreover, 
this feature of welfare state performance needs to be closely related with a similar 
modernisation path in southern Europe. As Ferrera argues (1996b) the expansion of 
welfare benefits has played a notorious role in smoothing the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy and in consolidating the electoral roots of the new parties. 
The political tendency (table 8.1) is then a combination of corporatism and left forces 
inside and outside the political arena.
In Spain and in the other countries of southern Europe, this corporatist 
organisation of the social protection was, for a period of time, effective in reducing 
poverty in absolute terms although not so effective in providing women with the means 
for economic independence. The social protection system played a major role in social 
cohesion, since, in one way or another, the majority of individuals were socially 
integrated. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the dual conception of the social protection 
has intensified. Labour market flexibility has deepened the distance between the central, 
traditional male labour force, and peripheral workers, women and young people with 
precarious work conditions. Also, partly as a result of the new expectations of 
independence of women produced by access to universal rights, the traditional image of 
the extended and protective family has been blurred both as a symbol of identity and as an 
effective informal institution of welfare. Previous uniform and reliable family structures 
are being substituted by a number of ‘unreliable’ and heterogeneous forms in terms of its 
members, its functions and its role over time. Social protection systems are also 
challenged by population’s ageing, globalisation processes and the increased mobility of 
capital and labour, which impose a threat to previous understandings of the relationship 
between the market and the state.
One relevant question that has been posed in this investigation is the extent to 
which recent social protection reforms in Spain have taken into account new needs and 
risks. Another relevant issue for our analysis was to identify problems and advantages 
that the ‘southern welfare model’ faces in moving towards more gender-oriented social 
protection programmes. To face the challenges described the social protection systems
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should introduce changes to guarantee the economic and social sustainability o f the 
systems. According to EU reports (1997; 1998; 1999) the financing structures o f social 
protection systems should be reformed to allow for efficient reductions o f non-wage 
labour costs. Also, there has to be a reduction of the dependency ratio (the balance 
between the active and the non-active population). There is meant to be a debate on 
redefinition of responsibilities between those who pay and those who receive welfare. The 
dilemma is how to combine reduction in public expenditure with the promotion of social 
cohesion or to put in another way, how to avoid exclusion when selectivity in the 
provision of welfare increases. The financial aspects are most likely to impose changes in 
eligibility and entitlement criteria that will have an impact on the rights and obligations 
identified. The solution that has been proposed is to make benefit systems more 
employment oriented to become an integral part of an active employment policy and to 
allow individuals to get into or go back to work. On the other hand, the new gender 
balance fundamentally requires new arrangements for reconciling working and family life 
and new initiatives to strengthen the individualisation o f rights. The reconciling of 
working and family life is essential to fulfil women’s entrance into the labour market in 
equal conditions with men. This reconciling of working and family life would require the 
availability of public services for child and elderly care and the consideration, in 
entitlement rules, of periods outside the labour market due to caring activities. 
Furthermore, the individualisation of rights is the only possible way to answer to the 
changing patterns of family arrangements and women’s demand for independence. With 
increasing percentages of family breakdowns familialised benefits are both discriminatory 
and inefficient. Individualisation of rights would aim to stop the practice o f considering 
personal ties when ensuring social protection of individuals.
However, it has been pointed out that while social security reforms during the 
1990s in Spain were basically concerned with the financing structure to guarantee the 
economic sustainability of the social security system, not much attention was paid to the 
configuration of the benefits to include the new risks and needs. As described in several 
chapters, this resulted in the strengthening of previous patterns of inequality between men 
and women in the access and generosity of the benefits and ultimately created new trends 
of social exclusion. The 1996 Agreement, legally transformed into the 1997 law, modified 
the conditions of entitlement of the contributory pensions system to narrow the link 
between pensions level and total contributions made during working life. This 
concentration on the contributory side of the pension system makes sense in a moment
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when employment-friendly social protection systems are a priority. However, given very 
evident patterns of gender labour market segregation and the lack of reinforcement of the 
non-contributory system, the reform resulted in a general reduction o f the ‘solidarity’ 
component, being women the most negatively affected. Other alternatives in the 
configuration of the protection have been pretty much left aside and ignored in favour of a 
pure financial debate. Given the fact that the state is still unable to provide sufficient 
security to large sectors of the population, the family continues to play a major role in 
welfare provision. Moreover given the lack of measures aimed at reconciling working and 
family life and the individualisation of rights, the perspective of a more gender-oriented 
social protection system is not placed in the most immediate horizon.
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Appendix 1
Consideration on Methods
Interviews ’ material
All the interviewees were chosen by identifying their key positions on a given 
period. Interviewees were contacted by letter, with a brief explanation o f my research 
topic and the issues I wanted to raise in the interviews, so interviewees had a rough idea 
of what kind of information I wanted from them.
The interviews were conducted in two waves. The first one, in February 1999 
condensed the interviews with the former Prime Minister of Spain from 1982 to 1996; 
to IM’s directors; representatives of women’s unions bodies (TUW); and trade unions’ 
representatives (TU). The second wave of interviews was carried out in May 1999, to 
representatives o f the Ministry of Labour.
The interviews were semi-structured and were not pre-coded. They usually 
lasted from one to two hours. The issues and questions raised in the interviews varied 
according to the flow of the conversation. Although all the interviews were done with 
a topic guide schedule, new questions and arguments were introduced following the 
particular approach of the interviewee. In all of them there was interaction between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. Moreover, I raised other interviewees’ views on a 
particular issue to confront the opinions of the different respondents. What Melia 
(1997) asserts for informal interviewing can also be applied here:
“The data can be seen as an account o f  the interviewee’s opinions and view s, arrived 
at as a result o f  the interaction with the researcher. The effect o f  this interaction cannot 
be denied whether on the pragmatic ground that the interviewee’s talk is produced by 
the interviewer’s questions or on the theoretical ground that sym bolic interactionism  
rests on the assumption o f  the intersubjective construction o f  social reality” (M elia  
1997:34).
However, the existence of this interaction should not invalidate the data. Even 
if  we recognise that the information might have been given not just as the interviewees’
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experience but as a representation given the context of the interview, such information 
is considered as valid testimony. Otherwise, as happens in much qualitative research, 
we are tempted “to abandon the enterprise on the grounds that it is impossible to 
determine the status o f the data”(Melia 1997: 30).
Interviews ’ sample
Instituto de la Muier (IMF
IM1 Director of the IM from July 1988 to April 1991
Date: 19th of February 1999
IM2 Director of the IM from 1991 to 1993
Date: 12th of February 1999
IM3 Director of the IM from 1993 to 1996
Date: 19th of February 1999
Women’s Policy Machinery of Trade Unions (TUWI
TUW12 Director of the Women’s department UGT since 1993
Date: 18th of February 1999
TUW3 First director of the Women's Secretary CC.OO. from 1976 to 1978
From 1987 member of Forum Politico Feminista 
Date: 19th of February 1999
TUW2 Director of the Women’s Secretariat of CC.OO. since 1978
Date: 11th of February 1999
Trade Unions (TIP
TUI Head of the Institutional Relations Department of UGT since 1990
From 1984 to 1990 he has been upper-level civil servant.
Date: 18th of February 1999
TU23 Head of the Institutional Relations Department CC.OO
1 The first director, from 1983 to 1988 could not be reached, however, the three representatives 
interviewed were active members since 1983 and they have given their opinions on that first period.
2 The first director o f the Women’s Department could not be reached. TUW3 has been in charge o f the 
department since 1995 but has been an official o f the body since its creation.
3 The interview was appointed with the Head of the Institutional Relations dep. o f CC.OO. He preferred to
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TU2-2- Assistant of the Institutional Relations Department
TU2-3- Assistant of the Institutional Relations Department.
Date: 17th of February 1999
Ministry o f Labour (ML)
ML1 Secretario de Estado de la Seguridad Social from 1982 to 1996
Date: 5th of May 1999
ML2 Technical General Secretary Ministry of Labour and Social Security
(iSecretario General Tecnico) from 1982 to 1985; {Secretario General 
de Empleo y  Relaciones Labor ales) from 1985 to 1991.
Date: 4th of May 1999
ML3 General Director of Employment {Director General de Empleo) from
1982 to 1985; Ministry of Social Affairs Official {Subsecretario de 
Asuntos Sociales) and Member of the Advisory Council of the IM from 
1985 to1993.
Date: 4th of May 1999
FG Prime Minister of Spain 1982- 1996
Date: 10th of February
Topic guide for the interviews
Instituto de la Muier (IM):
- Creation of the IM
- Goals of the IM. Policies targeted.
- Social Policy Reforms (1985 Reform; 1990 Non-Contributory Pensions: Toledo 
Pact; 1996 Agreement)
- Labour market reforms (1992, 1994)
- Positive and negative aspects of the reform in terms of gender
- Family policies; childcare services; maternity leave
- Equality Programmes (PIOMs)
- Influence of EU Equality Programmes
- Evaluation of the I and II PIOM concerning social security legislation and labour 
market regulation
- IM’s administrative level and political power
- Intervention in the policy-making: mechanisms to intervene. The Advisory Council.
- Relationship with the government
Relationship with the women’s bodies of trade unions.
Relationship with the feminist movement
have his two assistants in the interview and the three interacted simultaneously as the interview went along.
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Women’s Department of UGT and Women’s Secretariat o f CC.OO (TUW)
- Social policy reforms (1985 reform; 1990 Non-contributory pensions; Toledo Pact;
1996 agreement)
- Positive and negative aspects of the reform in terms o f gender
- Labour market reforms (1992, 1994): flexibility versus security.
- Family policies; childcare facilities; maternity leave
- Equality programmes; equal opportunities policy; positive action
- EU equality programmes
- Intervention in policy-making (bargaining processes, institutional representation)
- Role o f women’s departments within the organisational structure of trade unions
- Staff, power resources, administrative level and budget of women’s department.
- Female representation in directives and responsibility positions
- Relationship with the IM
- Role in the configuration and further evaluation of the I and II PIOM.
- Role in the IM’s Advisory Council
- Participation of trade unions women’s department in IM actions.
- Relationship with the feminist movement
Institutional Relations Departments UGT-CC.OO. (TIP
- Social policy reforms (1985 reform; 1990 Non-contributory pensions; Toledo pact;
1996 agreement). Minimum pensions; direct and derived benefits; redistributive 
mechanisms; financing; configuration of benefits; occupational regimes
- Labour market reforms (1992, 1994)
- Organisational aspects: membership composition; elections; representation
- Collective bargaining and equal opportunities policy
- Relationship with the government; social agreements
- Relationship with Women’s Department Trade Unions
Ministry o f Labour and Social Security (ML)
Social policy reforms (1985 reform; 1990 Non-contributory pensions; Toledo pact; 
1996 agreement) Minimum pensions; direct and derived benefits; redistributive 
mechanisms; financing; configuration of benefits; occupational regimes
- Labour market reforms (1992, 1994)
- Family policies
- Equality programmes
- Relationship with the IM
- Channels of communication and co-ordination between the ML and the IM
- Role in the Advisory Council
- Degree of achievement of equal opportunity policies in the Ministry of Social 
Affairs.
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Units o f  analysis
All interviews have been fully transcribed and analysed manually. Once the 
analysis and the coding was finalised for each interview, they were grouped into the 
four main categories of social actors: IM, TUW, TU, and ML. The interview with the 
ex-primer minister has been analysed separately given the general contents of the 
interview and has been utilised solely for contextual information. Each group of 
interviews was then analysed by topics, each topic relating to an indicator o f the 
research question and to a group of codes. In order to submit the transcript to textual 
analysis, I started with a set of pre-existing codes to find regularities in the data and also 
to assign units of meaning to fragments of data. This first set of codes was deductively 
created from the research questions and indicators derived from the theoretical 
background, being prior, therefore, to the fieldwork. Codes are, thus, descriptive. But, 
although the starting point is the theoretical background, it is also true that new ideas, 
new concepts, and new relationships appeared while doing the fieldwork and also 
afterwards while doing the analysis. Therefore, there is a starting point of building 
theory but there are also elements of grounded theory from which new dimensions 
(codes) emerged, inductively derived from the study of the gathered material. Both 
sides stand in reciprocal relationships.
The elaboration of a second set of codes, less descriptive and more 
interpretative, was accomplished through the use of memos. Therefore, to a certain 
extent, the coding procedure has followed what Lincoln and Guba (1985) explained in 
their study cycle, “coding as a process of revision”: 1. Filling in (adding codes as new 
insights emerge) 2. Extension (returning to materials coded earlier and interrogating 
them in a new way) 3. Bridging (seeing new or previously not understood relationships)
4. Surfacing (identifying new categories) (Lincoln and Guba 1985 quoted in Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 62). Codes were normally applied to aggregate units: sentences and 
paragraphs depending on the meaning of each fragment of text. There was, frequently, 
more than one code for the same block of data.
However, not every piece of work has been coded. Since the interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured fashion, interviewees were encouraged to give opinions 
and speak freely about the issues. In many cases there were references to current
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situations and parallel issues that enriched the interviews, but that were strictly outside 
the present purpose. I have considered this information not relevant to the object of 
study and so they have not been part of the coding process, the selection relying on my 
interpretation. Reducing and ordering materials always represents compromise on 
selection and interpretation and it might be subjected to criticism. However the options 
I adopted were guided by the indicators and dimensions I was looking for given the 
approach lying behind of the research and the sort of features being searched. 
Notwithstanding, interviews were fully transcribed to have access to the primary data 
prior analysis and interpretation
Documentary material
Institute de la Muier (IM)
I PIOM 1988-1990 (Equal opportunities programme) IMdocl
IIPIOM 1993-1995 IMdoc2
Trade Unions (TU and TUW)
Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO):
1st Congress, 1978 
2nd Congress, 1981 
3rd Congress, 1984 
4th Congress, 1988 
5th Congress, 1991 
6th Congress, 1995
Social Security in Spain. Social Benefits and Financing 
(La Seguridad Social en Espana. Prestaciones 
Sociales y  financiacion), 1994
TUdocl 
TUdoc3 
TUdoc5 
TUdoc7 
TUdoc9 
TUdocl 1
TUdocl 3
First Conference CC.OO: a trade union for men and women 
(1° Conferencia Comisiones Obreras, un espacio
sindical para hombres y  mujeres), 1993 TUdoc 12
Union General de Trabajadores (UGT):
33 th Congress, 1983 TUdoc2
34th Congress, 1986 TUdoc4
35th Congress, 1990 TUdoc6
36th Congress, 1994 TUdoc8
201
Proposal for the future of Social Security in Spain 
(Propuesta de Progreso para la Seguridad Social 
en Espana), 1996
The Participation of Women in Spanish Trade Unions 
{La Participacion de las mujeres en los sindicatos 
en Espana), 1995
Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Socio-economic study of the Social Security System 
(Estudio-Economico Financiero del sistema 
de Seguridad Social 1964-1985), 1985
The Consultative paper 'the Orange Book'
(El Libro Naranja), 1985
Urgent measures for the Rationalisation of Social Security 
(Medidas Urgentes para la Racionalizacion de la Estructuray de la 
Accion Protectora de la Seguridad Social), 1985
Non-contributory pension law
{Ley de Pensiones No-Contributivas), 1990
Spain in the Threshold of the 21st Century 
{Espana en el Umbral del siglo XXI,
Estudio Economico-Actuarial), 1995
The Toledo Pact 
{Pacto de Toledo), 1995
Agreement on Rationalisation and Consolidation 
of the Public Pensions System 
{Acuerdo sobre Racionalizacion y  Consolidacion 
del Sistema Publico de Pensiones),1996
TUdocl 0 
TUdocl 4
Mldocl
Mldoc2
Mldoc3
Mldoc4
Mldoc5
Mldoc6
Mldoc7
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Appendix 2
Tables Chapter 4
Table A.1: Current expenditure on social protection in relation to GDP at market prices1
1980 1985 1990 1994 1995
EU 24.3 26.0 25.2 28.6 28.4
Belgium 28.0 29.3 26.9 27.0 29.7
Denmark 28.7 27.8 29.8 33.7 34.3
Germany 28.8 28.4 26.9 30.8 31.3
Greece 9.7 15.4 16.1 16.0 21.2
Spain 18.1 19.9 20.7 23.6 22.6
France 25.4 28.8 27.6 30.5 30.6
Ireland 20.6 23.6 19.4 21.1 19.9
Italy 19.4 22.6 23.6 25.3 24.6
Luxemburg 26.5 23.1 22.5 24.9 25.3
Scandin. 30.1 31.7 32.2 32.3 32.1
Portugal 12.8 14.1 15.0 19.5 20.7
UK 21.5 24.3 22.7 28.1 27.7
Source: MTSS. Anuario Estadisticas Laborales 1996
Table A. 2: Social protection expenditure by function in EU countries (SEEPROS)
Old Age Illness Invalidity Survivors Family Unemploy. Other
1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994
EU 34.1 36.0 26.0 24.3 9.1 9.0 9.2 7.7 9.2 6.8 5.3 7.2 5.2 4.6
Belgium 28.6 33.0 21.8 24.7 9.6 8.7 13.0 10.7 10.7 7.3 9.2 9.4 7.2 5.7
Denmark 35.1 36.6 26.7 17.4 8.4 8.8 0.5 0.1 9.9 10.0 10.8 11.3 8.5 15.8
Germany 28.8 31.0 28.3 27.0 8.8 9.0 13.9 10.2 9.1 6.9 3.1 6.9 8.1 9.0
Greece 56.3 56.2 16.3 14.9 9.7 9.5 9.8 10.6 2.6 0.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 5.4
Spain 30.8 32.6 26.8 26.0 7.8 8.1 10.3 10.0 2.9 0.8 15.0 17.4 6.5 5.1
France 35.3 37.2 26.2 26.2 6.2 5.9 8.6 6.5 10.7 8.2 4.3 6.1 8.6 10.0
Ireland 24.6 21.4 36.6 29.3 6.3 7.0 6.8 6.1 8.4 11.0 8.0 13.3 9.3 11.9
Italy 45.8 52.7 24.6 20.9 7.8 6.8 9.3 11.3 6.9 3.1 2.3 2.4 3.3 2.8
Luxemb. 30.9 31.8 23.4 23.8 12.9 11.2 16.6 14.2 8.8 12.1 0.6 1.2 6.9 5.6
Scandin. 26.0 31.3 25.0 21.8 23.4 21.8 5.0 5.5 8.1 4.8 6.1 10.4 6.4 4.4
Portugal 32.6 32.9 29.0 34.2 13.5 11.2 6.8 7.2 6.8 4.4 2.7 5.3 8.5 4.8
UK 40.6 40.1 23.0 19.2 8.8 11.7 2.2 1.3 11.4 10.2 8.2 6.1 5.8 11.4
Source: MTSS, Anuario Estadisticas Laborales 1996
1 Social protection includes the following functions: Old age, Illness and Health; Invalidity; Survivors; 
Family; Unemployment; Housing; Social exclusion (not classified elsewhere) (SEEPROS in MTSS 1997).
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Table A. 3: Percentage o f  the Budget fo r Categories o f Contributory Pensions
Retirement Invalidity Widow Orphan Family
1986 52.53 29.42 15.86 1.85 0.33
1989 53.10 27.74 17.19 1.66 0.31
1992 52.24 26.42 18.36 1.49 0.29
1996 53.43 24.46 18.13 1.23 0.30
Source: Anuario El Pais 1996,1997
Table A. 4: Percentage o f  Claimants for categories o f Contributory Pensions
Years Retirement Invalidity Widow Orphan Family
1986 45.72 26.88 24.13 2.84 0.42
1989 45.96 25.83 25.09 2.70 0.43
1992 46.22 25.02 25.78 2.56 0.42
1996* 47.57 23.65 26.20 2.36 0.60
Source: Anuario El Pais 1996,1997 
*: Estimates
Table A. 5: Ratio Women/Total o f Retirement, Invalidity and Widow Contributory 
Pensions
1982 1986 1989 1994 1996
R I R I R I R I W R I W
Total 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.96 0.32 0.33 0.95
Under 30 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.98 0.18 0.97
30-39 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.94 0.23 0.93
40-49 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.95 0.24 0.93
50-54 0.57 0.25 0.50 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.96 0.23 0.95
55-59 0.20 0.31 0.05 0.27 0.04 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.97 0.06 0.23 0.96
60-64 0.23 0.34 0.14 0.31 0.12 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.97 0.15 0.27 0.96
65-69 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.96 0.28 0.33 0.96
70-74 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.37 0.96 0.31 0.37 0.96
75-79 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.48 0.38 0.45 0.96 0.37 0.42 0.96
80 and older 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.51 0.95 0.45 0.52 0.95
Source : Data from MTSS, Anuario Estadisticas Laborales 
Note : R : Retirement, I : Invalidity, W : Widow
Table A. 6: Contributory retirement pensions by sex and age group -percentages-
1982 1986 1989 1994 1996
men women men women men women men women men women
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
50-54 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
55- 59 0.06 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
60-64 5.68 2.62 9.86 2.56 12.2 4.1 12.6 4.4 12.8 4.7
65- 69 26.54 22.95 26.63 21.71 29.4 21.8 29.2 22.0 28.9 23.0
70-74 28.90 27.02 24.42 25.18 24.0 23.9 24.5 24.0 24.6 23.1
75- 79 21.55 22.48 20.42 22.88 15.5 19.6 15.2 19.1 16.0 19.3
80 17.18 24.72 18.42 27.62 18.8 30.6 18.4 30.4 17.7 29.9
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Table A. 7: Contributory invalidity pensions by sex and age group -percentages -
1982 1986 1989 1994 1996
men women men women men women men women men women
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Under 30 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.3
30-39 3.0 1.3 3.0 1.7 2.9 1.8 2.8 2.0 3.4 2.1
40-49 8.9 3.7 7.9 3.6 7.9 3.9 6.9 4.7 8.3 5.3
50-54 11.1 7.0 10.0 5.4 8.0 4.2 6.2 4.1 7.4 4.4
55- 59 16.9 14.0 16.4 12.2 15.1 9.8 10.3 7.3 10.7 6.6
60-64 21.5 20.9 22.4 20.0 20.7 17.5 17.7 14.6 18.1 13.4
65- 69 19.0 24.6 18.7 21.7 20.7 21.6 19.4 20.0 18.6 18.5
70-74 11.5 16.9 11.6 19.2 12.7 19.0 16.9 18.9 15.9 19.1
75- 79 4.6 7.4 6.0 10.6 7.2 13.8 10.8 14.9 10.0 14.8
80 3.6 3.7 3.4 5.3 4.3 8.0 8.6 13.5 7.0 15.5
Table A.8: Contributory widow pensions by sex and age group -percentages-
1982* 1985 1989 1994 1996
women women men women men women men women
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Under 30 0.37 0.31 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.20
30-39 1.8 1.63 1.81 1.4 2.12 1.36 2.25 1.33
40-49 5.13 4.6 3.80 4.2 4.64 3.74 5.06 3.56
50-54 5.79 5.39 3.44 4 3.18 3.64 3.60 3.56
55-59 8.5 8.2 7.05 7.5 4.50 5.62 4.16 5.01
60-64 1.3 11.7 10.67 10.7 8.08 9.97 7.99 9.33
65-69 14.3 13.6 12.12 14.5 11.52 13.67 11.47 13.39
70-74 17.8 17 13.56 15.6 15.89 17.09 15.75 17.12
75-79 16.7 17.2 18.26 17.3 15.63 16.41 15.97 17.11
80 18.2 20.3 29.29 24.4 34.30 28.26 33.63 29.36
Source: Data from MTSS 1996
*: Data by sex for widow benefits is not available before 1989
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Table A.9: Ratio women/men invalidity and retirement pensions by age group*
1982 1985 1990 1993 1996
Invalid.
m w w/m m w w/m m w w/m m w w/m m w w/m
Total 22.7 17.8 0.78 33.2 24.7 0.74 52.1 37.4 0.72 66.7 46.7 0.70 79.3 55.2 0.70
under 30 21.6 17.7 0.82 32.2 30.0 0.93 50 45 0.90 64 56.9 0.89 71.7 62.4 0.87
30-39 22.0 19.0 0.86 33.8 28.8 0.85 52.2 47.2 0.90 67.1 60.6 0.90 79.3 71.9 0.91
40-49 21.3 17.4 0.82 32.4 25.2 0.78 52.2 41.4 0.79 68.3 55.9 0.82 82.3 70.2 0.85
50-54 21.6 16.7 0.77 32.1 23.6 0.74 50.8 36.7 0.72 67.1 48.7 0.73 81.3 60.2 0.74
55-59 23.0 16.9 0.73 33.9 24.0 0.71 53.6 37.2 0.69 70.9 48.5 0.68 87.5 59.2 0.68
60-64 23.9 17.4 0.73 35.0 24.5 0.70 53.6 36.9 0.69 69.4 47.1 0.68 84.4 56.5 0.67
65-69 24.2 18.9 0.78 35.4 26.6 0.75 55.7 39.9 0.72 70.2 49.6 0.71 82.9 58.5 0.71
70-74 21.4 18.3 0.86 30.7 24.7 0.80 51.2 37.9 0.74 64.6 46.4 0.72 75.8 54 0.71
75-79 19.9 17.0 0.85 28.1 23.5 0.84 45.1 34.7 0.77 58.4 43 0.74 69.6 50.6 0.73
80
Retir.
21.5 15.4 0.72 28.3 20.5 0.72 41.9 32.2 0.77 51.6 39 0.76 60.4 45.3 0.75
Total 23.6 18.1 0.77 35.1 24.3 0.69 58.6 37.5 0.64 74.7 46.8 0.63 89.8 55.4 0.62
50-54 16.1 13.7 0.85 30.6 19.1 0.62 61.3 27.6 0.45 76.5 31.7 0.41 61.9 40.5 0.65
55-59 36.0 32.0 0.89 44.8 51.0 1.14 88 77.3 0.88 87.5 60.9 0.70 61.9 40.5 0.65
60-64 31.2 20.4 0.65 49.0 33.0 0.67 62.3 45.3 0.73 72.8 53.2 0.73 89.3 62.9 0.70
65-69 28.2 19.5 0.69 43.1 27.5 0.64 69.4 43.8 0.63 85.8 54.9 0.64 101 63.6 0.63
70-74 23.1 18.1 0.78 34.5 24.4 0.71 63.1 39.9 0.63 81.5 50.5 0.62 94.8 59.7 0.63
75-79 20.3 17.5 0.86 28.8 22.7 0.79 51 35.2 0.69 69.8 45 0.64 88.1 54.5 0.62
80 18.6 17.1 0.92 26.0 22.1 0.85 41.4 31.9 0.77 53.9 38.4 0.71 66.3 45.1 0.68
Source : MTSS, Anuario Estadisticas Laborales 
*: Average pensions thousand pesetas/month
Table A. 10: Ratio women widow contributory pension/men retirement contributory 
pension*
1982 1990 1993 1996
R W W/R R W W/R R W W/R R W W/R
Total 23.6 13.8 0.58 58.6 31.8 0.54 74.7 41.6 0.56 89.8 48.7 0.54
Under 30 17.6 35.4 42.7 48.8
30-39 17.3 38.7 47.8 54.4
40-49 15.6 37.5 47.6 56.8
50-54 16.1 15.0 0.93 61.3 35.1 0.57 76.5 44.8 0.59 61.9 54.3 0.88
55-59 36.0 14.5 0.40 88 33.8 0.38 87.5 42.5 0.49 61.9 51.4 0.83
60-64 31.2 13.7 0.44 62.3 33.1 0.53 72.8 44.9 0.62 89.3 53.2 0.60
65-69 28.2 13.8 0.49 69.4 34.2 0.49 85.8 44.4 0.52 100.9 53.2 0.53
70-74 23.1 13.4 0.58 63.1 31.7 0.50 81.5 41.3 0.51 94.8 50 0.53
75-79 20.3 13.2 0.65 51 29.9 0.59 69.8 38.7 0.55 88.1 46.7 0.53
80 18.6 12.9 0.69 41.4 28.7 0.69 53.9 37.7 0.70 66.3 43.4 0.65
Source : MTSS, Anuario Estadisticas Laborales 
*: Average pensions thousand pesetas/month
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Table A l l :  Proportion o f minimum pensions in relation to the minimum wage
1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Retirement 
Over 65 o f age 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Under 65 o f age 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
Invalidity
Severe Disablement 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.16 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.23
Absolute Incapacity 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Total Incapacity 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Partial Incapacity 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Widow
Over 65 o f age 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Under 65 o f age 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.72
Orphan 
Not absolute 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Absolute 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79
In Family Favour 
With additional pension 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Sole beneficiary > 65 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
Sole beneficiary < 65 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55
Illness 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Source: Author’s elaboration from MTSS, Anuario Estadisticas Laborales
Note: The minimum amounts for retirement, permanent invalidity and provisional invalidity correspond to 
the categories “without dependant spouse”.
Table A. 12: Percentage o f  contributory pensions by regimes
1976 1980 1985 1990 1995
General Regime 1793345 49.9 1636386 37.2 2245345 41.6 2834164 45.8, 3608374 51.3
Autonomous W. 217029 6.0 347308 7.9 508239 9.4 631338 10.2 752675 10.7
Agrarian (dep.) 499648 13.9 505306 11.5 616115 11.4 667239 10.8 673126 9.6
Agrarian (auton.) 722613 20.1 763582 17.4 870139 16.1 940496 15.2 944141 13.4
Miners 61822 1.7 63079 1.4 71583 1.3 75154 1.2 : 76350 1.1
Seamen 53385 1.5 74692 1.7 92739 1.7 108467 1.8 . 121520 1.7
Domestic Service 56758 1.6 80781 1.8 135093 2.5 172912 2.8 199177 2.8
Labour Accidents 143800 ; 4.0 156763 3.6 163251 3.0 169628 2.7 , 177738 2.5
Professional Desease 43605 1.2 41993 1.0 41111 0.8 42217 0.7 44672 0.6
S.O.V.I.** 728544 16.6 652902 12.1 545520 8.8 441905 6.3
TOTAL 3592005 100 4398434 100 5396517 100 6187135 100: 7039678 100
Source: Informe Economico-Financiero 1998
** Until 1979 S.O.V.I. pensions were included within each regime
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Table A. 13 Distribution o f retirement pensions by years o f  contribution by regimes
Yrs Contribution GR SRI SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 SR6 SR7
15 5.36 46.11 36.66 44.85 30.85 7.77 61.36 20.93
16-20 2.91 20.74 3.52 6.46 0.7 0.25 20.13 6.22
21-25 3.91 14.2 2.2 3.27 1.26 0.67 9.94 5.09
26-30 6.1 9.08 2.94 3.83 3.44 1.51 5.32 5.78
31-34 7.73 4.77 3.13 3.38 4.82 2.46 2.11 6.07
35 and more 73.99 5.1 51.55 38.21 58.94 87.34 1.15 55.91
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Informe Economico-financiero 1998 {Data 1st o f  January 1997).
GR:General Regime; SRI: self-employed workers; SR2: agrarian workers (dependent); SR3: agrarian 
workers (self-employed); SR4: seamen; SR5: miners; SR6: domestic service; SR7: illness; SR8: 
professional disease.
Table A. 14: Percentage o f pensions over the total that receive minimum complements
GR SRI SR2 SR3 SR4 SR5 !SR7 SR8
1987 24.34 62.65 50.37 54.21 37.06 16.7 61.25 25.65 29.62
1990 31.71 62.65 57.66 58.13 38.48 17.78 63.01 25.9 31.08
1994 29.67 58.42 57.89 55.39 35.62 16.95 59.04 23.36 27.73
1997 27.22 48.74 54.8 51.42 31.97 15.32 57.88 21.03 25.54
Source: Informe Economico-Financiero 1998
208
Appendix 3
Types of pensions and Cash Benefits 
- A selected Audit -
Standard Risks:
1.Employment Injuries and occupational Diseases. Temporary Incapacity
2. Maternity leave
3. Permanent Invalidity:
3.1.- Contributory:
3.1.1.- Social Security Regime (Partial; Total;
Absolute; Severe Disablement)
3.1.2.- S.O.V.I. Retirement
3.2.- Non Contributory
4. Old Age
4.1.- Contributory:
4.1.1.- Social Security Regime
4.1.2.- S.O.V.I. Retirement
4.2.- Non Contributory
5 Survivors (Contributory)
5.1.- Death Grant
5.2.- Widow’s/widower’s pension
5.2.1.- Social Security Regime
5.2.1.- S.O.V.I. widow(er)’s pension
5.3.- Orphan
5.4.- Familiar favour
6. Family Benefits (Prestaciones Familiares por Hijo a Cargo)
6.1.- Contributory
6.1.- Non Contributory
7. The Income Tax System (I.R.P.F.)
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TABLE A.15: TYPES OF PENSIONS AND CASH BENEFITS
PENSION TYPE Field of 
application
R isk p ro tected C onditions B enefits1 %  M P in relation  
to SM I1
T em poral
Incapacity
employees Loss o f  income for em ploym ent or 
non employment injuries and 
occupational disease
Active employees registered with social security 
Common illness: contribution period o f  180 days within 
the 5 years right before the cause o f  incapacity. 
Employment/non employment injuries/occupational 
disease: no preliminary contribution record is needed.
Economic Allowance:
-Common disease and non-employment 
injuries: 60%  o f  the RW  /75%  from the 
21st day o f  the sick leave onwards 
-Employment injuries and occupational 
diseases: 75% o f  RW
52%
P erm anen t
Invalidity
Contributory (RGSS)
1. Permanent Partial 
Incapacity for 
Habitual Occupation
2. Permanent Total 
Incapacity for 
Habitual Occupation
3. Permanent Total 
Incapacity for Work
4. Severe 
Disablement
employees and 
assimilated
Loss o f  income from physical or 
functional disabilities
Active employees registered with Social Security 
33% as the minimum level o f  incapacity for work 
Contribution period o f  15 years (3 years within the 10 
years right before the fait originator). Non qualifying 
period from non-employment related injury if  the insured 
person is regularly insured or assimilated thereto.
1. Lump-sum equal to 24 times RW used 
for calculation o f  sickness
2. Annuity 55% o f  RW (increased by 20% 
if  over 55 and out o f  work
3. Annuity o f  100% o f  RW
4. Same as 2 plus 50% if  assistance o f  a 
third person is needed.
1. 82% 
2. 82%
3. 82%
4. 120%
Contributory (SOVI) workers that had 
the conditions to 
receive a SOVI 
pension in 1967
Loss o f  income for old age 
invalidity , incapacity for w ork and 
severe disablement
1.800 days o f  contribution to the extinguished regime o f 
Retiro Obrero Obligatorio
Annual fixed amount pension by Royal 
Decree
59%
Non Contributory Physic or psychic 
handicap people 
with lack o f  
economic 
resources
Lack o f  economic resources in 
invalidity situations
Lack o f  economic resources for living, with no claim to a
contributory pension
Legal residence in Spain
Over 18 and under 65 years o f  age
To have a  degree o f  handicapped equal or over 65%
Annual fixed amount pension by Royal 
Decree
55%
M atern ity  Leave employees Loss o f  income for giving birth or 
adopting a child
Active employees registered with Social Security 
Minimum period o f  contribution o f  180 days within the 5 
years right before birth (or adoption)
Economic subsidy 100% o f  the RW
1 RW: Reference wage
2 Minimum pensions and Minimum Wage (SMI) o f 1996.
TYPE OF 
PENSION
Field of application Risk protected Conditions Benefits %  M P in relation to 
SM I
Old Age
Contributory employees Loss o f  income originated by the 
cessation o f  working activity due 
to em ployees’ age o f  retirement
- Contribution record o f  15 years ( 2  years within the 8 
years immediately preceding
- Legal retirement age: 65 years
A  unique for-life pension. Percentage o f  
RW corresponding to claim ant’s 
contribution record. From 50% for 10 years 
to 100% for 35yrs
82%
72%
SOVI same as contributory 
SOVI Invalidity
Idem - 1.800 days o f contribution to SOVI or to be affiliated to 
the extinguished regime o f  Retiro Obrero Obligatorio
- To be unable to receive any other Social Security 
Pension
Same as contributory SOVI invalidity
59%
Non Contrib. Persons in need o f 
protection and 
w ithout enough 
economic resources
Risk o f  poverty due to old age - Lack o f  economic resources (the total o f  the income is 
equal or under the pension’s amount)
- To have the legal residence in Spain
- 65 years o f  age and over
A fixed unique for life pension
55%
Survivors
Surviving Spouse
(Contributory
RGSS)
Spouse o f  the former 
worker
Lack o f  economic resources due to 
the death o f  the breadwinner
- The deceased must has been affiliated to social security 
scheme and must have contributed for at least 500 days in 
the 5 yrs preceding death, contribution record is needed 
only if  the death is provoked by a non-professional disease
- To have lived with the deceased insured on a regular 
basis
A unique for-life pension 45% o f  the RW 82%
72%
SOVI widow (er) 
pension
Spouse o f  the former 
worker
Lack o f  economic resources due to 
the death o f  the breadwinner
If the claimant died before 1-1-67 and was affiliated to 
SOVL-10 yrs o f  marital cohabitation; 50 yrs o f age or to a 
certain degree o f  handicap; No right to Social Security 
pensions system.
If  the claimant died after 1-1-67 and it is not a pensioner o f  
SOVI: 1.800 days o f  contribution to SOVI or to have been 
affiliated to the Retiro Obrero Obligatorio
A  fixed for life pension
59%
Orphan Children o f  the 
former employee
Contingency o f  survival that 
protects the paternal-filial 
relationship
- The orphan has to be the legal son or daughter o f  the 
deceased person
- The orphan has to be under 18 yrs o f age unless there is 
total incapacity to work
Absolute: 65% o f  RW 
Partial: 20%  o f  the RW
N ot AbsoI.:24% 
Absolute: 79%
Other Beneficiaries 
“In Family Favour”
Family members o f 
the deceased others 
than the surviving 
spouse and children
Loss o f income due to family 
dependence to the deceased person
-The cohabitation with the deceased person at least two 
years before death
- Economic dependency o f  the deceased person, lack o f 
subsistence resources and absence o f other family 
members with the possibility and obligation o f  helping in 
the subsistence
- No right to any other type o f  pension from the state
- If  the cause o f  death was a common disease: contribution 
period o f  500 days o f  the 5 yrs immediately before death
Temporary allowance o f  20%  o f  RW for 
old-age pension. Payment o f  12 monthly 
rates for children or brothers/sisters aged 
18-45
W ith add. Pension: 
24%
sole beneficiary >65 
63%
sole beneficiary <65 
55%
TYPE OF 
PENSION
Field o f application Risk protected Conditions Benefits
%  M P in relation to 
SM I
Family Benefits
Contributory 
(Family Benefit for 
a dependant child)
employees with 
children under 18 
and lack o f 
economic resources 
or with dependant 
handicapped 
children
- Risk o f  poverty for households 
with children under 18
- Disabled children
- To be affiliated to Social Security
- To have salaries no superior to a certain quantity 
established by the legislation (1 million pesetas per year in 
93)) no earned income limit for a handicapped child
- The cohabitation between the child and the claimant and 
the economic dependence o f  the child from the claimant
- Age limit: 18 (no age limit for serious disablement)
- A degree o f  handicapped over 33% if the child is under 
18 and over 65%
Economic allowance o f  fixed quantity Child under 18: 
Non-disabled:5%  
Disabled: 9% 
children over 18: 
>65%  dis.55% 
.75% dis. 82%
Non Contributory 
(Family Benefit for 
a dependant child)
idem Idem - Not to meet the requirements o f affiliation and 
contribution o f  the Social Security System
- Annual incomes must not be superior to a level 
established by the legislation (no earned income limit for a 
handicapped child)
- The cohabitation between the child and the claimant and 
the economic dependence o f  the child
- A degree o f  handicapped over 33% if the child is under 
18 and over 65%
Economic allowance o f  fixed quantity
1.- Employment Injuries and Occupational Diseases. Temporal Incapacity (Incapacidad Temporal-IT-) 
Concept: Economic Allowance as a substitute of the salary. The worker is temporary and involuntarily 
disabled to work due to employment injury or occupational disease. IT covers the risk o f loss o f  income of  
the employee. Sanitary assistance is covered from the moment that IT exists.
Historical Background: Before the Basic Law of Social Security (LBSS) o f 1963, the insurance regime 
was dependant on the cause or risk that originated the right of an incapacity pension. The LBSS established 
that there was only one category of risk: the lose o f income. According to that new consideration the 
protection was meant to be the same independently o f the risk o f origin. However, the uniformity has only 
been achieved in the length of the allowance but not in its amount (Action Protectora 1993: 79).
Before the 42/1994 Law o f 30 of December Temporal Incapacity was divided into two 
contingencies: Transitory Incapacity and Provisional Invalidity. The 42/1994 law converted the contingency 
into a unique category: Temporal Incapacity (Incapacidad Temporal).
Field o f  Application: Employees 
Conditions:
- Active employees registered in the social security system.
- In case o f common illness: contribution period o f 180 days within the five years right before the cause of  
the injury.
- In case of employment or non employment injuries and occupational disease no preliminary contribution 
record is needed.
Benefits:
- Common disease and non-employment injuries: 60% of the Reference wage from the first until the 
20th day o f the sick leave and 75% from the 21st day onwards.
- Employment injuries and occupational diseases: 75% of the Reference wage.
Duration o f  Benefits: Maximum duration of 12 moths. It might be extended to 6 months.
Administration : National Institute of Social Security. For certain cases the administration o f the benefits 
can be made through the Mutual Aids Funds.
2.-Maternity Leave
Concept: Maternity leave means the suspension o f the job contract for 16 non-stop weeks. The mother can 
distribute that period o f time between the pregnancy, the birth and the after birth period. It is however 
compulsory to leave 6 weeks of the maternal leave for the after-birth period. If both parents work, the 
mother can chose to leave the last 4 weeks of the maternity leave to the father.
In case o f adoption, if the child adopted is under nine months, the period o f maternity leave is o f  
eight weeks, if the child is over nine months and under five years old, the maximum leave o f absence of the 
mother is eight weeks.
Both parents can have access to this right, if  both are workers only one can have the right to it.
213
Historical Background: Before the 42/1994 law, maternity leave was considered as a category of 
Employment injuries and occupational diseases. From 1994 maternity leave begins to be considered as a 
contingency to be protected in itself. The category includes maternity leave and adoption.
Length of the allowance and other changes over time:
166 Article. Law o f labour contract {Ley Contrato de Trabajo)
6 weeks of voluntary leave before birth 
6 weeks o f compulsory leave after birth.
25.4 Article. Law o f Labour relations 1976 {Ley Relaciones Laborales 1976):
6 weeks of voluntary leave before birth
8 weeks o f compulsory leave after birth
48.4 Article. Statute of Workers {Estatuto de los Trabajadores)
14 weeks of voluntary leave (max.) to be distributed before and after giving birth 
3/1989, Law 3 of March
16 non-stop weeks, o f which 6 have to be after birth.
75% o f the salary and 1 year of contribution before giving birth 
42/1994 Law (Art. 33):
Maternity leave is no longer considered within the category o f Employment Injuries and Occupational 
Diseases ( Incapacidad Laboral -IL-) but as a contingency to be protected in its own.
100% o f the salary and 180 days o f contribution within the 5 years right before giving birth.
The law also established that the subsidy were to be paid directly by the INSS. Until then, maternity 
allowance had to be given by the employer directly to the employee. Therefore, the entrepreneurial 
costs o f maternity allowances have been reduced.
The voluntary leave has also been reformed: during the first year o f absence the same employment is 
preserved. The law gives facilities to employ substitute workers during the period of absence. Since 
1995 these “substitute” contracts have reductions for employers in the contributions to Social Security 
(95% the first year; 60% the second; and 50% the third). These “substitute workers” have to be 
recipients o f unemployment benefits for more than one year.
The first year o f voluntary leave is considered as contributory period.
Conditions: Active employees registered with Social Security. Minimum period o f contribution o f 180 
days, within the 5 years right before birth (or adoption). In part-time contract only the working hours are 
taking into account.
Benefit: Economic subsidy that corresponds to 100% of the correspondent reference wage.
3.- Permanent Invalidity
The concept o f invalidity has been deeply modified as a consequence o f the establishment of non 
contributory pensions in 1990. From that date onwards invalidity pensions within the Social Security 
system consist o f the current contributory pensions and the new non-contributory pensions. Since 1994 all 
invalidity pensioners are converted into retirement pensioners when they reach 65 years o f age.
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3 . 1 Contributory Invalidity
3.1.1.- Contributory Invalidity o f the Social Security General Regime
Concept: Permanent invalidity is the situation o f a worker who, after having undergone prescribed 
treatment, suffers from physical or functional disabilities, capable o f objective assessment and probably 
definitive in character, which render him or her partially or totally incapable o f work
Categories
.- Permanent Partial Incapacity for Habitual Occupation (2 afios a tanto alzado): Invalidity that implies for 
the employee an incapacity no less than 33% in his or her usual performance for his or her ordinary 
employment, without making the worker incapable of his/her fundamental tasks.
.- Permanent Total Incapacity for Habitual Occupation {total)’. It disqualifies the worker for all or at least 
the fundamental tasks o f his/her usual profession but not for any other occupational activity different from 
his/her normal one.
.- Permanent Total Incapacity for Work (Absoluta): Complete incapacity o f the employee for any type of 
professional activity
.- Severe Disablement: Complete incapacity o f the employee for any type of professional activity, been also 
necessary for him or her the assistance o f a third person.
Field o f  Application: Employees and assimilated 
Conditions
- Active employees registered with Social Security
- Minimum level o f incapacity for work: 33%; period for which cover is given: from the date on 
which the responsible body declares claimant to be permanently incapable (normally this will be an 
assessment o f the existing permanent invalidity).
-Minimum period of membership for entitlement:
Regularly insured person under 26 years: half time between the age 16 and the date o f onset o f condition 
giving rise to invalidity.
Regularly insured person over 26 years: a quarter o f the time between the age o f 20 and the event giving 
rise to invalidity, subject to a minimum of 5 years. One fifth of contribution period must full within the 10 
years prior to the causal event. Larger qualifying period if not regularly insured.
No qualifying period o f invalidity results from non-employment related injury if  the insured person is 
regularly insured or assimilated thereto.
Benefits: The economic subsidies vary depending on the degree o f invalidity recognised, the contingency 
responsible o f the invalidity and the fact that the employee was registered with Social Security at the 
moment o f the event.
a) Permanent Partial Incapacity for habitual occupation: Lump-sum equal to 24 times monthly reference 
wage used for calculation of sickness
b) Permanent Total Incapacity for Habitual Occupation: Annuity of 55% of reference wage. Increased by 
20% if over 55 and out of work (pension of 75%). Pension may, at request of beneficiary, be commuted to a 
lump-sum payment equal to 84 times monthly pension (minus 12 months for every year the claimant’s age 
exceeds 55, subject to a minimum of 12 months).
c) Permanent Total Incapacity for Work: Annuity 100% of the reference wage.
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d) Severe Disablement: Amount payable for permanent total incapacity for work plus 50% if  the disabled 
needs the assistance of a third person.
Administration: National Institute of Social Security (in certain cases also the Mutua Patronal)
Adjustment: Pensions are adjusted at the beginning of each year in line with forecast changes in the 
Consumer Price Index (IPC) for the year in question. Adjustment is automatic
Incompatibility: Invalidity pensions may not be drawn concurrent with any other pension under the 
General Scheme except a widow’s pension. They are also incompatible with lump-sum payments in respect 
of lesions, mutilations and deformities, except where the latter are entirely unconnected with the factors 
giving rise to invalidity. (MISSOC)
Taxation: Since 1994, permanent incapacity benefits are fully liable to taxation. Permanent total incapacity 
(for work) benefits and benefits for severe disablement are not subject to taxation.
3.1.2.- SOVI’ Contributory Invalidity:
Concept and Historical Background: The Compulsory Insurance o f Old Age and Invalidity (El Seguro 
Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez -S.O.V.I-.) was created in 1947. This pensions are given to old people, ill 
or invalid people that are not capable o f working. The beneficiaries are claimants that had the conditions to 
receive a SOVI pension in 1967.
Categories: Three main situations are protected by SOVI:
- Old age invalidity: a person of 60 years old and considered with permanent total incapacity for habitual 
occupation.
- Permanent total incapacity for habitual occupation: from 50 years old onwards.
- Severe disablement: between 30 years old and less than 50 
Conditions
a) To demonstrate the lack of economic resources and to be unable to receive any other pension o f the 
Social Security System.
b) The incapacity cannot be originated by a labour accident or professional disease.
c) To have contributed to SOVI during 1.800 days or to be affiliated to the extinguished Regime of Retiro 
Obrero Obligatorio
Benefits: A unique for-life pension o f fixed quantity (fixed each year by Royal Decree)
3.2.- Non contributory Invalidity
Concept : First introduced by the 26/1990 Law of 20 o f December o f non contributory benefits, Non 
contributory pensions are designed for those individuals without a claim to a contributory pension, either 
because they did not pay contributions or because they were not in the contributory scheme for the 
minimum period.
Non contributory pensions, as contributory pensions, include not only the economic subsidy but 
also the sanitary assistance and have the right to social services o f the Public Administration.
Conditions
a) Lack o f economic resources for living.: when the total annual income is under the annual amount o f the
pension. If in an household there is more than one person entitled to a pension, 70% of the amount of
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the pension is added for each additional person. If the pensioner lives by her/himself, then the total 
sources of annual income plus the amount o f the pension much be inferior to the limit o f  accumulation 
o f  resources:
Limit o f  Accumulation o f  Resources in the Economic Unit (1998)
Number o f members Without descendants in 1 st grade
1 521.920 ptas/year
2 887.264 ptas/year
3 1.252.608 ptas/year
4 1.617.952 ptas/year
(Informe Economico-financiero 1996: 241)
b) To have the legal residence in Spain
c) Age: over 18 years and under 65
d) To have a degree o f handicapped equal or over 65%
Benefits: Annual fixed amount 
If the beneficiary has a degree o f handicapped equal or over 75%, the amount of the pension is increased in 
50% the actual amount
Administration: Institute o f Social Services (INSERSO) or Regional Administrative Body when the 
competencies are transferred.
Financing : State contribution to the Social Security budget
4.- Old Age
4.1.- Contributory Retirement
4.1.1- Contributory Retirement (Social Security Regime)
Concept: Contributory retirement pensions protect the risk o f lack o f income originated by the cessation of 
working activity once the employee has reached the minimum age of retirement.
Historical Background
-1908: Creation of Instituto Nacional de Previsidn; Regime of old age pensions that creates a 
voluntary social insurance based on the free contracting of life annuity or temporal income.
-1909: Retiro Obrero Obligatorio
-1939 Transformed on: Old Age Subsidy (Subsidio de Vejez)
-1947 Compulsory Insurance of Old Age and Invalidity ( Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez 
-S.O.V.I-).
-1966 Law o f Social Security. It substitutes the old system o f SOVI, establishing a unique pension 
system. Pensions’amounts vary depending on the contributory background and reference wage
- 1974 General Law of Social Security. It changes the definition o f the risk protected. It is no 
longer called Old Age pension, now it becomes Retirement Pension
- 1978 Constitution (article 50).
With descendants in 1st grade
2.218.160 ptas/year 
3.131.520 ptas/year 
4.044.880 ptas/year
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Field o f  Application: Employees
Conditions: Legal retirement age: 65 years. The Legal Retirement Age can be reduced by Royal Decree in 
certain cases for certain professionals within the special regimes. Early retirement from 60 years of age is 
also possible. The amount of the pension is reduced by 8% for each year before the age of legal retirement 
(coeficiente reductor).
Minimum period of membership: Entitlement depending on a contribution record o f the last 15
years, including at least 2 years in the 8 immediately preceding retirement.
Benefits: Amount o f  the Pension. Changes over time
1972 Law: Percentage o f reference wage corresponding to claimant’s contribution record, on a scale 
running from 50% for a minimum period of 10 years to 100% for 35 years, with an increase o f 2% for each 
year within this range.
Law 26/1985
Percentage of reference wage corresponding to claimant’s contribution record, on a scale running from 
60% for a minimum period of 15 years to 100% for 35 years
The reference wage is obtained by dividing by 112 the sum of the contribution assessment figures for 
the 96 months immediately preceding retirement. The figures for the 72 contribution months most 
distant from retirement are adjusted in line with consumer price trends between the month in question 
and that 25 months from retirement.
Agreement 1996
Percentage o f reference wage corresponding to claimant’s contribution record, on a scale running from 
50% for a minimum period of 15 years, 80% for a period o f 25 years and 100% for 35 years 
Adjustment: (Same as Invalidity)
Accumulation with earnings: Pension is suspended in case o f earnings from employment/self-employment. 
Taxation: Benefits are fully liable to taxation
4.1.2- Contributory Retirement of S.O.V.I.
Concept (see Contributory Invalidity of SOVI)
Conditions
- 65 years of age
- To have contributed to SOVI during 1800 or to be affiliated to the extinguished regime o f Retiro Obrero 
Obligatorio {before 1940);
- To be unable to receive any other pension of the Social Security System.
Benefit (Same as Contributory Invalidity of SOVI)
4.2.- Non contributory Retirement Pension
Concept: First introduced by the 26/1990 Law of 20 of December, through which the right for a retirement 
pension is extended to all citizens, independently o f their contributory or non contributory background and 
the time o f contribution if they lack economic resources and need protection.
Non contributory pensions, as contributory pensions, include not only the economic subsidy but 
also the sanitary assistance and have the right to social services of the Public Administration.
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Field o f  Application: Persons in need o f protection and without enough economic resources 
Conditions:
- Lack of economic resources: the person is considered as not having enough economic resources 
when the total of her/his income is equal or under the amount of the pension. If the claimant shares a 
household with other people ( spouse, relatives,...) then the claimant has right to a pension when the total o f 
resources o f all the members of the household is under or equal the amount o f the pension plus the 70% for 
each additional member of the household.
- To have the legal residence in Spain
- 65 years o f age and over 
Benefits: Annual fixed amount
Incompatibility: Non contributory pensions may not be drawn concurrent with assistentialist pensions 
regulated under the 45/1960 Law of 21 of July. They are also incompatible with General non contributory 
minimum at the regional level.
Administration: Institute o f Social Services (INSERSO) or Regional Administrative Body when the 
competencies are transferred.
5.- Survivors
The unified protection for death and survivors begins with the Basic Law o f Social Security of  
1963 (La Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) and the Social Security Law o f 1966 
Categories
1.- Surviving spouse
2.- Orphan
3.- Other Beneficiaries( Supervivencia de Familiares)
4.- Other Benefits (Death grant)
Field o f  Application: Employees and dependents.
5.1.- Surviving spouse:
5.1.1.- Widow(er)’pension . General Regime o f Social Security 
Conditions
1. At the time of death: affiliated to social security scheme and either enjoying active contributor 
or equivalent status; in receipt of an invalidity or old-age pension; must have contributed for at least 500 
days in 5 years preceding death only if the death is provoked by a non-professional disease. Otherwise, no 
preliminary contribution record is needed.
2. The Widow or widower must have lived with the deceased insured on a regular basis. In case of 
separation or divorce, pension is shared between beneficiaries in proportion to the length o f period of 
cohabitation. In case o f extramarital unions there is no right for a pension.
Before the 30/1981 law, besides the marital status, the condition of cohabitation or living together 
was also required. The surviving spouse had to have lived ordinarily with the death spouse. The Resolution
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of 23 o f June 1989 o f the Social Security General Secretary decided to cancel the condition o f cohabitation 
in order to receive the pension.
The benefit is however cancelled if  the widow marries again.
Benefits: 45% of Reference wage (total amount o f paid wages subject to contributions over a continuous 
period o f 24 months within the last seven years are divided by 28) for deceased person. Where deceased 
insured was in receipt o f an invalidity or retirement pension, reference wage will be the same as was used 
for calculation of that pension, but subject to such increases and upward adjustments in corresponding death 
and survivor’s benefits since date on which invalidity or retirement pension was awarded.
Incompatibility: Widow benefits are incompatible with any source of income from employment or with a 
retirement and invalidity benefits.
5.1.2.- Widow pension o f S.O.V.I.
Concept (See Contributory Invalidity o f SOVI)
Conditions: It differs depending on the date of death and whether the claimant was or was not affiliated to 
the SOVI system
a) Before 1 o f January 1967:
If the claimant was affiliated to SOVI
- 10 years o f marital cohabitation
- 50 years o f age or to have a certain degree o f handicap
- no right to any other pension of the different regimes that conform the Social Security System. 
The pension becomes effective when the claimant is 65 years old.
b) After 1 January 1967:
If the claimant is not a pensioner of SOVI but has 1.800 days of contribution to SOVI or has been affiliated 
to the Retiro Obrero Obligatorio, the surviving spouse has right to a pension in the same conditions as in 
the case above.
Benefit: Monthly pension o f fixed quantity.
5.2. Orphan
Concept: Contingency o f survival that protects the paternal-filial relationship.
Conditions: The orphan has to be the son or daughter o f the deceased person. The legal nature or the 
conditions of such relationship do not interfere in the right for a pension. Orphan pensions are extinguished 
when the orphan is 18 years old ( if there is total incapacity to work this limit o f age is not applied).
Benefits
Orphan children having lost one parent Where there is a spouse with entitlement to a survivor’s 
pension: 1 child: 20%; 2 children 40%, 3 or more: 55% of reference figure. Sum of widow’s and orphan’s 
pensions paid may not exceed reference figure used for calculating those pensions, except as regards the 
minimum amount. Where there is no spouse with entitlement to a survivor’s pension: 1 child: 20%, 2 
children 40%; 3 children 60%; 4 children 80%; 5 or more: 100%.
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Orphan children having lost both parents 1 child: 65% of reference figure; 2 children 85%; 3 or more 
100% or more.
Compatibility: Orphan pensions are compatible with any other earned income o f the surviving spouse or 
of the orphan him/herself. The pension is also compatible with a widow pension.
5.5.- Other Beneficiaries (Supervivencia de Familiares)
Concept: Pension given, under certain conditions, to family members of the deceased others than the
surviving spouse and the children
Conditions
a) Grandchildren and brothers or sisters under 18 or over that age if  they have a permanent incapacity for 
work and if they are orphans o f father
b) Mothers and grandmothers (60 years old and older): widows, single or married whose husband has a 
permanent incapacity for work.
c) Fathers and grandfathers: 60 years old ( and older)or with a permanent incapacity for work 
General conditions:
- The cohabitation with the deceased person at least two years before his/her death
- Economic dependency
- No right to any other type o f pension from the state
- Lack o f subsistence resources and absence o f other family members with the possibility and obligation of  
helping in the subsistence-
- If the deceased person was employed by the time of death, he or she has to have covered a minimum 
period o f contribution o f 500 days of the 5 years immediately before the date o f death, this condition is 
only required when death is cause of a common disease.
Benefit: It consists o f a temporary allowance of 20% of reference figure for old-age pension. Payment of 12 
monthly rates for children or brothers/sisters aged 18-45.
Amount: 20% of the reference wage for each member entitled to receive the benefits. If there are several 
family members entitled for a pension the limit is the same as the one applied for widow and orphan 
pensions, 100% of the reference wage of the deceased person.
5.6 Other Benefits: Death grant: 5.000 ptas (amount that has not been readjusted since 1967).
6.- Family Benefits (Prestaciones fam iliarespor hijo a cargo)
6.I.- Economic allowance
Historical Background: The general category of ‘Family Protection’ was first established with the Basic 
Law o f Social Security o f 1963. Subsequently, the General Law of Social Security of 1974 developed the 
principal laws o f the Family Protection. In 1985 Law of urgent measures for the rationalisation o f the 
structure and action of the Social Security protection modified the previous legislation establishing the 
familiar protection to give priority to families with low income or less protected (unemployed, pensioners 
and low income employees).
In 1990 (26/1990 law o f 20 of December) non contributory family benefits were introduced.
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Concept: Economic allowance for each child under 18 or over that age if he/she is defined as handicapped 
in a degree equal or above 65% (if the child is under 18 the degree o f handicapped has to be above 33%).
In 1990 two types o f family benefits are established: contributory and non contributory benefit, 
while the first one needs the affiliation and contribution to the Social Security System the second one is 
designed for those cases where affiliation and contribution are not achieved.
Conditions:
6.1.1.- Family Benefit for a dependant child (Contributory)
a) Employees affiliated to Social Security that fulfil the conditions required and with incomes not superior 
to a certain quantity which is established by the legislation (for 1993 annual incomes could not be over a 
million pesetas with one dependant child and plus 15% for each additional dependant child). In the case o f a 
handicapped child - whether under or over 18 - there is no earned income limit (over 33% of handicap if 
the child is under 18 and over 65% if the handicapped is over 18).
b) Pensioners o f any contributory category with a dependant child or a handicapped child can also receive 
the family benefit if they do not exceed the minimum level o f income required.
c) The cohabitation between the child and the claimant (father or mother), and the economic dependence of 
the child from his/her father/mother are two compulsory conditions to receive the benefits.
d)The age limit is 18 years of age for non disabled and there is no age limit for serious disablement. 
Benefits: Economic allowance every six months for child under 18 benefit, and monthly for child over 18 
and a degree o f handicapped equal or over 65%. There are supplements that vary with income. No benefit if 
the family income per year exceeds one million pesetas. This amount increases by 15% per dependant child 
up from the second child
6.1.2.- Family Benefit for a dependant child ( Non Contributory)
Concept: Designed for those claimants that do not meet the requirements of affiliation and contribution to
the Social Security System
Conditions
a) Annual incomes must not be superior to a certain quantity which is established annually by Royal Decree 
( 1.128.000 ptas per year for 1996). In the case of a handicapped child - whether under or over 18 - there is 
no earned income limit, (over 33% of handicap if the child is under 18 and over 65% if the handicapped is 
over 18)
b) The cohabitation between the child and the claimant (father or mother), and the economic dependence of 
the child from his/her father/mother are two compulsory conditions to receive the benefits.
Benefit: Fixed annual amount
Incompatibility: The two types: contributory and non-contributory are incompatible. If both come together, 
the contributory one will prevailed over the non contributory.
Family benefit is also incompatible with any other similar subsidy o f the different regimes of the 
Social Security.
The claimant o f the family benefit subsidy cannot be a pensioner o f the contributory, non 
contributory, assistential pensions or the General non contributory Minimum of the regional level.
222
Taxation: Cash benefits are fully liable to taxation 
Administration: INSS. National Institute o f Social Security
Financing: The economic allowances for handicapped child (contributory and non-contributory) and the 
non-contributory economic allowance for child under 18 are financed through State transfer to the Social 
Security budget. The contributory economic allowance for child under 18 is financed directly through the 
Social Security Budget.
6.2 .-Other benefits
Extended leave of absence of three years maximum to look after the children. During the first year 
o f the extended leave o f absence the employee has the right of his/her occupation. The period o f extended 
leave o f absence is considered as a contribution period to the Social Security,
(regulated in 3/1989 law and 26/1990 Law o f 20 o f December).
7. The Income Tax System (IRPF)
Background: In 1964 the I.G.R.P.F. (Impuesto General de la Renta de Personas Flsicas) was created. The 
family was the unit o f taxation and only the income coming from work was subject to taxation.
In 1978 the ffancoist tax system was transformed to introduce more progressivity and 
redistribution between high and low incomes. The family remained as the unit o f taxation. Under this 
reform a number of tax deductions were established to compensate the burden o f dependants for the main 
earner within a family.
In 1989, a sentence o f the Supreme Court (Tribunal Constitucional) declared that the consideration 
o f the family as the unit o f taxation was against the Constitution o f 1978 which protects the right of every 
citizen to intimacy and also protects the family as an institution. The Court considered that none of these 
rights were considered in the tax system since members of a family unit were obliged to joint taxation and 
thus their incomes could not be kept private and also the family as an institution was not protected because 
the system penalised families with more than one earner.
As a consequence of the sentence, in 1989 a transitional law was created (Ley de Adaptacion de los 
Impuestos sobre la Renta y  el Patrimonio) valid until 1991. From this moment the individual is the unit o f  
taxation and joint taxation remains optional for married couples. A number o f mechanisms still existed to 
encourage joint taxation.
The law 18 o f 1991 gives the final configuration of the tax system I.R.P.F.{Impuesto de la Renta 
de Personas Flsicas). The option was to create a taxation system o f strict individual character in its basic 
design. The income splitting and other mechanisms that make joint taxation attractive to families are 
discharged.
Family Tax Deductions
Before 1991
General: Tax deduction depending on the number of members o f the family with earnings ( in 1985 
this was substituted by the deduccion variable for families with more than one earner (effective until 
1991)
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The housewife bonus (Marriage deduction was cancelled in 1991)
Dependant children: children under 25 leaving in the household and with earnings under the minimum 
wage
Age: tax relief for each member o f the family over 70 years of age.
Dependant elderly and handicapped: tax relief for each old person and/or handicapped living in the 
household.
Table A. 16: Family Tax Deductions 1979-1991 (pesetas)
Year General Marriage Children Age Old Relatives Handicapped
1979 15.000 8.500 6.000 3.000 5.000 8.000
1980 15.000 10.500 8.000 5.000 6.500 28.000
1981 15.000 12.500 10.000 7.000 8.000 30.000
1982 15.000 14.500 12.000 9.000 10.000 32.000
1983 16.500 16.500 13.000 11.000 12.000 36.000
1984 17.000 18.000 14.000 11.000 12.000 36.000
1985 17.000 20.000 15.000 12.000 12.000 38.000
1986 17.000 21.000 16.000 12.000 12.600 40.000
1987 17.850 22.050 16.800 12.600 13.200 42.000
1988 35.000 17.600 13.200 13.600 44.000
1989 36.000 18.100 13.600 14.300 45.300
1990 38.000 19.000 14.300 15.000 47.600
1991 40.000 20.000 15.000 15.000 50.000
Source: Alvarez 1999
After 1991
The number o f tax deductions were reduced. The ‘general tax relief and the housewife bonus were 
eliminated. The age for dependant children was extended to 30 and since 1995 a slightly further reduction 
is applied for the second, third and forth child. In the case of old relatives also a small increase in the 
deduction applies according to whether the dependant is under or over 75 years o f age.
Table A. 17: Family Tax Deductions 1992-1998 (pesetas)
Year Children Old Relatives Age Handicapped
1st 2nd 3rd Under 75 Over 75
1992 20.000 20.000 20.000 15.000 30.000 15.000 50.000
1993 20.000 20.000 20.000 15.000 30.000 20.000 50.000
1994 20.000 20.000 20.000 15.000 30.000 20.000 52.000
1995 20.700 20.700 25.000 15.000 31.000 15.500 54.000
1996 21.500 21.500 26.000 16.000 32.000 16.000 56.000
1997 22.100 22.100 26.700 16.500 32.900 16.000 56.000
1998 25.000 35.000 50.000 16.500 32.900 20.000 56.000
Source: Alvarez and Carrascal 1999
The 1991 reform defined two types o f family in the case of optional joint taxation:
Family integrated by the two spouses with their children (if any)
Family integrated by the mother or the father and the child(ren) independently of their marital status.
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